Andrews University

Digital Commons @ Andrews University
Master's Theses

Graduate Research

2012

Protology and Eschatology in the Writings of John C.
Polkinghorne: a Study of Contrastive Roles of Scripture
H Nicholas De Lima
Andrews University, nicholas.delima@cst.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.andrews.edu/theses
Part of the Religious Thought, Theology and Philosophy of Religion Commons

Recommended Citation
De Lima, H Nicholas, "Protology and Eschatology in the Writings of John C. Polkinghorne: a Study of
Contrastive Roles of Scripture" (2012). Master's Theses. 36.
https://digitalcommons.andrews.edu/theses/36

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate Research at Digital Commons @ Andrews
University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons @ Andrews University. For more information, please contact repository@andrews.edu.

Thank you for your interest in the

Andrews University Digital Library
of Dissertations and Theses.

Please honor the copyright of this document by
not duplicating or distributing additional copies
in any form without the author’s express written
permission. Thanks for your cooperation.

ABSTRACT

PROTOLOGY AND ESCHATOLOGY IN THE WRITINGS OF JOHN C.
POLKINGHORNE: A STUDY OF CONTRASTIVE
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Name of researcher: H. Nicholas De Lima
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Date completed: November 2012
Problem
The focus of this thesis is to address the problem of the contrastive roles of Scripture in
protology and eschatology in the writings of John C. Polkinghorne. On the one hand,
Polkinghorne rejects a univocal understanding of Gen 1-2, by invoking symbolic/analogical
language for Gen 1-2, so that he can accept scientific protology. On the other hand, Polkinghorne
introduces an apparent, relative univocity of biblical language in order to obtain his eschatology,
contrary to the claims of pure scientific eschatology. This seems to suggest a dimension of
internal methodological and theological incoherence in his system.
Methodology
This thesis provides a descriptive systematic and evaluative analysis of the contrastive
usage of Scripture in Polkinghorne’s protology and eschatology.

Chapter 1 provides a brief introduction, outlines the objective and describes the research
methodology and delimitations of the study. In chapter 2, Polkinghorne’s scientific and
theological methodology is analytically described. Chapters 3 and 4 present two case studies:
protology and eschatology. Chapter 5 critically compares and contrasts the two case studies and
presents the conclusion to this thesis and recommendations for further study.
Conclusions
The thesis concludes that Polkinghorne’s symbolic interpretation of biblical protology
and his relatively univocal interpretation of biblical eschatology suggests a problem in his
hermeneutics, which affects his theological understanding of protology and eschatology.
Polkinghorne does not clearly state his criteria for maintaining this distinction between his
theological understanding of protology and eschatology. If theological language in protology is
interpreted as symbolical rather than univocal, then eschatological language could be interpreted
as symbolic as well in order to maintain consistency.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Introduction
Physicist and theologian, John Polkinghorne, is one of the leading and respected voices1
in the ongoing debate about the complementary relation between science and theology. He has
attained his reputation through his prolific writing, authoring over thirty books while writing
extensively in academic journals and contributing chapters in various books. Polkinghorne
believes that both disciplines can inform one another, and he proposes doing theology in the
context of science. Employing a bottom-up approach,2 Polkinghorne describes his method with
reference to how a scientist works, “We look to evidence for what we are asked to believe.
Bottom-up thinkers proceed from the basement of phenomena to the superstructure of theory.”3
He wants a theology that is evidence-based, which would render it credible because it attempts to
attain rational justification for its motivated beliefs.

1

Alister E. McGrath, Science & Religion: A New Introduction, 2nd ed. (Chichester, West Sussex,
U.K.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010). McGrath writes, “One of Polkinghorne’s most significant achievements is
to establish a firm place for natural theology in apologetics and theology. Natural theology is, in
Polkinghorne’s view, perhaps the most important bridge between the worlds of science and religion” (217).
2

John C. Polkinghorne, Traffic in Truth: Exchanges between Science and Theology (Minneapolis,
MN: Fortress, 2002), 49. Polkinghorne writes, “It is both possible and fruitful to conduct theology in the
context of science, not because these two forms of the search for truthful understanding are without
significant differences from each other, but because underlying their surface distinctions there is a common
sharing in openness to reality which makes them intellectual cousins under the skin. Theology and science
are partners in the human quest for truth and understanding, gained through the search for motivated belief”
(John C. Polkinghorne, Theology in the Context of Science (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009),
40).
3

John C. Polkinghorne, Belief in God in an Age of Science (New Haven, CT: Yale University
Press, 1998), 84.

1

While the dialogue between science and theology may take place primarily in the areas of
cosmology and protology, the relationship has extended into other fields such as eschatology.4
Can a modern cosmology respond to the question of what will be the final destiny of this planet
and all of its inhabitants and how the end will take place? Scientific eschatology presents a
pessimistic viewpoint concluding that all life will be annihilated as a result of cosmic
catastrophes. There are two general scientific hypotheses concerning how the earth will be
terminated, either by way of a cosmic collapse or perpetual expansion. Because of the scientific
nature of its methodology, this paradigm is designated as being factual5 and does not offer any
optimism for a better and meaningful future.
Polkinghorne, who is cutting new paths in eschatology, claims that scientific eschatology
should be taken seriously, but he acknowledges that theology provides the answer to the final
destiny of this planet and its tenants. Scientific eschatology does not provide any hope, but a
theological eschatology provides a hopeful future, and this hope is anchored on the eternal
faithfulness of God, the Creator and Redeemer of history.
The role of cosmological presuppositions cannot be overstated. Polkinghorne rejects a
univocal reading of the biblical account of the origin of the universe while endorsing a symbolic

4

John C. Polkinghorne, "From Physicist to Priest," Dialog 35 (1996): 138.

5

On the one hand, science, according to Polkinghorne, “cannot claim the achievement of final
truth. It must always remain open to possibility of a radical revision of parts of its story” (John C.
Polkinghorne, Science and Theology: An Introduction (London: SPCK, 1998), 11). He adds, “Science is
not perceived as dealing with clear and indubitable facts, while other disciplines have to be content with
cloudy opinions. On the contrary, all human knowledge is personal knowledge, though science’s power to
manipulate the object of its investigation and to put it to the experimental test gives it a technique of
confirmation not available in other realms of experience, such as personal encounter, where the integrity of
the other demands a greater degree of restrained respect” (ibid., 17). On the other hand, Polkinghorne views
scientific achievements to have a “tightening grasp of an actual reality” (John C. Polkinghorne, One World:
The Interaction of Science and Theology (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), 24).

2

interpretation of the biblical text.6 As an evolutionary scientist and a theistic evolutionist,7
Polkinghorne accepts scientific protology and claims to be a creationist8 in the sense that “the
mind of God lies behind its [creation’s] marvelous order and the will of God behind its fruitful
history.”9 At creation, God, out of kenotic love,10 allowed his creation to develop and create itself

6

Three traditional approaches to theological language are the equivocal, univocal, and analogical
sense. An equivocal understanding implies that the same word is used twice with unrelated meaning: the
“bark” of a dog and the “bark” of a tree. Analogy is between univocity and equivocity. Words share similar
meanings when applied to the finite world and to divine reality. “Similarity is by way of analogy rather
than by way of equality. Thus, God’s love is like the love that a father or mother has . . . but it is so
different that, though we can posit analogy, w cannot posit equality between the two concepts.”
Understanding a word univocally implies that the meaning is the same in two different settings even though
there may be degrees of difference: “the pole is tall,” and the “tree is tall.” The idea “tall” is understood
exactly the same in the two cases. The same is true when a word is applied to finite reality or to divine
reality: “God is holy,” is the same as “St. Peter is holy,” with the only difference being degree. (For a more
complete overview of all three approaches, see H. Wayne House and Kyle A. Roberts, Charts on
Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel, 2006), 67-72). Carl Henry argues in favor of a univocal
approach by writing, “Only univocal assertions protect us from equivocacy; only univocal knowledge is,
therefore, genuine and authentic knowledge. . . . Unless we have some literal truth about God, no similarity
between man and God can in fact be predicated” (Carl F. H. Henry, God, Revelation, and Authority, vol. 3
(Waco, TX: Word Books, 1979), 364). Works on theological discourse include David K. Clark, To Know
and Love God: Method for Theology (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 2003); Frederick Ferré, Language,
Logic and God (New York: Harper & Row, 1961); Langdon Gilkey, "Cosmology, Ontology, and the
Travail of Biblical Thinking," The Journal of Religion 41 (1961): 194-205; Langdon Gilkey, Religion and
the Scientific Future (New York: Harper & Row, 1970); Ronald Nash, The Word of God and the Mind of
Man (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 1982); Dan R. Stiver, The Philosophy of Religious Language: Sign, Symbol &
Story (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1996).
7

John C. Polkinghorne, "The Universe as Creation," in Intelligent Design: William A. Dembski &
Michael Ruse in Dialogue, ed. Robert B. Stewart (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2007), 173. According to
Polkinghorne, creation is a collaborative process between God and his creatures. This is made possible
because of the Creator’s kenotic love that allows creation to create itself and be itself. This understanding is
also an attempt to assist theology with the challenges and difficulties of theodicy. He comments, “The
thought of creaturely self-making . . . is the theological way to interpret evolution. . . . It can be claimed
that a world of that kind of evolving fruitfulness is a greater good than a ready-made creation would have
been. Yet that goodness has a necessary cost. . . . In an evolving world, the death of one generation is the
necessary cost of the new life of the next.” For a biblical and theological repudiation of the necessity of
death and soteriological implications, see John T. Baldwin, "The Geological Column and Calvary: The
Rainbow Connection—Implications for an Evangelical Understanding of the Atonement," in Creation,
Catastrophe and Calvary, ed. John T. Baldwin (Hagerstown, MD: Review and Herald, 2000).
8

Polkinghorne, "The Universe as Creation," 178. He comments, “Like other theists, I am a
creationist in the true sense of believing that the divine will is the source of the universe’s being and the
divine purpose is expressed in its history, but I am certainly not a ‘creationist’ in the curious North
American sense of believing in a flat-footed literal interpretation of the first two chapters of Genesis”
(ibid.).
9

Ibid., 172.

10

Ibid., 173. Kenotic love comes from the Greek word (kenwsi/ß) for emptiness. In this sense, it is

3

through gradual evolvement, not “instantaneous magic.”11 As a result of this idea of becoming,
death became a necessary cause for the development of life.12
Although Polkinghorne accepts scientific protology, as a theologian, he is cognizant of
the problems a scientific eschatology presents and therefore rejects it because the ultimate future
lies in the hands of a faithful God, not in scientific extrapolation.13 In biblical or apocalyptic
eschatology, not in a realized eschatology,14 life culminates with the creation and establishment of
a new heaven and new earth as revealed in sacred Scripture. All suffering will be brought to a
close while creation and humanity will recover from its deterioration.15 God takes the initiative to
create from the old, ex vetere.16 The hope of a new heaven and a new earth, in order to be

used as an indication of God’s self-limiting activity. “The gift of love must always include some due degree
of independence granted to the objects of love. Recognizing this has led to many contemporary theologians
to understand the act of creation to be an act of creatorly kenosis, involving a divine self-limitation in order
to permit the created other truly to be itself and, indeed, to make itself.” Theistic evolution has to answer
the problem on how it correlates a loving, powerful Creator with a God who stands by and watches his
creation develop through death. This leads to another question,Why would God then take a different stance
in the new creation? If he is powerful and able, would it not have been easier for him to do such a thing
during the first creation? Polkinghorne claims that kenotic creation is a two-part activity: First, for the
purpose of freedom, beings truly being themselves, and second, God desires to draw those who will freely
come (Polkinghorne, Theology in the Context of Science, 158).
11

Polkinghorne, Theology in the Context of Science, 156.

12

Polkinghorne, "The Universe as Creation," 173.

13

John C. Polkinghorne, The God of Hope and the End of the World (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 2002), 12.
14

Ibid., 99. A realized eschatology, according to Polkinghorne, is an “inadequate expression of
Christian hope. This life is too hurtful and incomplete to be the whole story. . . . Without a transcendent
future, many are condemned to a loss of good that no process solely within history could ever restore to
them” (ibid.).
15

Polkinghorne, Theology in the Context of Science, 155, 157. According to Polkinghorne, God
can transform the old into the new. True human life is psychosomatic and restoration is re-embodiment
through an act of resurrection. Both humanity and the entire universe will participate in God’s new
creation.
16

Polkinghorne, The God of Hope and the End of the World, 116.

4

credible, should include elements of continuity and discontinuity17 and be grounded on the love of
a powerful and active God who is concerned with the well-being of his creatures.18 There is value
to Polkinghorne’s eschatology and his endeavor to develop a credible eschatology from a
Christian perspective in light of the hopelessness of a purely scientific eschatology is promising.
Revelation is not propositional, according to Polkinghorne; rather, it is experiential,19
consequently needing the assistance from other domains in order to achieve a unity of knowledge.
Statement of the Problem
Polkinghorne suggests that a scientific eschatology is not consonant with the biblical
notion of a new creation. Although he is committed to the scientific interpretation of protology,
he diverges on his methodology when discussing eschatology, even assigning an authoritative
role to Scripture. On the one hand, Polkinghorne rejects a univocal understanding of Gen 1-2 by
invoking symbolic/analogical language for Gen 1-2, so that he can accept scientific protology. On
the other hand, Polkinghorne introduces univocity of biblical language in order to obtain his
eschatology, contrary to the claims of pure scientific eschatology. This seems to suggest a
dimension of internal methodological and theological incoherence in his system.

17

Ibid., 12-13. Polkinghorne writes, “While it is for theology to say what it can about the ‘new’
that God will bring into being, if that new is to be understood as the eschatological transformation of the
old, then science may have some modest role to play in clarifying what will be the necessary degree of
continuity required” (ibid.).
18

Ibid., 95. Polkinghorne adds that “to sustain true hope it must be possible to speak of a God who
is powerful and active, not simply holding creation in being but also interacting with its history, the one
who ‘gives life to the dead and calls into existence the things that do not exist’ (Romans 4.17).” For
Polkinghorne, “God is the God of hope because God is the God of past, present and future” (ibid., 101).
19

Polkinghorne, Theology in the Context of Science, 4. He also writes, “A misunderstanding of the
nature of the Bible has led some Christians to believe that it contains all necessary truth about pretty well
everything. This leads, for example, to attempt to read Genesis 1 not as a profound assertion of the
theological truth that everything exists only because of the will of God (“And God said, let there be . . .”),
but as a divinely dictated scientific textbook, saving us the trouble by giving us an itemized account of how
the universe began. When modern scientific insight differs from this picture (as it mostly does in detail),
then the science must be manipulated and made to conform. This attempt of conquest leads to creation
science, falsely so-called” (Polkinghorne, Traffic in Truth: Exchanges between Science and Theology, 7).

5

On what basis does Polkinghorne reject a univocal understanding of protology while
affirming univocity for a biblical understanding of eschatology? How does this apparent
contradictory and faulty hermeneutic impact the theology of his protology and eschatology? This
is the hermeneutical/theological problem addressed by this thesis.
Statement of Purpose
The purpose of this study is two-fold. First, the study provides a descriptive overview of
Polkinghorne’s protology and eschatology and his theological attempt to resolve the dissonance
between pure scientific eschatology and the biblical notion of a new creation. In doing so, the
study examines his hermeneutical approach in rejecting univocal language for biblical protology
but employing univocity for biblical eschatology. Second, by providing two significantly
different theological approaches, the study critically evaluates his theological system for possible
internal consistencies or inconsistencies associated with his eschatological framework in light of
his treatment of protology.
Problem Justification
Prior research on Polkinghorne has been conducted in a few dissertations and theses.20
However, there is a lacuna in scholarly work regarding Polkinghorne’s methodology in relation to
protology and eschatology. This study is unique because no major work has compared or

20

For example, Stephen Bishop, “The Relationship of Science and Religion: A Study of the
Writings of Revd Dr John Polkinghorne, FRS” (M.A. thesis, University of Bristol, 1998); Elmer W.
Brewer, “The Approaches of John Polkinghorne, Arthur Peacocke, and Ian Barbour for the Integration of
Natural Science and Christian Theology” (Ph.D. dissertation, Southern Baptist Theological Seminary,
1995); Edward M. Hogan, “Whether Theology is a Science?” (Ph.D. dissertation, Boston College, 2001);
Robert E. Powers, “Science and Religion: Toward a Unitary View: Perspectives from Ian Barbour and John
Polkinghorne” (M.Div. thesis, Emory University, 1996); David Glenn Tully, “Critical Realist Faith: John
Polkinghorne’s Theology for a Scientific Culture” (M.Div. thesis, Emmanuel School of Religion, Johnson
City, TN, 1999). Recent published dissertations include, Astrid Dinter, Vom Glauben Eines Physikers:
John Polkinghornes Beitrag Zum Dialog Zwischen Theologie Und Naturwissenschaften (Mainz: MatthiasGrünewald-Verlag, 1999); Saether Knut-Willy, Traces of God: Exploring John Polkinghorne on Theology
and Science (Trondheim, Norway: Tapir Academic Press, 2011); Taede A. Smedes, Chaos, Complexity,
and God: Divine Action and Scientism (Leuven: Peeters, 2004).
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contrasted his hermeneutical approach for inner consistency between his hermeneutics in
protology and his hermeneutics in eschatology.
Methodology
This thesis is a descriptive systematic and evaluative analysis of the contrastive usage of
Scripture in Polkinghorne’s protology and eschatology. Although this study is limited primarily
to Polkinghorne’s theology and his abundant amount of literature, other writings have been
introduced that are relevant to this investigation, especially in the treatment of hermeneutics and
protology.
When discussing his eschatology, his volume The God of Hope and the End of the World
will be the main source because it represents his most concentrated work on eschatology.
Beginning this study is Polkinghorne’s scientific and theological method, that is, his
understanding of the relationship between science and theology, critical realism, a Revised
Natural Theology, revelation, and Scripture are described and analyzed. Next, two case studies,
his protology and eschatology, are examined in light of his interpretive presuppositions. Finally,
both case studies are evaluated by comparing and contrasting.
Delimitations
The focus of this study is to explore Polkinghorne’s hermeneutical approach to his
protology and eschatology in his model of doing theology in the context of science. Aside from
the topics under discussion, this investigation does not attempt to provide a comprehensive
treatment of his entire method and theology. The nature of this thesis is theological, and scientific
arguments will not be discussed unless they have a bearing on his hermeneutics and theology.
Summary
This first section has identified the problem and purpose of this thesis: the contrastive
role of Scripture in Polkinghorne’s hermeneutical model and its impact on the theology of his

7

protology and eschatology. This section has also justified the problem in terms of comparing and
contrasting his hermeneutical approach for inner consistency in his protology and eschatology
and the hermeneutical/theological implications. Finally, the methodology and delimitations have
been described. The second section provides a brief sketch of John Polkinghorne because in order
to be au fait with the views of another individual, it is essential to be acquainted with their past
experiences and life.
John C. Polkinghorne: The Scientist and Theologian
A self-proclaimed “vegetarian butcher,”21 Polkinghorne has been regarded as the “C. S.
Lewis” of science and religion dialogues22 and a “living icon.”23 John Charlton Polkinghorne was
born October 16, 1930, in Weston-super-Mare, England, and raised in an Anglican home.24
Polkinghorne began his mathematical and scientific education at Trinity College, Cambridge,
earning a bachelor’s degree in 1952.25 As a graduate student, Polkinghorne studied theoretical

21

John C. Polkinghorne, From Physicist to Priest: An Autobiography (London: SPCK, 2007), vii.

22

John C. Polkinghorne, "John Polkinghorne," in The Faith of Scientists in Their Own Words, ed.
Nancy K. Frankenberry (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008), 340.
23

Edward M. Hogan, "John Polkinghorne and Bernard Lonergan on the Scientific Status of
Theology," Zygon 44 (2009): 559.
24

Polkinghorne was raised in a modest home where religion was central to the family. He
describes himself as a “cradle Christian” worshipper in the Church of England. He had two siblings, Peter,
who was killed fighting in World War II, and a sister, Ann, who died as an infant. In 1955 Polkinghorne
married his sweetheart Ruth and they had three children. Their relationship spanned fifty-one years, until
her recent passing on March 29, 2006. For a more complete description on Polkinghorne’s life, see
Polkinghorne, From Physicist to Priest: An Autobiography. For a more concise sketch, see John C.
Polkinghorne, "From Physicist to Priest," in Science and Theology: The New Consonance (Boulder, CO:
Westview, 1998); John C. Polkinghorne, "Physicist and Priest," Spiritual Evolution 1998): 113-120.
25

Polkinghorne, "From Physicist to Priest," 134. Polkinghorne writes, “My undergraduate studies
at Cambridge were in mathematics. I had chosen the subject because I was good at it and liked getting
things right and also because my mathematical imagination had been kindled by an outstanding master who
taught me. At the university I got interested in how one could use mathematics to understand the deep
structure of the physical world” (ibid.).
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physics in quantum field theory under Paul Dirac26 and acquired his PhD in physics under the
guidance of Abdus Salam in 1955.27 Polkinghorne also completed post-doctoral work under
Murray Gell-Mann28 at Caltech (California Institute of Technology).
His appointment as a Lecturer in Mathematical Physics began at the University of
Edinburgh. Afterward he returned to Cambridge as a University Lecturer, and subsequently was
promoted to Reader in 1965; in 1968 he was elected the initial holder of the newly established
Professorship of Mathematical Physics, a position he held from 1968-1979. In 1974, he was
elected as a Fellow of the Royal Society,29 and from 1975-1979, Polkinghorne was a member of
Britain’s Science Research Council. His work was in theoretical elementary particle physics,30
using mathematics to model and understand the behavior of the smallest constituents of matter.
At the height of his career as a physicist in 1979, and after much contemplation,
Polkinghorne stunned the scientific community by resigning his chair of theoretical physics at the
University of Cambridge, by turning his “collar round”31 and announcing his intention to become
an Anglican priest. Polkinghorne gives two reasons to explain the rationale behind his pursuit of

26

Paul Dirac was one of the founding fathers of quantum theory and the founder of relativistic
quantum mechanics. He received the Nobel Laureate in Physics in 1933. For Polkinghorne’s brief sketch
on Dirac, see John C. Polkinghorne, Beyond Science: The Wider Human Context (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1996), 39-41.
27

Ibid., 41-42. Salam received the Nobel Laureate in 1979 in Physics.

28

Ibid., 42-45. Gell-Mann received the Nobel Laureate in Physics in 1969. Polkinghorne
comments, “In his immediate presence, Gell-Mann’s strength of character and his quickness of intellect
meant that his thought patterns were imposed on you and, of course, you could never out-think him. The
best one could manage was to limp along breathless in his wake” (42).
29

Polkinghorne, From Physicist to Priest: An Autobiography, 70. Commenting on this
achievement, Polkinghorne writes “that the ambition to be an FRS was a potent and disturbing element in
my scientific life for a good number of years. If you had put to me some curious scheme by which my
election would have been assisted by the murder of my grandmother, I would certainly have declined, but
there would have been a perceptible pause of mental struggle before I did so” (ibid.).
30

For a brief description of his contributions to physics, see ibid., 67-69.

31

Polkinghorne, "Physicist and Priest," 120.
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another occupation. First, he remarks that he was not disillusioned with science32 but rather his
partial departure from science was due to his exploration for truth that took him beyond the
boundaries and limitations of science.
Yet its enthralling account is not sufficient by itself to quench our thirst for understanding, for
science describes only one dimension of the many-layered reality within which we live,
restricting itself to the impersonal and general, and bracketing out the personal and unique.
Many things altered my life when I changed from being a physicist and became a priest, but
one significant thing remained the same: the central importance of the search for truth. All
my life I have been trying to explore reality. That exploration includes science, but it also
necessarily takes me beyond it.33
Second, the most fundamental reason for his changing occupations was that Christianity
had always been central to his life,34 though interestingly the topic of science and religion did not
play a role in his decision to enter ministry. Upon his resignation, Polkinghorne pursued his
training in theological studies at Westcott House, an Anglican seminary standing in a liberal
catholic tradition that is part of the Cambridge Theological Federation. During his studies,
Polkinghorne began to read Jürgen Moltmann’s theological works, which continue to exert a deep

32

Polkinghorne, "From Physicist to Priest," 134. Polkinghorne comments, “The subject was
always changing in response to new ideas and new discoveries. When one was young this state of
intellectual flux was exciting; it became somewhat more tiring as one grew older. In mathematical thinking,
most of us lose in middle age the flexibility of mind that is a characteristic of youth. We can still do the old
tricks but it becomes harder to learn or to invent new ones. I had seen many senior colleagues get
somewhat miserable as the subject moved away from them. I resolved I would leave physics before physics
left me. I felt I owed this, not only myself, but also to the young workers in the large research group I was
privileged to lead. As my fiftieth birthday approached, and as a particular era in particle physics came to a
close with the establishment of what is called the Standard Model, I realised the time had come for me to
go. I was not leaving physics because I had in any way become disillusioned with it, but I had done my
little bit for the subject and now it was time to do something else” (ibid.).
33

John C. Polkinghorne, Exploring Reality: The Intertwining of Science and Religion (New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press, 2005), ix.
34

Polkinghorne, From Physicist to Priest: An Autobiography, 73. Polkinghorne describes
“formative experiences” that encouraged his move to priesthood: (1) the value of silence and prayer, (2)
becoming a lay reader, and (3) the influence exerted upon him through a Bible study group.
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influence.35 In 1981, he was ordained a deacon and served as Curate of St. Andrews in
Chesterton, Cambridge, from 1981-1982. Ordained a priest in 1982,36 he also served at St.
Michaels and All Angels in Bristol and in Bedminster (1982-1984). Polkinghorne was Vicar of a
parish in Blean, located in the Canterbury district of Kent from 1984 to 1986. It was while
serving in Blean that Polkinghorne came to realize that the task of writing about science and
religion was part of his vocation.37
Following his five-year parochial ministry, Polkinghorne returned to academia, being
elected to serve as Fellow Dean and Chaplain of Chapel at Trinity Hall, Campbell, from 19861989. Finally in 1989, he was elected President of Queens' College, Cambridge University, and
remained there until his retirement in 1997.

35

Ibid., 82. While a student, Polkinghorne read Moltmann’s work, The Crucified God. The concept
of God as a “fellow-sufferer has made a lasting impression in Polkinghorne’s thinking. “The insight of the
crucified God is at the heart of my own Christian belief, and indeed the possibility of that belief. Later I
was to go on to read all of Moltmann’s major writings, and he has been the contemporary theologian who
has helped and influenced me the most” (ibid.).
36

Jennifer Lee Atkin, "Revelation & Reason: As a Physicist Who Became an Anglican Priest, John
C. Polkinghorne Forges Common Ground between Science and Religion," (2002). www.sciencespirit.org/article_detail.php?article_id=299 (accessed January 16, 2007). During 1982, Polkinghorne faced
a life-threatening illness. He suffered from a severe digestive tract disease and had three abdominal
surgeries. “My whole world had closed in to my hospital bed and the drips that were keeping me alive. My
attention was focused on those drips, as if they needed continual mental assistance to do their job properly.
God seemed very far away and I could not manage to pray. Yet I was deeply conscious of being prayed for,
by my family, by my church and by some Anglican nuns who had become friends of mine. This weight of
vicarious prayer sustained me.” Following his discharge from the hospital, Polkinghorne convalesced for
several months. This condition enabled him to better understand others who suffer physically. For a more
detailed account, see Polkinghorne, From Physicist to Priest: An Autobiography, 98-99.
37

Polkinghorne, "From Physicist to Priest," 135. Reflecting on his return to Cambridge from
parochial work, Polkinghorne wrote, “I had thought originally that I had left the academic world for good,
but I gradually came to recognize that thinking and writing about science and religion was part of my
vocation, the particular way in which I might serve the Christian community” (ibid.). Regarding his interest
in theology, he wrote, “I cared for physics, and I continue to do so, but I have come to realise that theology
grips me much more profoundly than science ever did. Yet the personal paradox is that I shall never be able
to become a professional theologian. I do not have the time or opportunity to recapitulate that long
apprenticeship and involvement with a world-wide academic community which is the indispensable
requirement of becoming a fully-fledged practitioner. I do not think this means that I have nothing to
contribute to theological thinking, but I am aware of my limitations. I cannot claim to be more than a
scientist with serious theological interests. I have to say that I wish I met a few more theologians who have
serious scientific interests” (ibid.).
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John Polkinghorne is a pioneer in the interdisciplinary studies of science and theology
and a passionate believer in the unity of knowledge.38 Because of his training as a mathematicianphysicist turned theologian, Polkinghorne is a hybrid,39 and his versatility enables him to cross
over40 both fields, crystallizing his thoughts through scores of scholarly articles, essays, and
books. He has earned international recognition as one of the leading thinkers relentlessly
searching for truth while correlating the conundrums of science and the Christian faith to enhance
and gain a deeper understanding of reality.
After an illustrious career41 as a physicist, priest, theologian, and author, Polkinghorne
continues to be active, and numerous honors, accomplishments, and awards demonstrate the
significance of his contributions.

38

John C. Polkinghorne, Science and Religion in Quest of Truth (New Haven, CT; London: Yale
University Press, 2011), 20.
39

Ted Peters, "Science and Theology: Toward Consonance," in Science and Theology: The New
Consonance, ed. Ted Peters (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998), 29.
40

Polkinghorne, From Physicist to Priest: An Autobiography, 134. Interdisciplinary writing
requires a “degree of intellectual boldness and a degree of intellectual charity. . . . I often say to myself that
I strive to be two-eyed, looking with both the eye of science and with the eye of religion, and that such
binocular vision enables me to see more than would be possible with either eye on its own.” His “double
mission” is to persuade others of the rationally motivated credibility of Christianity by encouraging
“scientists to take religion seriously and not dismiss it unreflectively without a hearing, and on the other
hand to encourage religious people to take science seriously and not to fear the truth that it brings” (ibid.).
41

Sir Reverend Dr John Polkinghorne has truly had an amazing and distinguished career. Aside
from being an accomplished theoretical elementary particle physicist and theologian, his illustrious
achievements include additional honors and awards such as his election as a Fellow of the Royal Society
(FRS) in 1974 and his appointment in 1997 as Knight Commander of the order of the British Empire
(KBE) by Queen Elizabeth II for distinguished service to science, religion, learning, and medical ethics. He
is a Fellow of Queens' College, Cambridge, a Canon Theologian of Liverpool Cathedral (1994), a Six
Preacher, Canterbury Cathedral (1996), and was awarded a von Humboldt Foundation Award (1999). He
was the recipient of the Templeton Laureate Prize for his treatment of theology as a natural science (2002),
the fourth physicist to do so, winning the £700,000 prize money. He donated the money to Cambridge
University towards the funding of post-doctoral research into science and religion. He is the founding
president of the International Society for Science and Religion as well as one of the founders of the Society
of Ordained Scientists. Polkinghorne has chaired and participated in various committees throughout his
career: the Science, Medicine and Technology Committee of the Church of England's Board of Social
Responsibility, the Advisory Committee on Genetic Testing (1996-1999), the publications committee of
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Summary
The first section of this chapter identified the problem and purpose of this thesis: the
contrastive role of Scripture in Polkinghorne’s protology and eschatology. A historical
background on Polkinghorne was provided in the second section. Polkinghorne’s contrastive
hermeneutic in protology and eschatology will be described and evaluated in chapters 2 to 4 of
this thesis.

SPCK, the joint working party on Cloning of the Human Genetics Advisory Commission (1996-1999), the
Human Fertilization and Embryology Authority. He served on the General Synod (1990-2000) and the
Doctrine Commission (1989-1995) of the Church of England, and on the Medical Ethics Committee of the
British Medical Association (1989-1998). As a physicist, Polkinghorne’s contribution to bioethics is most
notable. He was Chairman of the Committee to Review the Research Use of Fetuses and Fetal Material
(1988-1989). In the UK the uses of fetal tissue, from which EG cells could be derived, are subject to
guidance set out in the Polkinghorne Review (also known as “Polkinghorne Report,” 1989). He chaired: the
Nuclear Physics Board (1978-79), the Task Force to Review Services for Drug Misusers (1994-96), and the
Governors of the Perse School, Cambridge (1972-81). Polkinghorne has been a member of the BMA
Medical Ethics Committee, the General Synod of the Church of England, the Doctrine Commission, and
the Human Genetics Commission (1996-2002). In 2004 he chaired the Appointments Committee to appoint
members to the UK Biobank Ethics and Governance Council (EGC). Several universities have bestowed
honorary doctorates and fellowships on Polkinghorne. He has received an Honorary Doctor of Science
(ScD) from the Universities of Cambridge (1974), Exeter (1994), Leicester (1995) and Marquette (2003); a
Honorary Doctor of Divinity (DD) from Kent (1994), Durham (1999) and an Honorary Doctor of
Humanities (DHum) from the University of Hong Kong Baptist (2006). In addition to the doctorates, he has
also received Honorary Fellowships that include Trinity College, Cambridge (1954, 1989), Royal Society
(1974), Queens College, Cambridge (1999), St. Chad’s College, Durham (1999), and St. Edmund’s College
Cambridge (2002).
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CHAPTER II
POLKINGHORNE’S SCIENTIFIC AND THEOLOGICAL METHOD
Introduction
This chapter presents an analytical description of Polkinghorne’s conceptions of science
and theology and his hermeneutical perspectives on Critical Realism, Natural Theology, and
Revelation. These insights will be helpful when analyzing and evaluating two proposed case
studies for doing theology in the context of science, specifically Polkinghorne’s protology and
eschatology in subsequent chapters.
Theology in the Context of Science
Science and theology1 are two of the most powerful cultural and intellectual forces in the
world today. It is usual to discuss their relation as if they are two independent activities, but there

1

There is no uniform entity called science, religion or theology because each has a wide range of
disciplines with its own methodological distinction. In English, an exclusive definition of science is usually
synonymous with the natural sciences or a method of gaining knowledge of natural phenomena. However,
Hodgson notes that the German usage of wissenchaft denotes the systematic pursuit of knowledge and
learning which follows closely the Latin scientia (see Peter C. Hodgson, "Theology and the Philosophy of
Science," Religious Studies Review 3 (1977): 216). Under this inclusive definition, theology would be
included because it also has a method of gaining knowledge about God. The label religion is also vague in
view of the fact that there are numerous religious movements, each with its own exclusive understanding
about nature and God. The term theology is also complicated because it could suggest metaphysics, a
system of theoretical principles, the beliefs of a particular religious tradition, and the study or science of the
doctrine of God. It is necessary to qualify the terms used in this thesis: science, is the “elaborate
interconnection of thought, conviction, and tested experience related to nature and its texture” (Michael
Welker, "Science and Theology: Their Relation at the Beginning of the Third Millenium," in The Oxford
Handbook of Religion and Science, ed. Philip Clayton and Zachary Simpson (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2006), 554). In addition, in this study, theology is limited to Christian theology as the objective and
systematic study and interpretation of Christian teachings of reality while preserving interest in the unity of
theology through critical reflection. For a discussion on defining theology as a science, see V. Philips Long
and others, Foundations of Contemporary Interpretation (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 1996), 640-644.
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is an “organic connection” between them when they are viewed from a historical perspective.2
Both attempt to capture a complete picture of reality, and exploring their correlation can generate
both conflict and enrichment.3 Polkinghorne has labored to show the compatibility of science and
theology. He writes that although his impression
is that scientists are as likely to be religious believers as any other section of the community.
Nevertheless there is a feeling abroad that somehow science and religion are opposed to each
other. . . . In fact science and theology seem to me to have in common that they are both
exploring aspects of reality. They are capable of mutual interaction which, though at times it
is puzzling, can also be fruitful.4
Religion exerts a profound influence on science through its beliefs and traditions, and it
continues to remain the biggest challenge that science faces.5 Religion is increasingly being
viewed as an “important dialogue partner in allowing the natural sciences to engage with

2

Peter E. Hodgson, Theology and Modern Physics (Aldershot, England: Ashgate, 2005), 19.

3

The variations of the possible relational models between science and religion are the Conflict
Model (antagonist and intolerant); the Independence Model (complete separation between science and
religion because each uses different languages and poses different questions); the Dialogue Model
(complementarian and both disciplines exhibit a degree of compatibilty) and the Integration Model (only
one God and consequently only one truth). For a more complete description of these classifications see Ian
G. Barbour, “Science and Religion, Models and Relations,” in Encyclopedia of Science and Religion, ed. J.
Wentzel van Huyssteen (London: Thomson Gale, 2003), 760-764; McGrath, Science and Religion, 45-50.
Polkinghorne redescribes the Dialogue and Integration models in terms of the Consonance and
Assimilation categories. He defines Consonance as “the way in which ‘science does not determine
theological thought but it certainly constrains it’ by conditions of mutual congruence.” In the case of
Assimilation, a greater merging of the two is attempted. Polkinghorne adds that he is cautious of
Assimilation. He writes, “I am suspicious of this latter approach, since I believe that it tends to result in
science playing too great a controlling role in the proposed convergence, with the result that there is a
danger that theological concerns become subordinated to the scientific.” John C. Polkinghorne, Science and
the Trinity: The Christian Encounter with Reality (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004), 9.
4

Polkinghorne, One World: The Interaction of Science and Theology, xi.

5

Cornelius G. Hunter, Science's Blind Spot (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2007), 9. He writes,
“The biggest challenge that science faces stems from religion. The problem is not, as is sometimes
popularly held, that religion opposes science. The problem is that religion has joined science” (ibid.).
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questions which are raised, yet not answered, by scientific research.”6 The search for truth and
understanding would be incomplete without religious input.7
The dialogue model for relations between science and theology is described in the
following manner:
What is important here is that in the dialogue model one tries to respect the specific nature
and significance of both faith and science. The metaphor of consonance expresses this
wonderfully: when two voices or instruments are consonant (literally: sound together) it is not
the case that each makes the same sound, but rather that the different sounds they produce
make an unmistakable harmony. The harmony between faith and science that people attempt
to discover in the dialogue model likewise does not so much have the character of overlap,
but rather of parallels and analogies and of tendencies which point in each other’s direction.8
In view of the fact that the modern practice of science has important roots in the JudeoChristian faith traditions,9 along with the principle of the unity of knowledge,10

6

McGrath, Science & Religion: A New Introduction, 4.

7

John C. Polkinghorne, Science and Creation: The Search for Understanding (Boston, MA:
Shambhala, 1988), xi. Polkinghorne writes, “Nevertheless the search for understanding will be incomplete
if it does not include within itself the religious qeust, for otherwise it will leave fundamental questions of
significance and purpose unaddressed and unanswered” (ibid.).
8

Gijsbert van den Brink, Philosophy of Science for Theologians: An Introduction (Frankfurt am
Main: Peter Lang, 2009), 234. The relationship between science and religion was not originally understood
through the various models of interaction. Rather, the metaphor of “God’s two books of scripture and
nature” was the dominate theme reaching its fullest articulation in the medieval philosophy and literature of
Raimundus Sabunde. A popular saying during the seventeenth century was that God had written two books:
the Book of Nature and the Book of Scripture and when read correctly they would not contradict each other
since they shared the same author. For an overview of the metaphor’s origin and decline, see Peter M. J.
Hess, "God's Two Books: Special Revelation and Natural Science in the Christian West," in Bridging
Science and Religion, ed. Ted Peters and Gaymon Bennett (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2003), 123140.
9

van den Brink, Philosophy of Science for Theologians, 234. Brink resolutely affirms that “in fact
science is a Christian enterprise, deeply anchored as it is in the doctrine of creation! The fact that later
generations of scientists distanced themselves from these Christian roots, just as a booster is discarded from
a rocket once it has helped to launch it, is another matter. The consonance between Christian faith and the
presuppositions on which science was built does not change as a result of this development” (237).
Hodgson affirms that “science as we know it is based on certain difinite beliefs about the world. . . .
Modern science began only when they were reinforced and extended by the religious beliefs of the
Hebrews and finally brought to completion by the theology of Christian Europe” (Hodgson, Theology and
Modern Physics, 19). Concerning the doctrine of creation as an important driving force in the development
of modern science Polkinghorne comments, “Nevertheless, a significant case can be made that it was the
doctrine of creation that supplied a supportive ideological setting for the development of modern science”
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Polkinghorne does not simply opine that science and theology can converse with each other in a
constructive and responsible manner.11 He not only affirms mutual compatibility but he also
claims that theology is a “true Theory of Everything,” by commenting, “I think that this futher
quest, if openly pursued, will take the enquirer in the direction of religious belief. It is a search for
the Logos. In consequence, I believe that ultimately the cousinly relationships . . . find their most
most profound understanding in terms of that true Theory of Everything which is trinitarian
theology.”12

(John C. Polkinghorne, "Christianity and Science," in The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science, ed.
Philip Clayton and Zachary Simpson, Oxford Handbooks [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006], 58).
Other authors have asserted that the assessment of Christianity having fostered science is “historically
inaccurate and deeply misleading.” See J. Wentzel van Huyssteen and others, "Introduction," in
Encyclopedia of Science and Religion, ed. J. Wentzel van Huyssteen (London: Thomson Gale, 2003), xi.
10

Polkinghorne, Belief in God in an Age of Science, 110. This impies that theology contains
cognitive content. Polkinghorne writes, “God is the ground of all that is, every kind of human rational
investigation of reality must have something to contribute to theological thinking, as the latter pursues its
goal of an adequate understanding of the created world, understood in the light of the belief that the mind
and purposes of the Creator lie behind cosmic order and history. Every mode of rational exploration of
reality will have an offering to make” (Polkinghorne, Theology in the Context of Science, 9).
11
Because the experience of God as creator is pivotal for both Natural Theology and the sciencetheology dialogue, one can trace important cousinly connections between science and theology. Both
science and theology share the common cause for truth and “both are led to belief in unseen realities”
(Polkinghorne, Traffic in Truth: Exchanges between Science and Theology, 49-50). Polkinghorne
recognizes that there are significant disanalogies as well between the two. Theology does not share the
cumulative character that science exhibits. Scientific understanding “attains a stability that means that it
will not require further revision or amplification unless the boundaries of that regime are crossed.” When it
comes to theology, Polkinghorne claims that it has “never been a purely static discipline” and that it is a
diachronic discipline (Polkinghorne, Science and the Trinity: The Christian Encounter with Reality, 26-27).
Polkinghorne recognizes that it is mainly scientist-theologians who are leading the way in these dialogues.
He stresses the need of theologians to get more involved in this dialogue. He comments, “To put the matter
bluntly, I believe that too many theologians fail to treat what science has to offer with appropriate degree of
seriousness that would enable them to acknowledge adequately its contextual role” (Polkinghorne,
Theology in the Context of Science, 8). In another place he writes, “The most grievous absence from the
conversation is that of the theologians. Their presence, in a sustained rather than a merely occasional way,
is earnestly desired as part of future developments” (Polkinghorne, Belief in God in an Age of Science, 80).
12

John C. Polkinghorne, Quantum Physics and Theology: An Unexpected Kinship (New Haven,
CT: Yale University Press, 2007), 110. Elsewhere he writes, “In other words, there is indeed a Theory of
Everything, but a theory that is much grander and more comprehensive and intellectually satisfying than
any Grand Unified Theory of particle physics could ever be. I have been suggesting that the name of that
Theory is Theology, that the world makes total sense because it is a creation, the unified expression of the
Mind and Will of its Creator. In short, I believe that the search for understanding through and through, if
pursued with total openness and honesty, will in the end be found to be the search for God” (John C.
Polkinghorne, Faith, Science & Understanding (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), 25).
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Polkinghorne designates his approach to the dialogue model as developmental; a
continuously unfolding exploration between science and theology13 in which theological
discourse is influenced by modern discoveries and the theological progress that takes place is
“evolutionary rather than revolutionary.”14
Polkinghorne perceives science and theology as intellectual cousins15 speaking of
unobservable entities,16 such as the reality of the quantum world and the reality of the invisible
God,17 and consequently will even borrow language from one discipline to describe the other.18

13

Polkinghorne, Science and the Trinity: The Christian Encounter with Reality, 28. Polkinghorne’s
approach should perhaps be labled as revisionary/developmental. For Polkinghorne, some topics that have
been the traditional concern of Christian theology and their interpretation require revision in light of
modern knowledge and as a result of scientific discovery. An example of this would be the Fall in Gen 2.
See John C. Polkinghorne, Encountering Scripture: A Scientist Explores the Bible (London: SPCK, 2010),
28-31. Barbour comments the following, “Polkinghorne’s fourth category is Developmental, as he calls his
own position. He wants theology rather than science to shape the agenda, but he recognizes that theological
ideas were developed in the Bible, and in later interpretations of it, within changing cultural contexts. I
would argue that all three of us share a developmental understanding of the history of theology, but we
differ in the extent to which we think reformulations are called for in the light of historical research and
well-supported scientific theories” (Ian G. Barbour, "John Polkinghorne on Three Scientist-Theologians,"
Theology and Science 8 (2010): 252).
14

Polkinghorne, Science and the Trinity: The Christian Encounter with Reality, 28.

15

Polkinghorne, One World: The Interaction of Science and Theology, 36; Polkinghorne, Science
and Religion in Quest of Truth, 13.
16

John C. Polkinghorne, Scientists as Theologians: A Comparison of the Writings of Ian Barbour,
Arthur Peacocke and John Polkinghorne (London: SPCK, 1996), 14. “The quarks and gluons, which are
believed to be the fundamental constituents of nuclear matter, are also thought to be confined – that is to
say, so tightly bound within the particles that they constitute, that they will never be observable separately
in isolation. Their existence is inferred from the way in which its assumption makes sense of great swathes
of physical data. God is not available for direct inspection. His unseen presence is inferred from the way
that this makes sense of great swathes of spiritual experience” (ibid.). For nice summaries in regards to
believing in unobservable entities, see André Kukla and Joel Walmsley, "A Theory's Predictive Success
Does Not Warrant Belief in the Unobservable Entities It Postulates," in Contemporary Debates in
Philosophy of Science, ed. Christopher Hitchcock (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 133-148; Jarrett
Leplin, "A Theory's Predictive Success Can Warrant Belief in the Unobservable Belief in the Unobservable
Entities It Postulates," in Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science, ed. Christopher Hitchcock
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 117-132.
17

Polkinghorne, Belief in God in an Age of Science, 122. “Yet, on the basis of intelligibility as
providing the grounds for ontological belief . . . I am fully persuaded of the reality of the quark structure of
matter. I believe that it makes sense of physical experience precisely because it corresponds to what is the
case. A similar conviction” concludes Polkinghorne, “grounds my belief in the invisible reality of God”
(ibid.).
18

Ibid. “I believe,” Polkinghorne states, “that nuclear matter is made up of quarks which are not
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Both are open to correction. Polkinghorne writes, “Theology, like science, is corrigible. There is
nothing immutable in its pronouncements. If they are found wanting after careful investigation
they are to be abandoned.”19 Both disciplines speak of unity. In science, the unity of the natural
world, and in theology, the unity of God.20
Polkinghorne advocates there are epistemological parallels between science and theology,
which makes the dialogical approach attainable because both are concerned about making sense
of things through their search for truth and understanding.21 Scientific insights provide
information that are vital for theological reflection. They complement each other by focusing on
different dimensions of truth.22 Science seeks to provide explanations to answer the How
questions without theological assistance. In regard to metaquestions, for example, questions that
are beyond the self-qualified confines of science, this is where theology can contribute by
providing a broader and deeper context of reality. Accordingly, then, theology seeks to provide

only unseen but which are also invisible in principle. . . . The effects of these quarks can be perceived, but
not the entities themselves. To borrow language from theology, we know the economic quark but not the
immanent quark” (ibid.).
19

Polkinghorne, One World: The Interaction of Science and Theology, 28.

20

Polkinghorne, Science and Religion in Quest of Truth, 15. In another place Polkinghorne writes,
“The unity of knowledge is underwritten by the unity of the one true God; the veracity of well-motivated
belief is underwritten by the reliability of God” (Polkinghorne, Belief in God in an Age of Science, 122).
21

Polkinghorne, One World: The Interaction of Science and Theology. When theology is
conceived as primarily a theoretical understanding of the world, this places theology in the same category
as science. Yet the cognitive dimension does not take into consideration the existential character of
theology. For Niekerk, theology is primarily concerned with existential questions, and the cognitive aspect
of theology is subordinated to its existential subject matter. This leads him to write, “The priorities must be
reversed: theology concerns primarily existential and only secondarily theoretical questions” (Kees van
Kooten Niekerk, "A Critical Realist Perspective on the Dialogue between Theology and Science," in
Rethinking Theology and Science, ed. Niels Henrik Gregersen and J. Wentzel van Huyssteen (Grand
Rapids, MI; Cambridge: Eerdmans, 1998), 72).
22
Polkinghorne, Quantum Physics and Theology: An Unexpected Kinship, 1. Polkinghorne adds,
“Although in both kinds of enquiry this truth will never be grasped totally and exhaustively, it can be
approximated to in an intellectually satisfying manner that deserves the adjective ‘verisimilitudinous,’ even
if it does not qualify to be described in an absolute sense as ‘complete’” (ibid.). In other words, both
disciplines merely provide the appearance of truth, i.e., appearing to be true and probable.
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meaning to the Why questions.23 Both attempt to gain knowledge of the world and, according to
their own methods, they should attempt to gain an integrated and complete picture. Polkinghorne
affirms, “Science cannot tell theology how to answer theological questions, and theology cannot
tell science how to answer scientific questions, but the two sets of answers will have to fit in with
each other if they are really describing the one world of God’s creation.”24
This can be achieved by applying the rational strategy of bottom-up thinking. This
perspective seeks to understand reality that is evidence-based, moving from experience to the
attainment of well-motivated belief and understanding.25 Polkinghorne describes the bottom-up
thinker in science or theology as living “by reasonable faith but not by certain sight.”26 This form
of rationality, natural to the sciences, can also be followed in theology because “religious faith
does not demand irrational submission to some unquestionable authority, but it does involve
rational commitment to well-motivated belief.”27
According to Polkinghorne, “science and theology meet in the human,”28 suggesting that
human rationality supplies the key ingredient to working out a framework for dialogue.29
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Polkinghorne, Traffic in Truth: Exchanges between Science and Theology, 8. A distinction
between explanation and meaning is necessary because meaning transcends explanation. Baumeister
defines meaning as “shared mental representations of possible relationships among things, events, and
relationships. Thus, meaning connects things.” Roy F. Baumeister, Meanings of Life (New York: Guilford
Press, 1991), 15.
24

Polkinghorne, Traffic in Truth: Exchanges between Science and Theology, 10.

25

Polkinghorne, Science and Religion in Quest of Truth, 17-18.

26

Ibid., 19.

27

Ibid., 13.

28
See chapter 6 in John C. Polkinghorne, Reason and Reality: The Relationship between Science
and Theology (London: SPCK, 1991).
29

Ernan McMullin concurs with Polkinghorne’s sentiments on the centrality of human rationality
in understanding where science and theology meet. He writes, “And I am fairly sure that the two do not
deal with the same reality. By that I do not mean that there are different levels of ‘reality’, different degrees
to which existence itself is realized. Rather, I mean that theology and science deal for the most part with
different domains of the same reality. Science has no access to God in its explanations; theology has
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Science and theology approach the universe from different perspectives. On one hand, the
scientific perspective of the physical world is of a purely natural phenomena. Theology, on the
other hand, looks at the natural world as God’s creation, implying that scientific statements and
theological propositions are about the same real world.30
Theological cognitive claims, when reformulated in contemporary categories, also have
the same status as scientific claims. This allows Polkinghorne to take scientific and theological
claims seriously. He aspires a theistic metaphysic where interdisciplinary consonance is
exhibited.31 He seeks to construct a “comprehensive and unified view of reality, within which
both science and theology are contained and are able to interact with each other.”32 What then
should be the controlling influence between science and theology? Polkinghorne answers:
Our goal is an integrated picture of the way the world is. In that picture science and theology,
reason and revelation, all find their place. There is indeed revelation of God, in those
particular events and understandings preserved in scripture and tradition, but it is not
insulated from the critique of reason or from evaluation in association with other forms of
insight.33

nothing to say about the natural world. Where the two, however, may overlap and thus interact is in the
human domain; each has things to say about the nature of human reality” (Ernan McMullin, "Realism in
Theology and Science: Response to Arthur Peacocke," Religion and Intellectual Life 2 (1985): 39).
30

Polkinghorne, One World: The Interaction of Science and Theology, 36. “Theology and science
differ greatly in the nature of the subject of their concern. Yet each is attempting to understand aspects of
the way the world is. There are, therefore, important points of kinship between the two disciplines. They
are not chalk and cheese, irrational assertion compared with reasonable investigation, as the caricature
account would have it” (ibid.).
31

Polkinghorne, Traffic in Truth: Exchanges between Science and Theology, 11. This can be
comprehended in the following statement, “Science will tell theology what the structure and the history of
the physical world are like. Theology will gratefully acknowledge these gifts and seek to set them within
the more profound and comprehensive setting that belief in God affords. In its turn, this will enable
theology to offer gifts to science that can make more intelligible the success and character of the scientific
enterprise” (ibid.).
32

Polkinghorne, Scientists as Theologians: A Comparison of the Writings of Ian Barbour, Arthur
Peacocke and John Polkinghorne, 11.
33

Polkinghorne, One World: The Interaction of Science and Theology, 42.
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This even-handed strategy embraces insights without prejudice from each discipline,
while avoiding the inherent danger of a fully unified synthesis of science and theology where one
discipline takes a dominating role and assimilates the other.34
Interdisciplinary interaction is essential and attainable through motivated belief35
amplifying his commitment to the idea of the unity of all knowledge. He writes,
Knowledge is of value because it is the exploration of a created reality, itself given value by
the love of its Creator. Knowledge is one because God is one, so that our encounter is with a
created unity. The search for understanding is fundamental to our being human, an
expression, whether acknowledged as such or not, of a profound obligation to seek for and to
honour the Creator.36
In general, Polkinghorne provides a coherent model for the use of theology in the context
of science while adopting a model of inference to the best explanation.37 He offers an openminded, critical attitude toward science and theology that constitutes a deeply insightful case for
Christian theism. For him, both science and theology testify to a form of motivated belief38 and
both operate under the rubric of critical realism.
In this section, Polkinghorne’s view of the relationship between science and theology was
surveyed. The next section describes Polkinghorne’s endorsement of a epistemological position,
that is, critical realism.

34

Polkinghorne, Science and Religion in Quest of Truth, 22.

35

Ibid., 2.

36

Polkinghorne, Faith, Science & Understanding, 26. Polkinghorne also writes, “Search for
knowledge of God is the quest for the most profound and comprehensive form of understanding, a task to
which contributions from all truth-seeking enterprises will be both welcome and necessary” (Polkinghorne,
Theology in the Context of Science, 6).
37

Polkinghorne, Science and Religion in Quest of Truth, 73-74.

38

Polkinghorne, Theology in the Context of Science, 40.
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Critical Realism
According to Andreas Losch, realism, at its core, is “a personal belief and a commitment
to an external reality.”39 Polkinghorne qualifies scientific realism40 as a critical one.41 He
interprets knowledge in science and theology through the philosophical lens of critical realism.42
Critical realism is an epistemological view that claims the attainment of increasingly approximate
knowledge of an objective reality independent of our reflections. However, human knowledge of
reality is progressive and fallible, so it is liable to revision.43 Special to Polkinghorne’s realist and

39

Andreas Losch, "Our World Is More Than Physics: A Constructive—Critical Comment on the
Current Science and Theology Debate," Theology and Science 3 (2005): 281.
40

According to Ronald MacLennan, scientific realism means “that the world is such that reliable
knowledge of the world is possible, and that the process of human knowing is such that human beings do
gain such reliable knowledge of the world” (Ronald B. MacLennan, "Belief-Ful Realism and Scientifc
Realism," Zygon 36 (2001): 312). Major sources that have partially influenced and molded Polkinghorne’s
critical realism are Michael Polanyi, Ian G. Barbour, and A. N. Whitehead. See Losch, “Our World Is More
Than Physics: A Constructive—Critical Comment on the Current Science and Theology Debate,” 276-278;
Andreas Losch, "On the Origins of Critical Realism," Theology and Science 7 (2009): 92.
41

Polkinghorne, Science and Religion in Quest of Truth, 10.

42

“I have to say that personally I remain persuaded of the validity of a carefully nuanced critical
realism in both science and theology” (Polkinghorne, Science and the Trinity: The Christian Encounter
with Reality, 10). “Thus, I see there to be a cousinly relationship between the ways in which theology and
science each pursue truth within the proper domains of their interpreted experience. Critical realism is a
concept applicable to both, not because there is some kind of entailment from method in one to method in
the other—for the differences in their subject material would preclude so simple a connection—but because
the idea is deep enough to encompass the character of both these forms of the human search for truthful
understanding” (Polkinghorne, Quantum Physics and Theology: An Unexpected Kinship, 15). Polkinghorne
views critical realism as the mediating view between modernism and postmodernism (ibid., 5-6). Nancey
Murphy describes the steps in critical realism as “arguing from explanatory adequacy, to realism, to
comparable epistemic status for theology and science, to the possibility for meaningful interactions
between theology and science” (Nancey Murphy, "From Critical Realism to a Methodological Approach:
Response to Robbins, Van Huyssteen, and Hefner," Zygon 23 (1988): 288).
43

Critical realism affirms that objects exist independently of our thoughts about them (realism) and
asserts that human knowledge of reality is a progressive dialogue between knower and known (critical). It
has been the dominant epistemology in the Anglo-Saxon science and theology debate for several decades.
The term was introduced into the science and theology dialogue in 1966 by Ian Barbour, covering both
scientific realism and a theological realism that takes seriously the cognitive claims of religion (see Ian G.
Barbour, "Commentary on Theological Resources from the Physical Sciences," Zygon 1 (1966): 27-30).
Barbour believes critical realism must “acknowledge both the creativity of man’s mind, and the existence
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rational theory of science is the motto “epistemology models ontology,”44 which means
intelligibility is the reliable guide to ontology, but knowledge is not derived directly from reality.
As Polkinghorne describes it, “My instinct is to adopt a realist stance, that is to believe that what
we know is a reliable guide to what is the case.”45 For critical realists such as Polkinghorne,
science and theology provide partial views of the world that may overlap on a range of issues
such as cosmic origins and human nature. Polkinghorne is committed to providing theological
perspectives that are capable of being harmonized with science when he writes that critical
realism is “fundamental to the entire human quest for truth.”46

of patterns in events that are not created by man’s mind” (Issues in Science and Religion [London: SCM
Press, 1966], 172). Peter Barrett provides the following description of critical realism, “Here the subject of
inquiry, whether it be the natural world or the being of God, is regarded not as simply a construct of the
human mind but as actually existing independently of the mind—it is a realist view. Furthermore, since
knowledge of the subject is acquired through the use of critical faculties, acting like spectacles through
which the subject is viewed and reflected upon, this view is called critical realism. It stands in contrast to
naïve realism of earlier centuries since it does not claim exactness of fit between mental models and the
realities to which they refer. It acknowledges that knowledge is provisional, corrigible, approximate—and,
from a later point of view, frequently wrong” (Peter Barrett, Science and Theology since Copernicus: The
Search for Understanding (Pretoria: University of South Africa, 2000), 135). Currently a variety of critical
realisms are in circulation, thus rendering the term ambiguous. After analyzing five main types of critical
realism, Andreas Losch, who has written extensively on critical realism, concludes that it is an ambiguous
term. In summary he writes, “Unfortunately, facing the diverse types of critical realism, I am not able to
give a more positive definition of what it is about. Maybe the clue is something like ‘reality is not what it at
first appears to be like’; that may not sound very sophisticated. . . . In some sense, critical realism is realism
after Kant, and also the relation to the evolving scientific method is an issue. For now, we have however to
conclude that ‘critical realism’ as such is a rather ambiguous term which needs to be determined by the
epistemological considerations of a distinctive philosophical tradition. If one wants to deal with critical
realism further, one has therefore to distinguish its different types and their philosophical traditions and
decide which one wants to treat. In addition, the dictionary definitions initially given in some respects
probably only allow for a certain type of critical realism” (Losch, "On the Origins of Critical Realism," 98).
44

Polkinghorne, Science and the Trinity: The Christian Encounter with Reality, 79. According to
Smede’s reading of Polkinghorne’s critical realism, there is not a one-to-one mapping between our
knowledge and reality. This model should not be interpreted as “what we know about reality implies that
reality is so. . . . Critical realism merely claims that there is a similarity between the model (knowledge) and
the modeled (reality), without there being a one-to-one correspondence. And it is reality that ultimately
decides which models are appropriate and which inappropriate” (Smedes, Chaos, Complexity, and God, 4849).
45

Polkinghorne, Science and the Trinity: The Christian Encounter with Reality, 79. See also
Polkinghorne, Science and Religion in Quest of Truth, 5. If there were no correspondence between ideas
and reality, scientific success would seem unintelligibly gratuitous.
46

Ibid., 11.
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This raises the question as to what extent scientific and theological statements are
compatible and how critical realism evaluates their cognitive contents. Unlike theology, science is
not interested in incorporating theological claims since non-natural explanations are excluded in
advance. However, theology does have an interest in science, suggesting an asymmetrical relation
between the two. Niekerk writes that theology
has an interest in science with regard to the performance of its proper task. The reason is the
critical realist assignment of theology. This assignment involves the task of subjecting the
realist claims of particular versions of a Christian worldview to a critical assessment, and in
order to do so theology has to take into account the compatibility of those claims with
science. Not in the sense that the scientific worldview should be considered as an absolute
criterion. But . . . science contains a core of accepted knowledge which in many respects must
be considered to have a realist bearing. Therefore, a critical realist theology has to take
science seriously. This means on the one hand, that incompatibility with uncontroversial
scientific views constitutes a serious challenge to theology. When for example geology,
paleontology, and biology agree that there has been life on earth for at least 3.7 billion years,
theology cannot reasonably stick to the view that life was created about 6000 years ago.47
It is clear to Polkinghorne that if theology is to be taken as a credible discipline, at the
very least when constructing its cosmology, it becomes imperative that the scientific worldview
be incorporated, implying a redefining of theological terms. Even though the critical realist
position is suited with what science reveals about the world, it is important to note that it is a
meta-scientific and philosophical position that interprets scientific data in a particular way.48
Some have suggested that critical realism operates under a dualistic epistemological economy,49
and, despite its influence in the science and theology dialogue, critical realism has been the

47

van Kooten Niekerk, “A Critical Realist Perspective on the Dialogue between Theology and
Science,” 80.
48

Smedes, Chaos, Complexity, and God, 49. Nancey Murphy describes critical realism as a
“truism” and “problematic.” She also comments that it does not solve the problem of how science and
theology interact, and when comparing worldviews she writes: “One is left with two equally valid but
complementary pictures of reality—a situation that comes close, after all the struggle, to falling back into a
version of the two-worlds approach” (Nancey Murphy, Theology in the Age of Scientific Reasoning (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1990), 197-198).
49

Philip J. Knight, "The Adequacy of Language as a Critique of Religious Critical Realism,"
Modern Believing 2 (1999): 45.
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subject of significant criticism,50 including Niekerk’s assumption that critical realism with regard
to theological propositions mainly survives within the context of the Christian tradition.51
Polkinghorne aims at a “coherent interpretation of experience”52 in which critical realism
accounts for the parallels between science and theology. The overarching goal is the search for
truth and understanding. However, knowledge and an understanding of reality can only be
tentative and approximate.53 The predictive success of science has produced knowledge that is

50

Losch comments that critical realism only fits with the natural sciences, reminding us that there
is a category distinction. Theology is part of the humanities and critical realism omits social and human
sciences resulting “when only natural science is involved, the richness of theology is reduced to a theology
of nature only.” He calls for a constructive-critical realism which would include the humanities to give an
account of all of the dimensions of human experience, Losch, "Our World Is More Than Physics: A
Constructive—Critical Comment on the Current Science and Theology Debate," 283-287. Ernan McMullin
comments on Polkinghorne’s critical realism that there is no single epistemological doctrine available to
handle knowledge across the interdisciplinary divide. He writes, “Again, the critical realism of natural
science does not, to my mind, carry over into theology. The affinities that Polkinghorne finds between the
development of Christian doctrine and the recent development of quantum mechanics do not extend to the
manner in which the two sorts of development were validated. But it is upon the mode of validation that the
thesis of scientific realism depends. And the arguments that are advanced on its behalf simply do not carry
over into theology. That is not to say that arguments might not be found for an appropriate doctrine of
critical realism in theology, but these would have to be of a kind very different from those relied on in
regard to natural science” (Ernan McMullin, "Belief in God in an Age of Science," Commonweal 125
(1998): 23). Gregory Peterson points out that critical realism is languishing. He echoes Murphy’s sentiment
on the problematic issue of how scientific and religious models can be said to correspond to reality. He also
adds another point: “The more one acknowledges the critical element in any theory or model, the less
realist it seems to be” (Gregory R. Peterson, "Science and Religion, Methodologies," in Encyclopedia of
Science and Religion, ed. J. Wentzel van Huyssteen (London: Thomson Gale, 2003), 758).
51

van Kooten Niekerk, “A Critical Realist Perspective on the Dialogue between Theology and
Science,” 76, 78. “It presupposes a positive attitude to Christian belief. In a fundamental way it is a
question of fides quaerens intellectum (faith seeking understanding), which remains within the context of
faith.” Niekerk also notes that the definition of critical realism is affected because critical realism claims to
be able to acquire knowledge about the physical world but also of God.
52

Ian G. Barbour, Issues in Science and Religion (London: SCM Press, 1966), 269.
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“The chosen initial point of view must be open to correction in light of further experience, but it
cannot be dispensed with and this introduces an element of circularity into the quest for understanding.
There is both a hermeneutic circularity (we must adopt a point of view in order to understand experience;
experience must confirm or modify our chosen point of view) and an epistemic circularity (how we know is
controlled by the nature of the object of our knowledge; and that nature is revealed through our knowledge
of the object)” (Polkinghorne, Scientists as Theologians: A Comparison of the Writings of Ian Barbour,
Arthur Peacocke and John Polkinghorne, 15). In another place, he comments, “The true goal of scientific
endeavor is understanding of the structure of the physical world, an understanding which is never complete
but ever capable of further improvement. The terms of that understanding are dictated by the way things
are” (Polkinghorne, One World: The Interaction of Science and Theology, 22).
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gained by a “creative interpretation of experience.”54 In science, an experiment attempts to
confirm or disconfirm a theory and a theory attempts to interpret an experiment.55 Thus, the
interaction between interpretation and experimentation can yield reliable knowledge or wellmotivated beliefs, but it does not warrant complete and absolute certainty.56 Science then can only
claim the attainment of increasingly verisimilitudinous knowledge of the physical world.57
In order to determine what is postulated as verisimilitudinous truth, personal judgment
and concepts must play a part.58 Both science and theology rest on an unexplained foundation.
For science, it is the fundamental laws of nature. In theology, it is the given existence of God.
Hermeneutical perspectives determine what is observed and how it is to be observed. Even
though there is a considerable degree of circularity59 between the perspectives and the data, one
always starts from some initial perspective. Polkinghorne, writes, “Because we can only approach
reality from some initial point of view, experience and interpretation are inevitably intertwined.
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Polkinghorne, Science and Theology: An Introduction, 17. “It is a realist position because it
claims the attainment of increasingly verisimilitudinous knowledge of that nature of the physical world. It
is a critical realist position because that knowledge is not directly obtained by looking at what is going on,
but it requires a subtle and creative interaction between interpretation and experiment” (ibid.). Elsewhere,
he writes, “Hence the belief is usually called ‘critical realism’, the modifying adjective being required as a
recognition that scientific understanding is not just read out of nature but it is attained through a creative
itnerpretative process” (Polkinghorne, Faith, Science & Understanding, 79).
55

Kees van Kooten Niekerk, "Critical Realism," in Encyclopedia of Science and Religion, ed. J.
Wentzel van Huyssteen (London: Thomson Gale, 2003). Niekerk explains that scientific theories are
undetermined by empirical data because the same data allow for different theories that explain them (192).
56

“A critical realist cannot claim the attainment of absolute truth, but rather an increasing
verisimilitude–the construction of better and better maps of physical reality” (Polkinghorne, Scientists as
Theologians: A Comparison of the Writings of Ian Barbour, Arthur Peacocke and John Polkinghorne, 1617; Polkinghorne, Science and Religion in Quest of Truth, 7).
57

Polkinghorne, One World: The Interaction of Science and Theology, 22. “If realism is to prove
defensible it has to be a critical, rather than a naïve, realism. Firstly, it has to recognize that at any
particular moment verisimilitude is all that can be claimed as science’s achievement–an adequate account
of a circumscribed physical regime, a map good enough for some, but not for all, purposes” (ibid.).
58

Smedes, Chaos, Complexity, and God, 93.
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Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy (Chicago, IL: The
University of Chicago Press, 1974), 299. “Any enquiry into our ultimate beliefs can be consistent only if it
presupposes its own conclusions. It must be intentionally circular” (ibid.).
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We cannot escape from the hermeneutic circle. . . . The scientist commits himself to belief in the
rationality of the world in order to discover what form that rationality takes.”60
Redolent with Polanyi’s belief that complete objectivity is a “delusion” and “false
idea,”61 Polkinghorne states, “There are no significant scientific facts that are not already
interpreted facts.”62 In other words, concepts shape and condition reality. Knowledge is
constructed and mediated by concepts and theories.63 This implies that concepts and theories have
a heuristic function, guiding and indicating what to look for in light of a specific framework.64
Polkinghorne believes theology should adopt a prior interpretive point of view, and it is
here that critical realism becomes relevant to theology. He articulates his interpretive priority of
knowledge as:
Intelligibility requires the adoption of a prior interpretive point of view in the effort to make
sense of what is going on. Another reason our realism must be qualified as ‘critical’ lies in
this need to don these theoretical spectacles in the attempt to perceive pattern in the flux of
60

Polkinghorne, Reason and Reality: The Relationship between Science and Theology, 6. Cf. ibid.,
15: “Observer and object are linked in a mutual relationship. The nature of the object controls what can be
known about it and the way in which that knowledge must be expressed. . . . A kind of version of the
hermeneutic circle is involved.”
61

Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, 18.

62

Polkinghorne, Belief in God in an Age of Science, 107.

63

Smedes, Chaos, Complexity, and God, 94. “Observation does not simply mean ‘seeing’ but
rather ‘seeing as.’ One observes in the sense that one sees something already as something. Our observation
is thus filtered through our concepts” (ibid.). Smedes points out that Polkinghorne’s critical realism can be
converted to subjectivism, idealism, or even skepticism.
64

Christopher C. Knight, Wrestling with the Divine (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2001), 76.
Christopher Knight elucidates, “For just as the scientist does not simply start with random raw data, but
chooses what seems to be significant from the point of view of his or her current framework and then seeks
to understand the data within that framework” (ibid.). Philip Knight comments, “For critical realists, while
the reality of God and the realities of the physical world are independent of us, they are nevertheless
understood and shaped in language and conveyed through media that reflect the psychological, sociological
and cultural conditions of an observer's general milieu, thus limiting the claims of any observer to be able
to 'describe' the reality being referred to as it is in itself. There is then no possibility of a humanly neutral
description of divine reality” (Knight, "The Adequacy of Language as a Critique of Religious Critical
Realism," 42).

28

events. Neither in science nor in theology will we derive much insight from simply staring at
raw data.65
The concept of commitment to a belief is very important to Polkinghorne. He adopts
Polanyi’s philosophy of a responsible commitment. Intellectual assent and a commitment to a
point of view in either science or religion must have sufficient motivation for commitment66 even
though one should remain mindful that in principle it may be mistaken.67
As a scientific and theological realist, Polkinghorne stresses parallels between critical
realism in science and theology68 when he writes, “The scientist and the theologian both work by
faith, a realist trust in the rational reliability of our understanding of experience,”69 and this
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Polkinghorne, Scientists as Theologians: A Comparison of the Writings of Ian Barbour, Arthur
Peacocke and John Polkinghorne, 15. “The dilemma,” critiques Allen on Polkinghorne’s explanatory
theory, “with this portrait of theological knowledge gives the impression that theology is as empirical as the
other disciplines–on critical realist grounds. What is ironic is that Polkinghorne presents theology’s
dependence on faith as truly distinctive. The reader is left with conflicting interpretations of Polkinghorne’s
position” (Paul L. Allen, Ernan McMullin and Critical Realism in the Science-Theology Dialogue
[Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006], 37).
66

Polkinghorne, Science and Religion in Quest of Truth, 9, 12. “Religious faith does not demand
irrational submission to some unquestionable authority, but it does involve rational commitment to wellmotivated belief.” In regard to science, “Science, by these lights, is a set of beliefs which scientists are
motvated to accept, not a set of truths that can’t be called into question by those motivated to be skeptical
about them” (Dean Nelson and Karl Giberson, Quantum Leap (Monarch Books, 2011), 45-46).
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Janet Martin Soskice, Metaphor and Religious Language (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 139140, 152. Michael Polanyi writes, “So we see that both Kepler and Einstein approached nature with
intellectual passions and with beliefs inherent in these passions, which led them to their triumphs and
misguided them to their errors. . . . And again, what I accept of their work as true today, I accept
personally, guided by passions and beliefs similar to theirs, holding in my turn that my impulses are valid,
universally, even though I must admit the possibility that they may be mistaken” (Polanyi, 145). Echoing
Polanyi, Polkinghorne comments, “I have motivations for my believing in a creative God. . . . It’s a
reasonable position, but not a knock-down argument. But it’s strong enough to bet my life on it. Just as
Polanyi bet his life on his belief, knowing that it might not be true, I give my life to it, but I’m not certain.
I’m as certain as I am in judging people’s character. Sometimes I’m wrong. . . . I quiver with the notion that
I may be mistaken. But I choose to stand with Christ” (Nelson and Giberson, Quantum Leap, 47-48).
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Polkinghorne presents six parallels between critical realism in science and in theology in his
Belief in God in an Age of Science, 105-122. An overview of the differences between critical realism in
science and theology in Polkinghorne can be found in Andreas Losch, "Critical Realism: A Sustainable
Bridge between Science and Religion?," Theology and Science 8 (2010): 400-401.
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Polkinghorne, Belief in God in an Age of Science, 124.
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understanding stems from his conviction that the pursuit of science is an aspect of the Imago
Dei.70
Polkinghorne’s critical realist interpretation of science then rests on a metaphysical and
religious worldview71 that provides an “economic, coherent, adequately comprehensive and
intellectually satisfying understanding of the rich range of human experience of reality.”72 His
metaphysical and religious position warrants extracting knowledge of the physical world because
of the rationality of the cosmos.73 For this reason, Polkinghorne believes intelligibility is the key
to reality.74 Grounds for ontological belief are not limited to the observable but to the intelligible
which provides the explanatory adequacy.75 Rational inquiry is
not characterized by an unwillingness to take intellectual risks, so that we cling to what is
deductively certain, but it is bold enough to venture on the construction of a metaphysical
scheme whose justification will lie in its attainment of comprehensive explanatory power.
70

Polkinghorne, Reason and Reality: The Relationship between Science and Theology, 6. “One
might put it in theological terms by saying that the image of God is not so defaced in humanity that we are
unable to attain a verisimilitudinous grasp of reality” (ibid.).
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Smedes, Chaos, Complexity, and God, 95-96.
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Polkinghorne, Science and Religion in Quest of Truth, 23.
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Polkinghorne, Reason and Reality: The Relationship between Science and Theology, 11.
Polkinghorne claims that “the critical realist believes the way things are will provide the necessary clue to
how they are to be understood. Those who commit themselves to this trust in a rational cosmos are
asserting intelligibility to be the key to reality.” Smedes explains, “This belief in the rationality of the
cosmos, and the belief that our understanding is tuned in with that rationality and that reality, is the warrant
that our scientific knowledge is a clue to how things really are” (Smedes, Chaos, Complexity, and God, 95).
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Polkinghorne, Scientists as Theologians: A Comparison of the Writings of Ian Barbour, Arthur
Peacocke and John Polkinghorne, 14. “I have added to my critical realism the suggestion that it is
intelligibility that is the key to reality, an attitude I first adopted in the course of seeking to defend the
reality of the elusive and unpicturable quantum world. Entities with explanatory power are candidates for
acceptance as components of reality. What makes sense of extensive experience is to be treated with
ontological seriousness. Here is a particular way of expressing the realist conviction so natural to a scientist
and so necessary for a theologian” (ibid.).
75

Polkinghorne, Science and Religion in Quest of Truth, 11. “The existence of quarks must be
defended by appeal to the intelligibility that they offer of more directly accessible phenomena. . . . In fact I
believe that critical realism is a concept that is fundamental to the entire human quest for truth and
understanding and that theology can defend its belief in the unseen reality of God by a similar appeal to the
intelligibility that this offers of the general nature of the world and of great swathes of well-testified
spiritual experience.” Barbour makes the remark that “the real is the intelligible, not the observable”
(Barbour, Issues in Science and Religion, 173).
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The success of science should encourage us to take such a bet on the reasonableness of the
world and commit ourselves to an openness of experience to being understood.76
Because of this, Polkinghorne believes there is rational motivation for religious belief.
The existence of God is a necessary condition for this motivation and theological statements
presuppose matters of fact. Theological propositions have as their core, propositions about God.
The applicability of critical realism to theology has to do primarily with the theological
propositions with reference to God.77 When theological propositions are reformulated in
contemporary categories, this allows theology to operate as a critical realist discipline as
expressed in the epigram fides quaerens intellectum.78 Polkinghorne develops his theological
critical realism on the assumptions that theological cognitive claims are reasonable because
doctrines are a distinct theological form of knowledge.79
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Polkinghorne, Reason and Reality: The Relationship between Science and Theology, 11.
Elsewhere he writes, “At the heart of scientific realism lies the conviction that intelligibility is the reliable
guide to ontology, that concepts and entities whose postulation enables us to make deep sense of wide
swathes of experience, are to be taken with the utmost seriousness as candidate descriptions of what is
actually the case” (Polkinghorne, Belief in God in an Age of Science, 109-110).
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van Kooten Niekerk, "A Critical Realist Perspective on the Dialogue between Theology and
Science," 73-76. Niekerk provides three basic reasons why the transfer of a critical realist understanding
from scientific statements to theological cognitive claims about God is not possible without modification.
First, theology differs in regard to science because its core subject matter is contested. Second, the contrast
between personal and unrepeatable experience in religion and the impersonal experiment in science. Third,
language in theology differs because it is metaphorical and it lacks the precise mathematical statements of
science.
78

Polkinghorne, One World: The Interaction of Science and Theology, 28. Niekerk notes that
“critical realism is at least a logically possible view of theological propositions. . . . But since God is not
accessible to sense experience and experimental control, critical realism can hardly have the same rational
plausibility for theology as for science” (192). Since the 1990s, the transfer of critical realism to theology
has increasingly been disputed on the ground that it is not sufficient to the nature of theology. Niekerk
outlines the main arguments in favor and against the transferring of critical realism to theology. The main
arguments in favor are: (1) theology makes cognitive claims as science does; (2) theology seeks to explain
religious experience with reference to divine reality. Science seeks to explain sense-experience with
reference to the natural world; (3) both theology and science employ the use of metaphors and models as
approximate descriptions of external realities. The main arguments against this transfer are: (1) religious
language has an expressive function rather than a cognitive one; (2) theology examines God, who is wholly
different from the natural world, which is the subject matter of science; (3) theology does not have similar
predictive success as science. Therefore, theology lacks an equivalent of the main reason for a realistic
view of science (192).
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Allen, Ernan McMullin and Critical Realism in the Science-Theology Dialogue, 15.
Observations concerning Polkinghorne’s critical realism are largely dependent on ibid., 13-47.
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Polkinghorne’s critical theological faith is open to development and correction in its
understanding. In addition, revision can occur and, as in science, only verisimilitudinous
knowledge is obtained.80 Polkinghorne appeals to a theological argument in support of his
philosophical claim that guides theological development and revision: “The God of truth will not
be a deceiver, and insights into the divine character, manifested either in the works of creation or
in the events of revelation, can be relied upon not to mislead.”81
Polkinghorne addresses “faith, redemptive categories, human historicity, or revelational
theology” in his theological critical realism and he also allows “a greater role for theological
tradition in defining the way in which critical realism applies within theology.”82 Though
theological tradition has a greater role, revisions to theology are permitted in light of present
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Polkinghorne, Scientists as Theologians: A Comparison of the Writings of Ian Barbour, Arthur
Peacocke and John Polkinghorne, 18. “The verisimilitudinous nature of our knowledge in science, and
even more so in theology whose finite discourse will never be adequate to the Infinite Reality of which it
purports to speak” (Kai Man Kwan, "A Critical Faith Vs. Uncritical Suspicion: Towards Critical Realism,"
Stimulus 16 (2008): 33). Kwan Kai Man defines his faith as a critical faith. He writes, “The kind of faith I
am defending is a kind of critical faith. It adheres to the framework of critical realism. . . . It is also a faith
that is willing to face criticism . . . faith can have a critical dialogue with criticism, sometimes rebutting the
criticism and sometimes admitting the need to revise our understanding of the faith” (ibid.).
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Polkinghorne, Quantum Physics and Theology: An Unexpected Kinship, 15.

82

Allen, Ernan McMullin and Critical Realism in the Science-Theology Dialogue, 14, 36. As Allen
notes, Polkinghorne is prepared to shed the timeless view of God in classical theism. Polkinghorne stresses
God’s temporality. Polkinghorne comments, “Classical theism has always claimed that theatemporal view
does not contradict human free actions since they are not foreknown but known only as they happen in
God’s timeless state of universally contemporaneous knowledge. My argument has been that it is unnatural
to think of a world open to agencies that act to produce the future, as being one laid out complete in space
and time, since it seems to be a world of unfolding becoming rather than static being. . . . Yet, it is difficult
to reconcile the atemporal view with a great deal of Christian thought. The religion of the Incarnation
seems to imply a divine participation in the reality of the temporal, from a birth under Augustus to a death
under Tiberius. The God of the Old and New Testaments seems to have a deep engagement with historical
process, with the becomingness of the world. . . . If one is to talk of divine temporality, then one must face
the question of which time is the divine time. What is God’s frame of reference for the judging of
simultaneity? The problem is not as acute as it might seem for, whatever solution is supposed, God is not a
localized observer in the chosen frame but omnipresent within it. As its time sweeps out history, God will
experience every event as, where and when it happens, and know all such events in their correct causal
interrelations” (Polkinghorne, Belief in God in an Age of Science, 70-71).
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scientific insights.83 In theological critical realism, theology procures motivated belief rather than
fideistic assertions and certainties. Polkinghorne’s theological critical realism is modeled on its
scientific counterpart. He describes it as “based on an analogy with science’s approach to
exploring the way things are. Because it is realist, theology will want to retain an evidential
appeal to Scripture as ground for belief. Because it is critical realism, theology will seek to
respect the nature of the Reality it encounters.84
How then should one understand and interpret scientific statements and theological
propositions? Since science and theology can only claim verisimilitudinous knowledge, models
and metaphors are used to describe reality. Models, even though they are of “recognized
inadequacy,”85 are used in science as “explanatory devices, useful in the attempt to gain some
understanding of a limited aspect of physical phenomena,” and “there is no reason to treat models
with ontological seriousness, as if they were approximate maps of reality.”86 When used by
science, metaphors are “picturesque shorthand for ideas that they can readily and more adequately
convey in precise scientific language.”87
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“Perhaps rather more than my scientist-theologian colleagues, I am anxious to locate our
twentieth-century understandings within that development of Christian doctrine, to stress continuity rather
than discontinuity with the past, without denying the particular insights available in the present”
(Polkinghorne, Scientists as Theologians: A Comparison of the Writings of Ian Barbour, Arthur Peacocke
and John Polkinghorne, 17). A few pages later, Polkinghorne further clarifies “I wrote my own Gifford
lectures to explore to what extent we can use the search for motivated understanding, so congenial to the
scientific mind, as a route to being able to make the substance of Christian orthodoxy our own and my
conclusion was that one could attain a Christian belief which is certainly revised in the light of our
twentieth-century insights but which is recognizably contained within an envelope of understanding in
continuity with the developing doctrine of the Church through the centuries” (24-25). Wegter-McNelly
comments along the same line “Critical realism’ . . . provides room for religious reflection and theological
(re)description to exist alongside scientific accounts” (Kirk Wegter-McNelly, "Fundamental Physics and
Religion," in The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science, ed. Philip Clayton (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2006), 157-158).
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Polkinghorne, Reason and Reality: The Relationship between Science and Theology, 69.
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Ibid., 23.
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Polkinghorne, Scientists as Theologians: A Comparison of the Writings of Ian Barbour, Arthur
Peacocke and John Polkinghorne, 19.
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Ibid., 20.
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In regard to theology, Polkinghorne believes that metaphors and models play a more
fundamental role than in science. Metaphors, when representing divine reality, provide a
necessary medium because they not only say and refer to something in a way that cannot be said
or referred to in another manner, they are inadequate because they are not straightforward
descriptions, that is, they do not offer literal descriptions of their reference.88 For Polkinghorne,
metaphors are intrinsic to theological discourse: “Metaphor, in my view is not intrinsic to
scientific discourse, but it certainly is to theological discourse. The latter’s need to use finite
language about the uncapturable infinity of the divine nature requires the indefinite openendedness that metaphor affords, its poetic power to grant intuitive illumination.”89
As in science, theological models are a necessary means of offering valuable partial
insight in their exploration of depicting divine reality.90 Because they are culturally conditioned,
the interpretation of models is subject to revision. When required, models should be reformulated
in contemporary categories:
The primary source of theology is the biblical tradition. Theology recognizes that this
tradition is an expression of human religious experience interpreted by changing categories of
different times. Therefore, it cannot assign absolute authority to the cognitive claims of this
tradition. It has to judge to what extent those claims can be regarded as valid in the light of
88

Soskice, Metaphor and Religious Language, 160. “All the metaphors which we use to speak of
God arise from experiences of that which cannot adequately be described, of that which Jews and
Christians believe to be 'He who is’” (ibid.).
89

Polkinghorne, Scientists as Theologians: A Comparison of the Writings of Ian Barbour, Arthur
Peacocke and John Polkinghorne, 20. Polkinghorne further comments, “Theology must go beyond the
literary device of metaphor and make use of the broader concept of symbol. Symbols exceed signs in their
possessing a profound power to participate in that which they represent. They verge on the sacramental and
they are an indispensable expression of the life of worship.” If metaphors are in fact inadequate means of
describing divine reality, then “how,” asks Don Cupitt, “can religion both be sure about God and yet be
sure of the inadequacy of all the representations of God with which it operates?” (Don Cupitt, Christ and
the Hiddenness of God (Philadelphia, PA: Westminster Press, 1985), 53).
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Polkinghorne, Scientists as Theologians: A Comparison of the Writings of Ian Barbour, Arthur
Peacocke and John Polkinghorne, 23. “I find it useful to restrict the term ‘model’ to cases of acknowledged
partial description and limited adequacy. That is also, I believe, how the concept functions in theology.
Theology knows that all its models of God, if pressed too far, will eventually become inadequate idols. It
also knows from apophatic theology concerning the unknowable mystery of the divine nature, that its
pretensions to theory-making are never going to find adequate fulfillment. However, that does not lead it to
intellectual despair, but to cautious modesty about its achievements” (ibid.). See also Arthur R. Peacocke,
Theology for a Scientific Age: Being and Becoming Divine and Human (London: SCM Press, 1993), 14.
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the knowledge of our time. Moreover, it has to reformulate them in contemporary categories
in order that they can be understood by people of our time. 91
Theological models also include an affective element, engaging the emotions as well as
the mind.92 Models in theological discussions do not offer a complete understanding of the
infinite divine reality nor should they be taken as serious ontological descriptions.93 What
Polkinghorne desires is the replacement of models, which do not refer to reality, for a single
integrated theory that does refer to a “verisimilitudinous description of physical reality.”94
Revised Natural Theology and Theology of Nature
Polkinghorne frames critical realism within Natural Theology, which also serves as the
bridge between science and theology. This section examines his view on Natural Theology and
Theology of Nature.
The theological strands of95 Natural Theology and Theology of Nature are present in
Polkinghorne’s line of thinking. According to Polkinghorne, the assertions of traditional theology
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van Kooten Niekerk, "A Critical Realist Perspective on the Dialogue between Theology and
Science," 71.
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McGrath, Science & Religion: A New Introduction, 211.
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Polkinghorne, Scientists as Theologians: A Comparison of the Writings of Ian Barbour, Arthur
Peacocke and John Polkinghorne, 21. Polkinghorne writes, “The limited scope of any one model’s
explanatory ambition, and the fact that it is not proposed as an adequate ontological description, means that
there is no perplexity about the use of a portfolio of different models, and no necessity to seek their perfect
reconciliation with each other. We no more need to resolve the tension between the divine models of God
as Father and as Judge than we need to do the same for the physical models of the nucleus as a cloudy
crystal ball and as a liquid drop. They simply serve to shed modest light on different, mutually exclusive,
aspects of our experience. As Barbour says, we need to take them ‘seriously but not literally’” (ibid.).
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Polkinghorne, Science and Religion in Quest of Truth, 19. See also Losch, "On the Origins of
Critical Realism," 91. The “bottom-up” approach takes the interpreted experience of reality as the starting
point and moves toward a theory that accounts for it.
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It is important not to conflate or confuse these two expressions. According to Ian Barbour, both
Natural Theology and Theology of Nature are examples of partial integrations between science and
theology. Both are characterized as attempts to integrate the evolutionary paradigm into theology. Natural
Theology is a form of reflection that attempts to learn about God as creator by applying human reason to
the natural world. Its starting point is the result of scientific research, rather than through divine revelation.
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can be maintained in a scientific world.96 He achieves this by using a revised form of Natural
Theology for the purpose of integrating the natural sciences with Christian theology.97 Hence, the
role of Natural Theology is to provide the framework in exploring this integration in view of the
fact that it affords a “convenient setting in which to begin.”98 What is this revised Natural
Theology? Polkinghorne explains that the revision “reflects a clearer understanding of the status
of natural theology and of its relationship both to science and to a theology that looks to
revelation for its fundamental basis.”99

In Theology of Nature, the starting point is not science, but a religious tradition based on histori, and reject
already established theological doctrines. The Christian doctrine of creation is where this is most clearly
seen. Barbour writes that “some traditional doctrines need to be reformulated in the light of current science.
. . . In particular, the doctrines of creation, providence, and human nature are affected by the findings of
science. If religious beliefs are to be in harmony with scientific knowledge, some adjustments or
modifications are called for. . . . Theological doctrines must be consistent with the scientific evidence even
if they are not required by it.” Ian G. Barbour, Religion and Science: Historical and Contemporary Issues
(New York: HarperCollins, 1997), 100-101; Ian G. Barbour, "Science and Religion, Models and
Relations," in Encyclopedia of Science and Religion, ed. J. Wentzel van Huyssteen (London: Thomson
Gale, 2003).
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Though beyond the scope of this study, the resilience of Natural Theology in England deserves
attention. It flourished in England on account of its distinctive character. Brooke describes a unique
characteristic of British Natural Theology: “Consequently, a critical mentality and faith in progress could
thrive in England within piety. The peculiar resilience of natural theology can then be understood as a
visible, and enduring, symbol of an Enlightenment goal—the pursuit of science—thriving within piety”
(John H. Brooke, Science and Religion: Some Historical Perspectives, The Cambridge History of Science
Series (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 200. For a summary, see pp. 197-203).
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Polkinghorne, Science and Theology: An Introduction, 70-72. According to William Alston, the
Christian may appeal to Natural Theology in order to offer “metaphysical reasons for the truth of a theism
as a general world-view; and then, within the field of theistic religions, he may argue that historical
evidence gives much stronger support to the claims of Christianity than to those of its theistic rivals—
Judaism and Islam.” William P. Alston, Perceiving God (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991), 270.
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Polkinghorne, Science and Religion in Quest of Truth, 70. Polkinghorne comments that
“one should also acknowledge that natural theology helps the believer to set basic Christian belief in the
context of wider human culture and knowledge, and that it can also play an apologetic role in encouraging
an honest enquirer to put the issue of God onto the agenda of possibility.” John C. Polkinghorne, "Where Is
Natural Theology Today?," Science and Christian Belief 18 (2006): 172. Fergusson writes that the term
Natural Theology has been “stretched to comprehend a wide variety of theological tasks” and he describes
five functions of Natural Theology. One role is to display the consistency of theology in ways in which the
“essential claims of revelation can coexist” with other forms of enquiry. David Fergusson, "Types of
Natural Theology," in The Evolution of Rationality, ed. F. LeRon Shults (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans,
2006), 384-389.
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Polkinghorne, "Where Is Natural Theology Today?," 171.
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The revised form of discourse replaces the hackneyed expressions of older styles of
Natural Theology, such as “proofs” of God’s existence for the cogent and theistic language of the
“best explanation,”100 which serves as the “deepest and most satisfying insight into the way the
world is,” 101 leading to motivated belief.
The content of Natural Theology revolves around two metaquestions: Why is science
possible and Why is the universe so special? 102 Polkinghorne’s interpretation is rooted on a
metaphysical proposal: a divine Creator and a religious worldview. These features can be
recognized in his theological explanations to the metaquestions.
For Polkinghorne, God operates as a warrant and as an explanation for the rationality of
the physical world. He resituates theology, allowing it to “be an interpretative framework with its
own data of religious experience as a distinct data-theory level in human culture.”103
For Polkinghorne, the universe is both rationally transparent to inquiry and rationally
beautiful.104 He utilizes three general approaches to Natural Theology: human reason, orderliness
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Polkinghorne, Science and Religion in Quest of Truth, 71.
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Polkinghorne, "Where Is Natural Theology Today?," 171. “The thesis that I would defend about
theistic belief is not that it is logically ineveitable, but that it gives us the deepest and most satisfying
insight into the way the world is. It is not that our atheistic friends are stupid—far from it—but that atheism
explains less than theism can” (ibid.).
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Polkinghorne, Science and Religion in Quest of Truth, 71-76.
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Allen, Ernan McMullin and Critical Realism in the Science-Theology Dialogue 38. John C.
Polkinghorne, The Faith of a Physicist: Reflections of a Bottom-up Thinker: The Gifford Lectures for 19934 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 44. Polkinghorne further comments, “If natural
theology is to flourish again, it will require more input from the theological side.” Polkinghorne explains
“that theism offers a persuasive and coherent response to understanding the origin of the deep rational
transparency and deep rational beauty that physics has discovered at the basis of the universe. Theology
sees the reason within (human thinking) and the reason without (the order of the physical world) as having
a common origin in the Mind of the Creator, whose will is the ground of both our mental capacity and our
physical experience. The new natural theology suggests that science is possible, and mathematics is so
unreasonably effective, just because the universe is a creation and human beings are, to use an ancient and
powerful phrase, creatures made in the image of their Creator” (Polkinghorne, “Where Is Natural Theology
Today?,” 174).
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Polkinghorne, Science and Religion in Quest of Truth, 73.
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of the world, and the beauty of nature.105 Polkinghorne explains that science is possible because
of the congruity between the human mind and creation. The human mind is “fine-tuned”106 to
discern God in an “orderly cosmos”107 that contains and constitutes evidence for the presence of a
divine Mind108 and Purpose. This is inferred from the “deep intelligibility”109 or “rational beauty
of the cosmos.”110 This rational beauty is mimicked by the fact that mathematics111 provides the

105

McGrath, Science & Religion: A New Introduction, 111-115.
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Ibid., 111.
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Polkinghorne, Science and Creation: The Search for Understanding, 20-21. “There is a
congruence between our minds and the universe, between the rationality experienced within and the
rationality observed without” (ibid.).
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Polkinghorne, Quantum Physics and Theology: An Unexpected Kinship, 8. “Achieving
scientific success is a specific ability possessed by humankind . . . that a full understanding of this
remarkable human capacity for scientific discovery ultimately requires the insight that our power in this
respect is the gift of the universe’s Creator who . . . made humanity in the image of God (Genesis 1:26-27)
. . . are able to discern a world of deep and beautiful order—a universe shot through with signs of mind. I
believe that it is indeed the Mind of that world’s Creator that is perceived in this way. Science is possible
because the universe is a divine creation” (ibid.).
109

Polkinghorne, Theology in the Context of Science, 12. “In addition, there is a further
metascientific necessity to make comprehensible the deep intelligibility of the universe, that fundamental
fact about the world which has enabled science to derive its explanatory success. This is too remarkable a
cosmological feature to be treated as if it were just a brute fact or a happy accident” (ibid.).
110

Polkinghorne, Belief in God in an Age of Science, 4.
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For a summary of Polkinghorne’s beliefs on mathematics, see John C. Polkinghorne,
"Mathematical Reality," in Meaning in Mathematics, ed. John C. Polkinghorne (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2011), 27-34. A strong thread of interest between science and theology continues while a similar
thread between mathematics and theology did not emerge. Recent articles and essays that demonstrate
increased interest in this relationship are in fashion. More recent literature includes: Wolfgang Achtner,
"Truth and Proof in Mathematics and (Philosophical) Theology," Theology and Science 9 (2011): 75-89;
James E. Bradley, "Theology and Mathematics--Key Themes and Central Historical Figures," Theology
and Science 9 (2011): 5-26; Owen Gingerich, "Kepler's Trinitarian Cosmology," Theology and Science 9
(2011): 45-51; Ladislav Kvasv, "The Invisible Link between Mathematics and Theology," Perspectives on
Science and Christian Faith 56 (2004): 111-116; Albert C. Lewis, "The Divine Truths of Mathematics and
the Origins of Linear Algebra," Theology and Science 9 (2011): 109-120; W. G. Malcolm, "Thinking
About God and Infinity: Can Mathematics Contribute?," Stimulus 18 (2010): 35-41; Vance G. Morgan,
"Mathematics and Supernatural Friendship," Philosophy & Theology 18 (2006): 319-335; Alvin Platinga,
"Theism and Mathematics," Theology and Science 9 (2011): 27-33; Volker R. Remmert, "Galileo, God and
Mathematics," in Mathematics and the Divine: A Historical Study, ed. Teun Koetsier and Luc Bergmans
(Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2005); Stewart Shapiro, "Theology and the Actual Infinite: Burley and Cantor,"
Theology and Science 9 (2011): 101-108; Christian Tapp, "Infinity in Mathematics and Theology,"
Theology and Science 9 (2011): 91-100.
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“key to unlock these physical secrets . . . whose equations are endowed with the unmistakable
character of mathematical beauty.”112 Polkinghorne further elucidates:
Those seeking an understanding as complete as possible must ask what it could be that links
together the reason within (mathematical thinking) and the reason without (the structure of
the physical world) in this remarkable way? . . . I believe that the reason within and the
reason without fit together because they have a common origin in the God who is the ground
both of human mental experience and of the existence of the physical world of which we are
a part. The fact of an intelligible universe itself becomes intelligible when the world is seen as
being a divine creation and human beings, to use an ancient and powerful phrase, as creatures
made in the image of their Creator.113
The uniqueness of the universe can be seen through the insights of the anthropic
principle.114 This provides the epistemological basis to theological claims regarding the natural
universe. The laws of nature operate in a precisely defined form, and a religious believer “will see
cosmic fine-tuning as an endowment of potentiality given by the Creator to creation in order to
bring about a fruitful history that fulfills the divine Purpose.”115
It is critical to keep in mind that Polkinghorne is influenced by his high view of science.
His revised Natural Theology presupposes the validity of science and does not rival scientific
explanation. He explains:
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Polkinghorne, Science and the Trinity: The Christian Encounter with Reality, 12-13.
Polkinghorne explains, “There is much more to the mind of God than physics will ever disclose, but
thisusage is not misleading, for I believe that the rational beauty of the cosmos indeed reflects the Mind that
holds it in being. The ‘unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics’ in uncovering the structure of the
physical world . . . is a hint of the presence of the Creator, given to us creatures who are made in the divine
image. I do not present this conclusion as a logical demonstration—we are in a realm of metaphysical
discourse where such certainty is not available either to believer or to unbeliever—but I do present it as a
coherent and intellectually satisfying understanding” (Polkinghorne, Belief in God in an Age of Science, 45).
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Polkinghorne, Science and Religion in Quest of Truth, 73. Ratzsch explains that “This aesthetic
dimension is perceived as so fundamentally infused into the structure of law that many physicists take
beauty to be a pointer toward truth” (Del Ratzsch, Nature, Design and Science (Albany, NY: State
University of New York Press, 2001), 35.
114

The term Anthropic Principle is generally used to refer to the remarkable degree of fine-tuning
observed within the natural order. For an overview see Michael A. Corey, “Anthropic Principle,” in
Encyclopedia of Science and Religion, ed. J. Wenztel van Huyssteen [London: Thomson Gale, 2003], 1318.
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Polkinghorne, Science and Religion in Quest of Truth, 74.
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This new natural theology is in no way a rival to science within science’s proper domain. It
does not purport to provide answers to what are essentially scientific questions but it serves as
a complement to science, going beyond the latter’s self-limited realm of enquiry and
addressing metaquestions, that arise from scientific experience but which transcend the
bounds of scientific understanding alone. There is no recourse here to ‘the God of the Gaps’
. . . but to the God whose steadfast will is held to be expressed in the laws of nature that
science discovers but does not explain.116
Notwithstanding that Natural Theology can elaborate a cumulative case for theism,117 it
offers limited resources for theological investigation and consequently leads to limited
theological insight. Polkinghorne realizes that Natural Theology alone is insufficient for faith.118
Polkinghorne’s approach can also be considered under the aspect of Theology of Nature
whose metaphysical scheme has as its defining basis theism. He regards God’s existence as
having explanatory force, “as an aid for understanding why things have developed in the physical
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Polkinghorne, Science and Theology: An Introduction, 71. He writes elsewhere: “Theology’s
job is not to rival science on its own ground (the How questions) but to complement science by offering its
own more profound kind of understanding (the answers to Why quesitons)” (Polkinghorne, Traffic in
Truth: Exchanges between Science and Theology, 30). Polkinghorne assumes the integrity of human
capacity to reason, perceive, interpret, and evaluate the universe. The effects of sin do not appear to prevent
a correct understanding and interpretation of the universe.
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The identity of God remains unanswered. The God prescribed by Christians is not obviously
distinguished. In Christian theology, God is a personal being who cares for his creation. Natural theology
cannot prove the existence of an infinite Creator from the existence of a finite universe. It can only
establish through inference the existence of a powerful but perhaps limited God. Polkinghorne recognizes
this when he writes: “Even if the arguments presented so far are accorded their most persuasive force, one
must confess that they lead only to a rather thin idea of God, conceived as something like the Cosmic
Architect or the Great Mathematician” (Polkinghorne, Science and Theology: An Introduction, 76). If this
line of reasoning is correct and adequately presented, one would tend to think any rational person would be
convinced. Yet, this is not the case and Polkinghorne is aware of this: “The claim being made is not that
this insight is logically incontestable and could not be denied, but that it offers the deeply intellectually
satisfying best explanation of the remarkable access that science has been able to attain to the deep
structure of the universe” (Polkinghorne, Science and Religion in Quest of Truth, 73-74).
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Polkinghorne, Reason and Reality: The Relationship between Science and Theology, 60. “I do
say, however, that considerations of natural theology and the like do not afford the fundamental basis for
my own religious belief. That lies in my encounter with God in Christ, mediated through the Church, the
sacraments, and, of course, the reading of Scripture” (ibid.). Elsewhere, he notes that Natural Theology, on
its own, “can lead only to a generic kind of theism and it leaves unaddressed many significant questions,
such as whether the Creator enters into any particular relationship with particular creatures. Resources for
addressing such questions will have to come from specific acts of divine disclosure, that is to say, from
what theology terms ‘special revelation’” (Polkinghorne, Science and Religion in Quest of Truth, 110-111).
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world in the manner that they have.”119 He further comments, “Theism is concerned with making
total sense of the world. The force of its claims depends upon the degree to which belief in God
affords the best explanation of the varieties, not just of religious experience, but of all human
experience.120
In this strategy, the scientific account of the character of the physical world is maintained,
but an “alternative metainterpretation” is given. God is the source and the understanding of the
world flows from the belief in the existence of a Creator.121 This automatically leads to the
doctrine of creation, expressing further consonance between science and theology.
Scientific Methodology and Presuppositions
The object of scientific inquiry is the natural world, and the standard image of scientific
knowledge is of linear progress. As knowledge increases, more gaps are filled in its
understanding. The key to science is the method by which it arrives at its conclusions. This
method is described by the formula “from fact to theory.”122 Scientific methodology seeks to gain
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Polkinghorne, Belief in God in an Age of Science, 13. “The theologian’s response to the
biologist’s unbelief must lie in proposing an alternative interpretation of the history and process of the
universe. Here we are concerned . . . with metaquestions about how its historical process is to be
understood. This shift of attention corresponds to a transition from natural theology to a theology of nature.
We are not now looking to the physical world for hints of God’s existence but to God’s existence as an aid
for understanding why things have developed in the physical world in the manner that they have” (ibid.).
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Ibid., 24. “Since God is the ground of all that is, every kind of human rational investigation of
reality must have something to contribute to theological thinking, as the latter pursues its goal of an
adequate understanding of the created world, understood in the light of the belief that the mind and
purposes of the Creator lie behind cosmic order and history” (Polkinghorne, Theology in the Context of
Science, 9).
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Polkinghorne, Science and Theology: An Introduction, 77. “The task is to accept the scientific
story at its own level but to propose an alternative metainterpretation of that story, read out from the belief
that behind it lie the creative purposes of God” (ibid.).
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van den Brink, Philosophy of Science for Theologians: An Introduction, 27. Brink succinctly
explains the scientific method: “Things start with the scientist observing factual data. These data call for an
explanation, or a theory. What scientists then do, on the basis of the observed facts, is to develop a theory
with which to test the facts. . . . If the theory now seems to work, then it can be seen to have been proven,
and another blank is filled in on the map, and the voyage of discovery in search of new facts and
explanations can continue” (ibid.).
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knowledge by understanding the natural processes of physical reality by addressing specific types
of questions and advancing specific types of answers.
Scientific methodology has four main features,123 which contain three key elements: the
empirical, the objective, and rationality.124 First, the scientific method is in tune with facts that
consist of observing and identifying reliable and predictive patterns and structures of physical
reality, that is, natural laws empirically. Natural causes must explain these patterns and structures
rationally. Second, the patterns of physical reality are explained through a hypothesis that can
become a theory. Only theories that produce testable predictions are regarded as scientific. Third,
hypothesis and theories are tested and compared to other relevant theories and are often modified
and changed in light of new evidence. Thus, science is open to revision, and the scientific method
cannot claim it produces absolute truth but only partial approximations.125 Finally, science is open
to distortion because scientists view the world from a chosen perspective with multiple
interpretations and prior expectations. The scientific method must exhibit some degree of
objectivity in handling data, and this is fostered by submitting all fact-claims and theories to
communal challenge.
Science also has a characteristic set of presuppositions that are not proven scientifically
but rather they are philosophically assumed. First, it is postulated that nature is understandable.
Second, science assumes that nature is uniform and its processes and patterns hold universally.
Third, science presupposes that observable patterns in nature provide keys to unobservable
patterns and processes.
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Michael H. Barnes, Understanding Religion and Science: Introducing the Debate (New York:
Continuum, 2010), 41-43.
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Del Ratzsch, Science and Its Limits (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2000), 14.
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Polkinghorne, Science and Religion in Quest of Truth, 8. “While the achievement of science
does not amount to absolute and exhaustive truth, it can be asserted to be what one may call
‘verisimilitude’, an ever tightening, but never total, grasp of physical reality” (ibid.).
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The Authority and Limits of Science
Scientism,126 or “cosmic literalism,”127 is the biased view that scientific truth is absolute truth. It
sees science possessing rational legitimacy while other sources of knowledge, including theology,
are generally viewed as not holding this intellectual distinction. For example, Peter Atkins views
modernist science as the only true source of knowledge when he writes that science “is the only
path to understanding.”128 However, others have affirmed that there are clear limits to its
authority and competence because it encounters a universe that transcends its ability to explain.129
Polkinghorne is a resolute opponent of scientistic claims. He refutes the notion of the
absolute relevancy in science because there are other equally legitimate avenues to seeking
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The epistemological form of scientism should be distinguished from ontological scientism.
Epistemic scientism is any assertion that only scientific understanding yields genuine knowledge on
everything there is to know about reality. Because of its monopoly on knowledge, anything outside of
science is pseudo-knowledge. This sets the limit of human knowledge. Ontological scientism limits reality
by reducing it to the material world (Mikael Stenmark, "Scientism," in Encyclopedia of Science and
Religion, ed. J. Wentzel van Huyssteen (London: Thomson Gale, 2003)). Ted Peters writes, “Not only is it
anti-religious, it only pretends to be scientific. Actual science as a research enterprise does not need the
ideology of scientism.” Ted Peters, "Contributions from Practical Theology and Ethics," in The Oxford
Handbook of Religion and Science, ed. Philip Clayton and Zachary Simpson (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2006), 377.
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John Haught has coined scientism as a “cosmic literalism,” analogous to a biblical literalism
(John F. Haught, Deeper Than Darwin: The Prospect for Religion in the Age of Evolution (Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 2003), 16).
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Peter Atkins, "Atheism and Science," in The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science, ed.
Philip Clayton and Zachary Simpson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 124.
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George F. R. Ellis, "Physics, Complexity, and Religion," in The Oxford Handbook of Religion
and Science, ed. Philip Clayton and Zachary Simpson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 760-761.
For example, ethics, aesthetics, metaphysics, and meaning are outside the ambit of science. They are
beyond the competence of science because there are no scientific experiments that can determine any of
them. Ellis explains why there are limits to science. “Because experimental science deals with the generic,
the universal, in very restricted circumstances. It works in circumstances so tightly prescribed that effects
are repeatable. Most things which are of real value in human life are not repeatable. They are individual
events which may have crucial meaning for individuals and for humanity in the course of history; but each
occurs only once. So repeatable science does not encompass either all that is important or all than can
reasonably be called knowledge” (ibid.).
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knowledge, as is the case of theology, which searches for knowledge of God.130
Even though Polkinghorne acknowledges there are other forms of gaining knowledge, it
is evident that the advancement of scientific knowledge influences his context of thought. On the
one hand, he acknowledges the dominant and normative role of science in contemporary culture
by defending a view of science which asserts its achievements to have an “ever tightening, but
never total, grasp of physical reality.”131 On the other hand, Polkinghorne concedes that science is
limited to what it can offer.132 First, science is concerned with exploring the impersonal133
dimension of reality by its unique means of contriving the same phenomena through repeated
experiments since science does not engage with the personal dimension of experience, and this
implies a limited character that it can provide of reality.134 Second, science is limited to the kinds
of questions that clarify and explain the processes by which things happen.
The following section takes into consideration Polkinghorne’s view on the nature and
authority of sacred Scripture, and the function and language of Scripture. This investigation is a
necessary step in preparation for a subsequent examination of his usage of Scripture in his model
of protology and eschatology.
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Polkinghorne, Traffic in Truth: Exchanges between Science and Theology, 1-2. “A few of my
scientific colleagues think that science is the only real source of knowledge and that the only questions
worth asking and answering are those that are scientific in character. . . . It is hard to exaggerate the
implausibility of this view. The land of science rings with tales of great successes, but that is partly because
the inhabitants of that land have set themselves a limited range of tasks to accomplish” (ibid.).
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Polkinghorne, Science and Religion in Quest of Truth, 8.
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Polkinghorne, Exploring Reality: The Intertwining of Science and Religion, 137. In the
following comment, Polkinghorne specifically addresses biologists. He writes, “Second, placing an
extraordinary degree of overconfidence in science’s unaided power to gain understanding can lead some
biologists to make grossly inflated claims that their insights are capable of explaining pretty well
everything. . . . Man is more than a machine. Yet biologists today, in the wake of their stunning discoveries
in molecular genetics, are all too prone to a euphoric degree of unjustified triumphalism that grossly
exaggerates the explanatory power of their discipline” (ibid.).
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Polkinghorne, Science and Religion in Quest of Truth, 3.
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Ibid., 3-4. “A scientist, speaking as a scientist, can say no more about music than that it is
vibrations in the air, but speaking as a person there would surely be much more to say about the mysterious
way in which a temporal succession of sounds can give us access to a timeless realm of beauty” (ibid.).
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Revelation and Sacred Scripture
The object of theological inquiry is the reality of God, and Christian theology elucidates
an appropriate expression of the transcendent and incomprehensible being of God through
revelation. Scripture is an indispensable and foundational source for Christian thinking.
The Nature and Authority of Sacred Scripture
Polkinghorne is concerned with the proper role of Scripture and its evidential nature since
it does not play a subsidiary role in his theological thinking. 135 The interpretation of Scripture in
light of modern cosmology is an important dimension of the interaction between science and
religion. On the one hand, Polkinghorne does not assign a minimal role to Scripture, but on the
other hand, he also does not assign it a normative enough role as the arbiter of all theological
inquiry. Scripture, “despite all its cultural strangeness and scientific inadequacy,”136 should be
taken into account when integrating science and theology into a single perspective. Scripture
deserves a respectful and inclusive reading into the divine reality,137 and it should be approached
“on the terms that are appropriate to its intrinsic nature.”138
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Polkinghorne, Science and Theology: An Introduction, 99. “Because it is realist, theology will
want to retain an evidential appeal to Scripture as ground for belief. Because it is critical realism, theology
will seek to respect the nature of the Reality it encounters” (Polkinghorne, Reason and Reality: The
Relationship between Science and Theology, 69). On Polkinghorne and critical realism, see pp. 25-39.
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Polkinghorne, Reason and Reality: The Relationship between Science and Theology, 65.
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Polkinghorne, Science and the Trinity: The Christian Encounter with Reality, xiv-xv. “It seems
important to establish at the start that scripture does not function in this mind-closing way. On the contrary,
for though the Bible is indeed an indispensable and authoritative source for the Christian, it is one that must
be approached in ways that are subtle and complex rather than literal and unproblematic. Scriptural roles
include the evidential, the spiritual and the contextual. In a respectful reading of the Bible attention must be
paid to genre and to historical authorial setting, together with acceptance of progressive spiritual and
theological development over the many centuries of the writings’ compilation. Honesty requires the
acknowledgement of the presence of unedifying passages in the Bible, and hermeneutical adequacy
requires recognition of the polysemous character of the texts, capable of conveying meaning at several
different levels” (ibid.).
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Polkinghorne, Science and Theology: An Introduction, 35.
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Polkinghorne extends to Scripture a Christological analogy in order to account for its
status as both divinely inspired and humanly written.139 Its embodied foundational stories “are not
simply symbolic tales given us to stir our imaginations, but are rooted in God’s actual acts of selfdisclosure, mediated through particular persons and events.”140 But what does Polkinghorne mean
with the expression symbolic tales? He elucidates: “Much of special revelation is contained in
accounts of historical events and persons, but some of it is conveyed through symbolic stories.
This is the real meaning of the word myth, which does not mean an incredible fairy story but a
way of expressing truth too deep to be expressed in any other form than story.”141
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Polkinghorne, Encountering Scripture: A Scientist Explores the Bible, 1, 8-9. Polkinghorne
equates Scripture with other pieces of literature. He comments, “Classic literature, whether that of the
Greek tragedians or that of the Hebrew prophets, the Gospel of John or the plays of Shakespeare, has a
deep power to speak across the centuries, and it is precisely this ability to break through the confines of
locality and epoch which is the authentic sign of great writing.” He also makes the following remark, “Not
all of the Bible is great literature. Some parts are plainly pedestrian and some downright boring (for
example, 1 Chronicles 1—8)” (5).
140

Ibid., x-xi. See also Polkinghorne, Reason and Reality: The Relationship between Science and
Theology, 63. “I am not willing to resign so easily from the cognitive quest. I cannot accept the view,
described by Northrop Frye, that ‘the events the Bible describes are what some scholars call “language
events,” brought to us only through words; and it is the words themselves that have the authority, not the
events they describe.’ I do not, of course, deny the presence of story in the Bible (Jonah, Daniel, and so on).
But the life, death and resurrection of Jesus is not just a tale, however evocative, but a wonderful fusion of
the power of myth and the power of actuality” (Polkinghorne, Reasons and Reality, 63). Elsewhere he
writes, “I canot regard theology as merely concerned with a collection of stories which motivate an attitude
to life. It must have its anchorage in the way things actually are, and the way they happen. . . . For me, the
Bible is neither an inerrant account of propositional truth nor a compendium of timeless symbols, but a
historically conditioned account of certain significant encounters and experiences” (Polkinghorne, The
Faith of a Physicist: Reflections of a Bottom-up Thinker: The Gifford Lectures for 1993-4, 8).
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Polkinghorne, Science and Religion in Quest of Truth, 113. Pierre Grelot explains, “A symbol
does not describe the reality that it envisions and of which it gives a glimpse beyond the limits of natural
understanding; rather, it evokes certain aspects of it, leaving the spirit to construct representations that, by
intuition, will grasp something of the mystery evoked” (Pierre Grelot, The Language of Symbolism, trans.,
Christopher R. Smith (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2006), 18). Clark defines myth in religious language as
“I don’t believe it” (Gordon H. Clark, Language and Theology (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and
Reformed Publishing, 1980), 112).

46

In other words, symbolic story and myth are literary genres that construct an image and
should not be understood in the ordinary sense as being untrue. Rather, they should be
comprehended as dealing with the ultimate questions of human existence.142
Furthermore, Polkinghorne adopts a rational strategy in order to commit to what he
considers to be well-motivated belief. He is aware that at times belief may need revision in light
of further evidence and insight. He justifies this line of reasoning because modern science has
afforded so much information on physical reality, theism should reflect the changes, in addition to
the understanding in cultural and scientific perspectives when interpreting Scripture.143
Polkinghorne affirms that primitive religious convictions can blend with modern scientific
knowledge144 because of the developmental nature145 of Scripture. This suggests that parts of
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David A. Haviland, Cultural Anthropology (New York: Harcourt Brace College Publishers,
1999), 419. “Actually, a true myth is basically religious, in that it provides a rationale for religious beliefs
and practices. Its subject matter is the ultimate of human existence: where we and everything in our world
came from, why we are here, and where we are going. . . . Myth has an explanatory function; it depicts and
describes an orderly universe, which sets the stage for orderly behavior” (ibid.).
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Polkinghorne, Encountering Scripture: A Scientist Explores the Bible, 8.
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Ibid., 31. Polkinghorne comments that “Scripture is not a dead deposit of unchanging meaning,
the repository of assertions that have to be accepted at face value without question, but a living spring from
which new truths and insight can be expected to continue to flow” (ibid.). Polkinghorne describes the
record of revelation as “one of a developing understanding of the divine will and nature, continuously
growing over time but never complete and quite primitive in its earliest stages” (12).
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Ibid., 11-12. “How can we square this picture of a vengeful God with the one given us by Jesus,
who tells us to love our enemies (Matthew 5.43-48)? The simple answer is that we cannot. I believe that
response to this dilemma demands the recognition that the record of revelation contained in Scripture is one
of a developing understanding of the divine will and nature” (ibid.). And he continues his argument, “This
developmental perspective on Scripture also helps to explain many of the apparent contradictions present in
its pages” (ibid., 14). “Thus it is clear that before the Hebrew Bible reached its final canonical form there
was a long developmental process, involving reworking of much that had been inherited from the past in
the light of the understanding and experience of the present. Yet the editors who assembled the final text
apparently did not find it necessary to smooth out the differences present in the sources that they used.
Instead, the deposit of many generations was often allowed to stand together in the formation of Scripture.
The long process of development was not obliterated in order to produce the appearance of a single
consistent text. The explorations of the past were not to be totally obscured from view” (ibid., 16).
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Scripture are open to revision in light of modern scientific knowledge.146 Polkinghorne claims
that the unfolding process of developing theological understanding found in Scripture proceeds
beyond its pages by virtue of the continuing work of the Holy Spirit.147 “The role of development,
within Scripture and after it, depends upon the fact that revelational disclosure is primarily
personal rather than propositional, living not petrified.”148 Polkinghorne illustrates his approach
through his interpretation of the Fall found in Gen 3:
This approach to the Fall illustrates the continuing power of Scripture, persisting under
changes of interpretation induced by changes in knowledge and experience. The ancient myth
of Adam and Eve in the garden was used by Paul to illuminate the Christian experience of the
saving power of Christ, and it can be reinterpreted by us for the same purpose in the light of
modern scientific knowledge, in a way that I believe preserves the essential core of its
meaning. There is certainly a clear difference in the details of how Paul and we understand
the story, but its essential points remains the same.149
Polkinghorne does not take Scripture as a source of authoritative propositions.150 For
instance, he writes that divine revelation “is not the mysterious transmission of infallible
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Ibid., 8. “These writings were composed in cultures very different from that of today, not least
because of the great changes in our picture of the world in which we live which have been given us by
modern science. . . . These changes in cultural perspective have to be taken into account in interpreting
Scripture, but they by no means imply that the Bible is merely of antiquarian interest” (ibid.). See also John
C. Polkinghorne, "Scripture and an Evolving Creation," Science and Christian Belief 21 (2009): 165. “The
older creation account of Genesis 2 is very human-oriented and it leads naturally to the story of the Fall in
Genesis 3. Of all the classic Christian doctrines, this is the one that demands the most careful revisionary
evaluation in the light of modern knowledge” (ibid.).
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Polkinghorne, Encountering Scripture: A Scientist Explores the Bible, 18-19. See also
Polkinghorne, Theology in the Context of Science, 2. “The biblical texts, which are often very concise in
their expression of deep and challenging truths, stand in need of continuing exploratory interpretation,
conducted in each succeeding Christian generation” (ibid.).
148

Polkinghorne, Encountering Scripture: A Scientist Explores the Bible, 19.
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Polkinghorne, Science and Theology: An Introduction. Polkinghorne, describing this approach
writes, “At its most fundamentalist, this could lead to the citation of ‘proof texts’ in ways that may pay
scant attention to context, and it might lead to desperate attempts to prove the total inner consistency of a
collection of writings compiled over a period of more than a thousand years and originating in many
different historical and cultural settings” (98-99). Polkinghorne also comments that “Revelation itself is
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propositions which are to be accepted without question.”151 However, despite his clear statement
that Scripture is not propositional, he does acknowledge that Scripture contains truth that must be
taken propositionally. An illustration of this is Polkinghorne’s acceptance of the incarnation of
Christ as a true historical event.152 Yet how does he know that the incarnation is real and not a
myth? What criteria does Polkinghorne use to determine what is historical truth and what is
symbolic story? Polkinghorne does not provide an answer. As previously mentioned,
Polkinghorne purports a critical realist approach to interpreting Scripture because it contains an
evidential aspect, making it proper to subject it to critical analysis carefully evaluating the
historical accuracy of its foundational stories while also rebuking any notion of inerrancy.153
While evaluating its historicity, the interpreter needs to discern insights that are of revelatory
character. Polkinghorne comments:
A central task for the christian interpreter of Scripture is to discern what in the Bible has
lasting truthful authority, rightly commanding the continuing respect of successive
generations, and what is simply time-bound cultural expression, demanding no necessary
continuing allegiance from us today. Absolutely no one is free from having to make
judgements of this kind.154

experiential rather than propositional.” Polkinghorne, Theology in the Context of Science, 4. “The Bible
certainly contains truth about God; it certainly has moved many people to lives of spiritual depth and to
deeds of great generosity; it certainly is an indispensable symbolic resource for Christian discourse. Yet it
also contains unedifying material concerned with acts of genocide portrayed as divine commands, vengeful
curses upon enemies, sadistic symbols of everlasting torture” (Polkinghorne, Science and Theology: An
Introduction, 99).
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Polkinghorne writes, “The nature of divine revelation is not the mysterious transmission of
infallible propositions which are to be accepted without question, but the record of persons and events
through which the divine will and nature have been most transparently made known” (Polkinghorne,
Encountering Scripture: A Scientist Explores the Bible, 1).
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Polkinghorne affirms, “Scripture contains witness to the incarnate Word” (ibid., 3). For an
excellent discussion on propositional truth, see Nash, The Word of God and the Word of Man, 43-54.
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Ibid., 7-8. Reading Scripture critically is just one mode of reading and putting it to the test. But
Polkinghorne mentions an additional way of reading, one in which Scripture puts the reader to the test.
“Great truths are set forth and great hopes are proclaimed. How we respond is of important significance for
our lives. We are no longer questioning the Bible, but the Bible is questioning us. Or rather God is
questioning us through. The manner of reading Scripture which medieval monasticism called lectio
divina—divine reading in which a short passage is meditatively read and reread to allow it to sink into heart
and mind—is a prime way in which we can submit ourselves to the power of the Bible” (ibid.).
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Polkinghorne further asserts that Scripture is not a divinely dictated book conveying
absolute and unquestionable truth.155 The uniqueness of Scripture is not that of an “ultimate
textbook” 156 to look up packaged answers. Rather Scripture’s prime role is to be the record of
significant encounters as revelatory disclosure through theologically foundational events with
humanity.157 Scripture’s uniqueness then lies in its furnishing of indispensable accounts of God’s
acts and self-disclosure recorded in the history of Israel and the person of Jesus Christ.158 Because
revelation is the deposit of encounters,159 it should not be equated with the Word of God. For
Polkinghorne,
The Word of God uttered to humanity is not a written text but a life lived, a painful and
shameful death accepted, and the divine faithfulness vindicated through the great act of
Christ’s resurrection. Scripture contains witness to the incarnate Word, but it is not the Word
155

Ibid., 1.

156

Polkinghorne, Theology in the Context of Science, 4. Mark Strauss comments that behind the
misguided “crystal ball” approach lies two positive motivations. “The first is a reverence for the Bible as
the Word of God and the belief that God is alive and active and wants to communicate his will to us. . . The
second positive motivation is the belief that the Bible, though written long ago, is still relevant for our lives
today” (Mark L. Strauss, How to Read the Bible in Changing Times (Grand Rapids, MI: BakerBooks,
2011), 15).
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Polkinghorne, Science and Theology: An Introduction, 98; Polkinghorne, Quantum Physics and
Theology: An Unexpected Kinship, 11. Polkinghorne further comments in Science and Theology: An
Introduction, “The continuing deposit of the record of transpersonal encounters with God is to be found in
scripture and tradition” (98). “[A] better metaphor is surely that of the laboratory notebook, in which are
recorded accounts of foundational encounters involving acts of divine self-disclosure, essential for
techological theory-making, but leading to and needing further reflective interpretation” (Polkinghorne,
Theology in the Context of Science, 4).
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Polkinghorne, Encountering Scripture: A Scientist Explores the Bible, 3. He also writes,
“Because revelation is the encounter with a Person and not the deliverance of a set of propositions, the
Bible is not our divinely-guaranteed textbook but a prime means by which we come to know God’s
dealings with humankind and particularly his self-utterance in Christ” (Polkinghorne, Reason and Reality:
The Relationship between Science and Theology, 62).
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Polkinghorne, Encountering Scripture: A Scientist Explores the Bible, 3-4. Because of the
‘revelatory character claimed,” in Scripture, the interpreter has the “central task” of discerning between the
authoritative and permanent with the temporary and culturally adventitious within these encounters. See
also Polkinghorne, Science and Theology: An Introduction, 98.
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himself. Its testimony is that ‘The Word became flesh and lived among us, and we have seen
his glory, the glory as of a father’s only Son, full of grace and truth’ (John 1.14).160
Polkinghorne assumes that grasping these observations is essential in order to understand
the proper role of Scripture.
The Language of Sacred Scripture
The influence that science has exerted on the understanding of religious discourse has
been both interesting and devastating.161 Religious thinkers have been perplexed about how to
stretch and elongate words from one context to fit what is transcendent. For Polkinghorne, the
mode of language162 employed in speaking of divine action differs from the precise language of
mathematics when discussing empirical objects or events.163 In theological discourse, a
significant degree of “prosaic clarity has to give way to something more like poetic discourse.”164
Is there foundational content in religious discourse? According to Polkinghorne, theological
discourse is symbolic:
Theology faces a particular difficulty in that the nature of its Object transcends us and our
power to grasp him. We do not have the words and concepts with which to encapsulate God.
160

Polkinghorne, Encountering Scripture: A Scientist Explores the Bible, 3. “For the Christian the
true Word of God is written, not with paper and ink, but in the flesh and blood of that life lived in Palestine
long ago (John 1.14) and in the continuing life of the Risen Lord. All authorty rests with him (Matthew
28.18) and it is not located between the covers of any book” (Polkinghorne, Reason and Reality: The
Relationship between Science and Theology, 62).
161

Gilkey, Religion and the Scientific Future, 4.

162

John C. Polkinghorne, Quarks, Chaos & Christianity: Questions to Science and Religion, 2d ed.
(New York, NY: Crossroad, 2005), 28. “If the unpicturable world of electrons gives us some surprises, we
shouldn’t be too amazed if the unpicturable God has some surprises in store for us also. If, as a Christian
believer, I find—as I do, and as millions have done before me—that when I talk of Jesus Christ I can’t just
talk about him in human terms, but I’m also driven to use divine language, then I have to accept the reality
of this experience, however difficult it is to understand how the infinite God and a finite man in firstcentury Palestine can, in some mysterious way, be joined together” (ibid.).
163

Polkinghorne, Science and Religion in Quest of Truth, 12. “The language of theology will have
to be the allusive and open language of symbol rather than the precise language of mathematics that is so
effective in science. To a significant degree in theology, prosaic clarity has to give way to something more
like poetic discourse” (ibid.). This implies that theology can only say the unsayable through poetry,
metaphor, and analogy. This will be problematic when discussing Polkinghorne’s eschatology. Metaphors
and symbols are meaningless if they do not have literal statements to give them meaning.
164

Ibid.
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Inescapable we are driven to the use of analogy. No doubt words such as personal, loving,
beautiful, are used of God by extension from our human experience, but they are surely used
as extensions in the right direction. . . . Thus it comes about that the language of theology is
the language of symbol.165
Because Polkinghorne claims that religious language is generally analogous, he
subscribes to a polysemic nature of Scripture in order to avoid a narrow biblicism.166 He
comments:
One of the defects of a self-confident and narrow Biblicism is to ignore this fact by
attempting to insist on the single meaning of an allegedly plain text. Such an approach may
suit the cookery book, but it will not do for the Bible. Of course, I am not arguing for an
‘anything goes’ approach to scriptural interpretation, but affirming the expectation that a
multilayered over-plus of meaning will often be found in the sacred text.167
Summary and Conclusions
This chapter covered Polkinghorne’s understanding of the relationship between science
and theology and his hermeneutical perspectives on critical realism, Natural Theology, and
Revelation. Polkinghorne refutes scientistic claims because there are other equally legitimate
avenues to seeking knowledge as is the case of theology. Because Polkinghorne believes the
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Polkinghorne, Science and Creation: The Search for Understanding, 94. “Symbol is not to be
reduced to sign by an insistence that it carry a single univocal meaning” (Polkinghorne, Reason and
Reality: The Relationship between Science and Theology, 67). But Polkinghorne also affirms that Scripture
is also “more than a symbolic story-book” (Polkinghorne, Encountering Scripture: A Scientist Explores the
Bible, 41). For Gilkey, theological language is a symbolic perspective on reality: “The role of symbols is
crucial; the expression of what is known appears in metaphors, models, and analogies rather than in literal,
univocal descriptions” (Langdon Gilkey, Nature, Reality, and the Sacred (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress,
1993), 31).
166

Does Polkinghorne not fall into this very biblicist interpretation when he writes that because we
live in a world greatly changed by modern science, “we no longer think that we inhabit a three-decker
universe. These changes in cultural perspective have to be taken into account in interpreting Scripture”
(Polkinghorne, Encountering Scripture: A Scientist Explores the Bible, 8). Did biblical authors really
believe in a “three-decker” universe?
167

Ibid., 5. In addition see Polkinghorne, Reason and Reality: The Relationship between Science
and Theology, 67. “Equally the Bible is not to be tied down; it must be acknowledged as being polysemous,
having multi-layered meaning, capable of mediating many messages to its readers” (ibid.). A less nuanced
interpretative strategy is problematic. He writes, “Even in a period such as Reformation times . . . people
were inclined to accept the idea that there is a plain meaning to be found in the scriptural text that anyone
who runs may read, the fact is that this approach actually led to a wide variety of different interpretative
conclusions” (Polkinghorne, Theology in the Context of Science, 4).
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universe contains evidence of a divine Mind and Purpose, he argues that science and theology can
be brought into harmony. For him, science and theology provide partial views of the world, and
they may overlap on a range of issues such as cosmic origins and human nature.
Equally important is the fact that Polkinghorne is committed to providing theological
perspectives that are capable of being harmonized with science. One way of achieving this is
through critical realist interpretations of knowledge in science and theology.
Polkinghorne welcomes a new form of Natural Theology as a bridge between science and
theology by framing critical realism in it, that is, intelligibility is a reliable guide to reality. This
new Natural Theology utilizes a revised form of discourse, replacing the idea of proofs of God in
the natural world with the language of the best explanation justifying his motivated belief.
Polkinghorne believes that the language of Scripture is symbolic. For him, revelation
does not take the form of propositions but rather revelation is the indispensable record of
significant human encounters with sacred reality. Polkinghorne may be underestimating the
significance of the fact that these human encounters with sacred reality are made in propositions.
He sees revelation as developing from a primitive form in need of being revised and harmonized
with modern scientific interpretations of reality.
In general, Polkinghorne provides a coherent methodology in harmonizing science and
theology. However, there appear to be elements of incoherence in his methodology, especially in
terms of Scripture. Despite his claims that science and theology are equal avenues of knowledge,
he gives methodological priority to science. This is based on his presupposition that each
discipline seeks knowledge at different levels: science answers the How questions and theology
answeres the Why questions. Yet, Scripture is revised in light of modern science. This suggests
that the scientific interpretation of reality is more authentic than revelation found in Scripture.
Authority resides in science, not in nature itself, but in the scientific interpretation of nature, and
for Polkinghorne, Scripture must submit to this interpretation.
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This chapter set out to describe Polkinghorne’s hermeneutical perspective. The next
chapter describes and evaluates his hermeneutics in interpreting Protology.
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CHAPTER III
SCRIPTURE IN POLKINGHORNE’S PROTOLOGY AND THE
REJECTION OF BIBLICAL UNIVOCITY
Introduction
Defining the role of Scripture in any theological reflection is critical. By situating
Polkinghorne’s different scriptural approaches into case studies, one is able to investigate and
discover more clearly the role Scripture plays in his theological method. This chapter traces
Polkinghorne’s thoughts on biblical protology and how his dismissal of biblical univocity has
impacted his cosmology.
Protology
Cosmology is the study of origins and development of the universe. In Christian
theology, cosmology refers to the doctrine of creation1 and the divine purpose for humanity. The
universe is normally said to be a free and nonnecessitated creation of one supreme and personal
God. The doctrine of creation has undergone a resurgence of interest in recent years by those

1

Polkinghorne writes, “The doctrine of creation, properly understood, is concerned with the
question of why things exist and not simply with how things began” (Polkinghorne, Science and Religion in
Quest of Truth, 78). Keith Ward notes, “The word creation has usually been used to refer to the origin of
the universe, but theologically it has always been clear that it more properly refers to the relationship of
every time and place to God. In this sense, when and how the universe originated is not of primary
importance.” Keith Ward, “Creation,” Encyclopedia of Science and Religion, ed. J. Wentzel Van Huyssteen
(New York: Thomas Gale, 2003), 186. Robert Hiebert echoes this sentiment: “Therefore, the juxtaposition,
by some modern interpreters, of scriptural assertions about creation with scientific evidence and theories
regarding origins often results in fruitless comparisons of different, although equally relevant, bodies of
knowledge. At the risk of oversimplifying the issue, one might say that Scripture deals with the who, why,
and what questions . . . whereas science investigates the problems of when and how the observable universe
came into existence and continues to function.” Robert J. V. Hiebert, “Create, Creation,” Baker Theological
Dictionary of the Bible, ed. Walter A. Elwell (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1996).
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attempting to integrate a Christian orthodox faith of creation with the results of modern
cosmological studies.2
The manner in which Polkinghorne bears witness to orthodox faith in regard to creation
deserves consideration. He presupposes that Christian theology and modern cosmology are
compatible and their interpretation of the created universe can be harmonized by placing the
scientific account of origins within the deeper context of a theological framework.3 Three
implications are derived from Polkinghorne’s assumption. First, God, not the universe, is the
ultimate reality. In his theological concept of creation, the universe is both a beautiful and rational
place4 that is open to human and divine action, yet the created order and Creator are clearly
distinguished.5 Emanationism is excluded because the universe is a consequence of a free act of
divine decision, but it is inherently contingent to him.6 This contingency is expressed in the idea
creatio ex nihilo.7 For Polkinghorne, this concept is used to “express the ontological dependence

2

See the various essays in Stephen C. Barton and David WIlkinson, eds., Reading Genesis after
Darwin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
3

John C. Polkinghorne, "Beyond the Big Bang," in Science Meets Faith, ed. Fraser Watts
(London: SPCK, 1998), 17. “I shall suggest that to look beyond the Big Bang is to enter a realm where the
doctrine of creation, in its Judaeo-Christian-Islamic articulation, has significant things to say” (ibid.).
4

Polkinghorne, Science and Creation: The Search for Understanding, 22. Polkinghorne writes, “If
the deep-seated congruence of the rationality present in our minds with the rationality present in the world
is to find a true explanation it must surely lie in some more profound reason which is the ground of both.
Such a reason would be provided by the Rationality of the Creator” (ibid.).
5

John C. Polkinghorne, "Kenotic Creation and Divine Action," in Work of Love: Creation as
Kenosis, ed. John C. Polkinghorne (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2001), 95. “Only a God who is distinct
from creation can be that creation’s ground of hope beyond its eventual natural decay” (ibid.).
6

Polkinghorne, Science and Creation: The Search for Understanding, 51.

7

John C. Polkinghorne, The Polkinghorne Reader: Science, Faith, and the Search for Meaning
(West Conshohocken, PA: Templeton Foundation Press, 2010), 106-107. “The universe’s inherent
contingency is conventionally and vividly expressed in the idea of creation ex nihilo. Nothing else existed
(such as the brute matter and the forms of the classical Greek scheme of things) either to prompt or to
constrain the divine creative act. The divine will alone is the source of created being” (ibid.).
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of all that is on the sustaining will of the Creator; it does not refer simply to the temporal
initiation of cosmic history.”8
Because the scientific perspective on the universe and life is one of evolution,
Polkinghorne sees two distinct aspects of the theological concept of creation. He adds to the idea
of creatio ex nihilo,9 the complementary concept of creatio continua. The latter concept, which is
“strongly encouraged by evolutionary insight,”10 affirms a continuous creative engagement of
God with the universe he holds. It is viewed as the “unfolding creative process by which
potentiality is continuously being transformed into actuality.”11 Both concepts (creatio ex nihilo
and creatio continua) can be understood as the transcendent and immanent poles of divine reality.

8

John C. Polkinghorne, "Christianity and Science," in The Oxford Handbook of Religion and
Science, ed. Philip Clayton and Zachary Simpson, Oxford Handbooks (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2006), 60. Elsewhere he writes, “To hold a doctrine of creation ex nihilo is to hold that all that is depends,
now and always, on the freely exercised will of God. It is certainly not to believe that God started things off
by manipulating a curious kind of stuff called ‘nothing’” (Polkinghorne, The Faith of a Physicist:
Reflections of a Bottom-up Thinker: The Gifford Lectures for 1993-4, 75). Janet Soskice writes that creatio
ex nihilo “affirms that God, from no compulsion or necessity, created the world out of nothing—really
nothing – no pre-existent matter, space or time. It is not the same thing as the ‘Big Bang theory’ with which
it is often confused and which might roughly be defined as ‘the creation of everything at the beginning of
time’” (Janet Martin Soskice, "Creatio Ex Nihilo: Its Jewish and Christian Foundations," in Creation and
the God of Abraham, ed. David B. Burrell et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 24).
9

Soskice asserts that creatio ex nihilo, as a metaphysical claim, does not dictate a particular
cosmology and therefore does not rival scientific explanation. See Soskice, "Creatio Ex Nihilo: Its Jewish
and Christian Foundations," 38-39. When properly applied, according to Stoeger, the concept of creatio ex
nihilo is complementary to any scientific explanation because creatio ex nihilo is the framework, i.e., the
ultimate ground of existence and order serving as the explanation to anything that is revealed in science. It
simply complements what science has revealed and is not in competition with the natural sciences or
cosmology. See William R. Stoeger, "The Big Bang, Quantum Cosmology and Creation Ex Nihilo," in
Creation and the God of Abraham, ed. David B. Burrell et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2010), 169-175.
10

Polkinghorne, Science and Religion in Quest of Truth, 79. The creatio continua concept has been
explored extensively in the writings of scientist-theologians. See Barbour, Issues in Science and Religion;
Arthur R. Peacocke, Creation and the World of Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979);
Polkinghorne, Science and Creation: The Search for Understanding.
11

Polkinghorne, Science and Religion in Quest of Truth, 79.
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Second, Polkinghorne acknowledges that science does not provide proof that a divine
Creator brought the universe into existence. However, his theological interpretation of science
leads him to believe that scientific insights suggest the existence of a divine Creator.12
Finally, modern cosmology postulates that the periods of time in which the universe
developed are significantly longer than suggested by the biblical record. Polkinghorne claims that
the current estimate of the age of the universe is 13.7 billion years.13 Polkinghorne is able to unify
modern cosmology and Christian theology because any theological discourse on the doctrine of
creation must be consonant with the scientific account on origins.14 For Polkinghorne, any
theological discourse on creation is “concerned with ontological origin and not with temporal
beginning.”15 It is clear that Polkinghorne takes a high view of science, which influences and
impacts his theology and particularly his protology, even revising or reinterpreting Scripture
through scientific concepts.16 This is evident in the fact that, for him, theology must yield and
comply with conventional scientific cosmology.

12

Polkinghorne, Belief in God in an Age of Science, 10. “Once again the theistic conclusion is not
logically coercive, but it can claim serious consideration as an intellectually satisfying understanding of
what would otherwise be unintelligible good fortune” (ibid.).
13

Polkinghorne, Science and Religion in Quest of Truth, 47.

14

Polkinghorne, The Faith of a Physicist: Reflections of a Bottom-up Thinker: The Gifford
Lectures for 1993-4, 73. “Such, in outline, is the story that science tells us about the history of the world.
There are some speculations (particularly in the very early cosmology) and some ignorances (particularly in
relation to the origin of life), but there seems to me to be every reason to take seriously the broad sweep of
what we are told. Theological discourse on the doctrine of creation must be consonant with that account.”
Polkinghorne futher elucidates, “The doctrine of creation can make intelligible what from a purely
scientific point of view has to be treated as brute fact or happy accident. Theology’s role is to complement
the scientific account, without pretending to replace it” (Polkinghorne, Theology in the Context of Science,
100).
15

Polkinghorne, The Faith of a Physicist: Reflections of a Bottom-up Thinker: The Gifford
Lectures for 1993-4, 73.
16

Polkinghorne uses science as a hermeneutic. For example, when he interprets the reiteration of
the goodness of creation found in Gen 1, he writes, “The goodness of creation. . . . is to be understood in
terms of fruitful potentiality (the Anthropic Principle) rather than initial perfection” (Polkinghorne, Reason
and Reality: The Relationship between Science and Theology, 99).
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The next section of this chapter describes Polkinghorne’s view of scientific insights that
seem to suggest the existence of a divine Creator and a proposed theological model that
incorporates these insights within a theological framework.
The Anthropic Principle
Twentieth-century cosmology raised questions in regard to God’s providence that seemed
to grow naturally out of the appearance of finely tuned features in the universe. In order for the
evolution of life to be possible, the laws of physics had to be finely tuned to what they actually are
in order to generate carbon-based life derived from the ashes of dead stars.17 This metascientific
fine tuning, named the Anthropic Principle,18 endeavors to relate the underlying structure of the
universe to the fact of the existence of life.
Polkinghorne is persuaded that the Anthropic Principle is evidence suggesting that the
ontological origin of the universe lies in the will of a creator God.19 He interprets this concept as

17

Polkinghorne, Theology in the Context of Science, 101. “Take for an example the origin of
carbon itself, the element that is of central importance in the chemical structure of living beings. . . . No
carbon was made during the initial aftermath of the big bang and, in fact, there is only one place in the
whole universe where carbon actually can be made, in the interior nuclear furnaces of the stars. (Every
atom of carbon in every living being was once inside a star—we are creatures made of stardust)” (ibid.).
18

The most accessible introduction to the Anthropic Principle is widely recognized to be John
Barrow and Frank J. Tipler, The Anthropic Cosmological Principle (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1986). For a general summary on the Anthropic Principle, see William Lane Craig, "The Anthropic
Principle," in The History of Science and Religion in the Western Tradition: An Encyclopedia, ed. Gary B.
Ferngren et al. (London: Garland Publishing, 2000), 366-368. Barbour argues that the Anthropic Principle
can be interpreted as a new form of design argument. He explains, “The fundamental parameters of the
early universe seem to be fine-tuned for the conditions needed for the emergence of life and intelligence.
Ifthe expansion rate one second after the Big Bang had been smaller by even one part in a hundred
thousand million million, the universe would have recollapsed before evolution could have occurred. If the
expansion had been even a tiny fraction faster it would have dispersed too rapidly for galaxies and planets
to have formed. The universe seems to be balanced on a knife-edge, too improbable to be a fortunate
chance occurrence” (Barbour, "Science and Religion, Models and Relations," 764).
19

John C. Polkinghorne, Science and Providence: God's Interaction with the World (London:
SPCK, 1989), 44-45. “This is just one of the many anthropic balances necessary in the fundamental laws of
physics if creation is to have the ‘goodness’ which is the capacity to evolve life. A rationally coherent
explanation of why this should be so is beyond science’s ability to offer, since it must take the laws of
nature as its given starting-point. Such an explanation would be provided by theology’s assertion that the
finely balanced circumstance of the world stems from the benevolent purpose of its Creator” (ibid.).
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supportive of his theistic claims of a divine purpose at work behind the universe because the
universe’s fine tuning resonates with a Christian picture of the world.20
Polkinghorne incorporates the Anthropic Principle in his doctrine of creation21 by
claiming the universe was endowed by its Creator with finely tuned laws. From this created order,
genuine novelty can emerge and develop from chaos.22 Polkinghorne prefers the singular

20

Polkinghorne, Theology in the Context of Science, 100-101. “There seems to be the chance of a
revised and revived argument from design—not appealing to Paley’s Cosmic Craftsman working within
physical process. . . . but appealing to a Cosmic Planner who has endowed his world with a potentiality
implanted within the delicate balance of the laws of nature themselves (which laws science cannot explain
since it assumes them as the basis for its explanation of the process). In short, the claim would be that the
universe is indeed not ‘any old world’ but the carefully calculated construct of its Creator. . . . I therefore
conclude that there is indeed a meta-question arising from Anthropic Principle considerations to which
theism provides a persuasive (but not logically coercive) answer” (Polkinghorne, Reason and Reality: The
Relationship between Science and Theology, 78, 80). Kenneth Howell writes, “If the universe displays such
precision as the value of the gravitational constant or a specific amount of background microwave
radiation, it not only suggests the presence of a Designer, it also calls for an explanation of the Designer’s
method of creation” (Kenneth J. Howell, "Theodicy," in The History of Science and Religion in the Western
Tradition: An Encyclopedia, ed. Gary B. Ferngren et al. (London: Garland Publishing, 2000), 75). John
Lennox comments, “This biblical teaching, that the earth was specifically designed as a home for human
beings, fits well with what contemporary science tells us about the fine-tuning of the universe. In recent
years physicists and cosmologists have discovered that the fundamental constants of nature—those special
numbers on which everything depends—have to be ‘just right’ in order for life as we know it to be
possible” (John C. Lennox, Seven Days That Divide the World (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2011), 9899).
21

Polkinghorne, Theology in the Context of Science, 103-104. “A possible explanation of anthropic
particularity can be offered by theology, for it asserts that the universe is indeed not ‘any old world’, but a
creation which can be understood to have been endowed by its Creator with precisely those properties that
have enabled it to have a fruitful history” (ibid.).
22

“Evolutionary process corresponds to the general scientific insight that regimes in which truly
novel possibilities can emerge are always ‘at the edge of chaos’, that is to say, they are situations in which
contingency and regularity, Chance and Necessity, interlace in delicate balance with each other. Too far on
the orderly side of this frontier and things would be too rigid for anything other than more of the same to be
possible. Too far on the disorderly side of the frontier, and things woud be too haphazard for any novelties
that did emerge to be able to persist. Quantum theory, order and disorder, too rigid, no change. If its [sic]
done haphazard, then nothing persists” (Polkinghorne, Science and Religion in Quest of Truth, 59).
“However, the more science enables us to understand the nature of evolving fertility, the more we see that
it is necessarily a package deal, an integrated process in which growth and decay are inextricably
interwoven as novelty emerges at the edge of chaos. The ambiguous character of genetic mutation, both the
engine of evolutionary fruitfulness and the source of malignancy, illustrates the point” (Polkinghorne,
Exploring Reality: The Intertwining of Science and Religion, 144).
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universe, a finely tuned created order, over the multiverse explanation.23 It has been
acknowledged that the Anthropic Principle does not constitute irrefutable evidence for the
existence of a creator God, but that it is consistent with a theistic worldview.24

Kenotic Love and Theodicy
Theology understands love to be the nature of God (1 John 4.8), yet theodicy, the reality
of evil, suffering, and death, poses a serious challenge to theology. The kenosis theory25 is a
theological concept that in the life and death of Jesus, God emptied out the divine self-hood in

23
“The multiverse proposal is ontologically prodigal and it seems to serve only one explanatory
purpose—to defuse the threat of theism. In constrast, metascientific belief in a divine Creator does a
number of other explanatory pieces of work, such as making the deep order of the cosmos intelligible and
there is a cumulative case for belief in God and a created universe, which does not seem to have a parallel
in the case of the multiverse” (Polkinghorne, Theology in the Context of Science, 105). In contrast to the
cosmocentric view, the multiverse theory explains that this universe is just one in addition to an enormous
amount of other universes with different laws of nature. For comments on the multiverse and other
cosmological issues and how they relate to God, see Bernard Carr, "Cosmology and Religion," in The
Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science, ed. Philip Clayton and Zachary Simpson (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2006). Carr explains the multiverse proposal as “we just happen to be in one of the small
fraction of universes which satisfy the anthropic constraints. Of course, involving many universes is highly
speculative, especially since the other universes may never be directly detectable. . . . Nevertheless, many
anthropically-inclined physicists are attracted to the multiverse because it seems to dispense with God as
the explanation of cosmic design” (149). On another page he writes, “The multiverse proposal certainly
poses a serious challenge to the theological view and it is not surprising that atheists find it a more plausible
explanation of the anthropic fine-tuning. However, the dichotomy between God and multiverse may be too
simplistic. While the fine-tunings certainly do not provide unequivocal evidence for God, nor would the
existence of a multiverse preclude God since there is no reason why a Creator should not act through the
multiverse” (153).
24

“The anthropic principle, whether stated in a weak or strong form, is strongly consistent with a
theistic perspective. A theist (for example, a Christian) with a firm commitment to a doctrine of creation
will find the “fine-tuning” of the universe to be an anticipated and pleasant confirmation of his or her
religious beliefs. This would not constitute a proof of the existence of God, but would be a further element
in a cumulative series of considerations which is at the very least consistent with the existence of a creator
God” (McGrath, Science & Religion: A New Introduction, 154-155). John Leslie concludes, “My argument
has been that the fine tuning is evidence, genuine evidence, of the following fact: that God is real, and/or
there are many and varied universes. And it could be tempting to call the fact an observed one. Observed
indirectly, but observed none the less” (John Leslie, Universes (London: Routledge, 1989), 198).
25

Kenosis is translated from the Greek as self-emptying as it appears in the New Testament (Phil
2.7). Even though the theme of God’s self-humbling has been present since the beginning of Christian
tradition, it was during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that it emerged more explicitly. Kenotic
theology originated as a serious form of reflection on Christology during this time. For an analytical
description and critique of kenosis, see P. Toon, “Kenosis, Kenotic Theology,” Evangelical Dictionary of
Theology, ed. Walter A. Elwell (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2001).
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humble self-giving love to the world. Since the twentieth century, kenotic applications have been
extended to other aspects of God’s relationship with creation.26 The theory attempts to correlate
and bind the evolutionary theory of origins and the reality of God. This concept asserts that God
is not distanced from the evolutionary processes by which life has emerged and its extinctions.27
The emerging picture of divine kenotic love is a humble God seeking to relate intimately with his
created order while renouncing any claims to coercive omnipotence.28 It is this portrait of God

26

John C. Polkinghorne, "Kenotic Creation and Divine Action," in The Altruism Reader:
Selections from Writings on Love, Religion, and Science, ed. Thomas Jay Oord (West Conshohocken, PA:
Templeton Foundation Press, 2007), 179. Polkinghorne writes, “We encounter here an idea of the greatest
importance, the understanding that the act of creation involves a kenosis of God, an emptying of himself
and an acceptance of the self-limitation inherent in the giving of creative love” (Polkinghorne, Science and
Creation: The Search for Understanding, 62).
27

John Haught writes, “The seemingly aimless meandering of biological evolution may be
incompatible with a divine designer, but now with a creative power that takes the form of defenseless love.
If the deity were powerful only in the vulgar sense of having the capacity to overwhelm, then evolution
might be theologically troubling. But a divine power that manifests itself in infinite self-giving loves does
not manipulate that which it enfolds. . . . A kenotic deity would be the ultimate source of the possibilities
for novel patterning made available to an evolving cosmos, but in such a way as to allow for a great
measure of spontaneity in the evolution of life, mind, and freedom” (John F. Haught, “Kenosis,”
Encyclopedia of Science and Religion, ed. J. Wentzel van Huyssteen [London: Thomson Gale, 2003], 502).
28

Polkinghorne, "Kenotic Creation and Divine Action," 106. “Kenotic theology is inevitably
paradoxical theology, for it is founded on the concept of the humility of God.” See also Keith Ward,
"Cosmos and Kenosis," in The Work of Love: Creation as Kenosis, ed. John C. Polkinghorne (Grand
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2001), 152-166. According to Ward, kenosis does not speak of a “renunciation of
ontological powers, but of a way of exercising those powers in love rather than in pride” (161-162), where
the divine relation to the cosmos can take place. God can suffer new things and enjoy new things. So there
is “an addition to the divine being as well as a limitation of it, and the two are essentially bound together”
(160) and this addition is a fulfillment “in God, by which new forms of perfection are added by creatures to
the divine being” (160). This relationship involves three moments. The first, which was just described, is
kenosis, which leads to enosis, an “intimate uniting of divine personhood and finite personhood” (164),
where God enters into the being of those who freely consent. The final step is theosis, which is the sharing
in the divine life and God’s final purpose for his creation (164). The Creator then invites, rather than
commands, because “love by its very nature cannot compel” (John F. Haught, God after Darwin: A
Theology of Evolution (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2008), 120).
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that many “hope to connect their conversations with science, and especially with evolutionary
biology.”29
Polkinghorne is concerned with preserving creation’s autonomy as a “universe of
becoming”30 while preserving the distinct emphasis on God as a God of love and qualifying
God’s intimate involvement with creation. Polkinghorne’s goal is to articulate a model that
accommodates the scientific understanding of nature and its operation31 and led him to develop a
fourfold scheme of kenosis.32 Polkinghorne is clear that in his kenotic model, God’s involvement

29

Haught, “Kenosis,” 500. For Philip Hefner, kenosis does not permit evolutionary theory to blur
the image of a loving God. He writes that despite “the twists and turns of evolution, with its gains and
losses in natural selection. . . . God enters into the processes and is thus present to all creatures. One might
question whether this kenosis theory is adequate . . . and whether it is elaborated fully enough. . . .
Nevertheless, it is clearly supportive of the effort to forge meaning, because of its assertion that we can
count on a divine presence in the evolutionary processes. It does not resolve the theodicy question, but. . . .
it brings God into the dialectic between redemption and tragedy” (Philip J. Hefner, "Religion-and-Science,"
in The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science, ed. Philip Clayton and Zachary Simpson (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2006), 571).
30

Polkinghorne, "Kenotic Creation and Divine Action," 103.

31

It is critical to understand how critical the kenotic tenet is in properly grasping theistic evolution.
John Haught writes, “The first step in developing a Christian theology of evolution, therefore, is to reform
our thoughts about God so as to make them correspond with the incredible idea of the divine selfoutpouring. Only then should we inquire into the intelligibility of evolution for Christian faith. . . .
Interestingly, this theological method can also lessen the temptation to deny the results of scientific
research. It will still allow room for the belief that a deep divine wisdom and power underlie everything,
but will be a wisdom furled in humility and a power transformed by unquenchable love. It is my view that
. . . Christianity’s self-abandoning God, on the one hand, and the scientific picture of life evolving
gradually by natural selection, on the other—can be mapped onto each other without much difficulty, and
in such a way as to reach a satisfactory resolution for both science and theology. . . . The image of a selfemptying God . . . may even help make sense of something as enigmatic as evolution without requiring that
we ignore, modify, or slant the data gathered by the fields of inquiry tributary to evolutionary theory
(geology, paleontology, anthropology, geography, anatomy, genetics, etc.). At the end of our theological
reflections on evolution, of course, mystery will still remain; but perhaps it will be a mystery that, even in
its inaccessibility can suffuse the whole universe and the long story of life with a meaning that eludes
creationism, scientism, and evolutionary naturalism” (John F. Haught, "God and Evolution," in The Oxford
Handbook of Religion and Science, ed. Philip Clayton and Zachary Simpson (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2006), 699-700).
32

Polkinghorne, "Kenotic Creation and Divine Action," 102-105. These limitations should not be
viewed as imperfections but rather something God does freely for the sake of creation. The four dimensions
relate to the self-limitation of God’s power, of God’s eternity, of God’s knoweldge and God’s participation
in the causal nexus of creation. Beginning with kenosis of omnipotence, God does not will moral or natural
evil but he permits them to allow causal space for creatures. Second, in kenosis of simple eternity, God has
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is deliberately self-limited, and he suggests that omnipotence, “centers on the fundamental divine
allowing of the created other to be and to act, so that, while all that happens is permitted by God's
special providence, not all that happens is in accordance with God's will or brought about by
special providence.”33
Divine allowance of the “created other to be and to act” permits Polkinghorne to explain
and embrace the scientific claims of creation and the evolution of the cosmos and life.34 His
kenotic model emphasizes the concept of creatio continua; the dynamic nature of creation
requires that God also be dynamic and relational, constantly interacting with his creation in
balancing God’s immanence with his transcendence.

a dual nature having an eternal and temporal pole. Polkinghorne writes, “God knows things as they really
are and so, if time is real and events are successive, surely God will know them temporally in their
succession, and not merely that they are successive. . . . God has not set aside the timeless and eternal
nature of divine Being, there has been ‘added’ to that (so to speak) a temporal pole of divinity that
corresponds to the Creator’s true engagement with created time. . . . The Eternal has freely embraced the
experience of time” (103). Third, Polkinghorne explains that kenosis of omniscience implies that for an
open future for a “world of true becoming,” then God does not know the future since the future is not yet
formed and does not yet exist. For Polkinghorne, the universe is not determinisitc but governed by the
interplay of chance and necessity. God possesses a “current omniscience,” and not an “absolute
omniscience.” This does not imply that God is not prepared for the future. It simply means that God does
not know the unformed future in all its detail. Perhaps God can extrapolate some possible future
developments but he cannot know which possibilities will become actual. This limitation has been
“embraced within the divine nature and not imposed from without.” Lastly, kenosis of causal status. This
proposal was a modification of Polkinghorne’s earlier thinking. This fourth kenosis means “the Creator’s
kenotic love includes allowing divine special providence to act as a cause among causes.” The Incarnation
is a prime example. “In the incarnation we see that, in first-century Palestine, God submitted in the most
drastic way to becoming a cause among causes” (104). Polkinghorne mentions a final form of kenosis. One
type of kenosis that Polkinghorne does not subscribe to is the kenosis of novelty. It is the “idea that God is
self-restricted to act in the future only as God has acted in the past. . . . Yet it is perfectly coherent to
believe that in new circumstances (“the fullness of time”) God will do new things” (105).
33

Ibid., 102.

34

Polkinghorne, Science and Religion in Quest of Truth, 80. Polkinghorne wants to avoid two
extreme profiles of God: the indifferent deitistic Spectator and the Cosmic Tyrant, which are inconsistent
with the belief that God is a God of love. By allowing creation to make itself, God shows love.
Polkinghorne writes, “One might dare to say that an evolving creation, in which creatures are allowed to be
themselves and to make themselves, is a more fitting creation for such a God than a ready-made world
would have been.” Haught comments, “So if ultimate reality is essentially self-giving love, and if love in
turn entails ‘letting the other be,’ then, theologically speaking, both the world’s original coming into being
and its indeterminate Darwinian transformation through time would be completely consonant with the
Christian experience of God” (Haught, God after Darwin: A Theology of Evolution, 120).
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Carefully note how Polkinghorne ties in and attempts to explain theodicy in light of
kenotic love. A creation that has been allowed to make itself is the theological way of interpreting
evolution35 and consequentially “no longer can God be held to be totally and directly responsible
for all that happens.”36 This altruistic kenosis involves a divine self-limitation that grants a
measure of independence, sanctioning the created other to truly be itself and to make itself.37
Despite evil being a consequence of kenotic omnipotence, God could not be held responsible for
all that transpires including moral and natural evil.38 If freedom is essential to the created order,
does this imply that God cannot remove or override creaturely freedom completely? Because if
“God is love,” why should he not intervene especially against those who generate evil? For this
reason, this line of theological reflection does not view the universe as a perfect, complete, and
instantaneous act of creation “frozen into finished perfection,”39 but rather sees the universe as

35

Haught suggests that “God is more concerned to enable the world to make itself—permitting it
to experience many mistakes in the process. There is a profound respect on the part of God for the freedom
of the creation, a selfless liberality. . . . So in life’s diversity, it is not a matter of natural processes rather
than God doing all the work, but of God creating through natural processes” (Haught, "God and Evolution,"
708).
36

Polkinghorne, "Kenotic Creation and Divine Action," 95. God is not an “indifferent deistic
Spectator, who having set it all going just lets it all happen, nor as the cosmic Puppet Master pulling every
string in the theatre of creation. The gift of love must always include some due degree of independence
granted to the objects of love” (Polkinghorne, "The Universe as Creation," 173).
37

Polkinghorne, "The Universe as Creation," 173. Love, among other things, consists in leaving
the other to be themselves. Haught concurs when he writes, “After all, it is in the very nature of selfsacrificing, kenotic love to long for the freedom and self-determination of the beloved. We may assume,
then, that an infinitely self-emptying divine love would will that the created universe become something
‘other’ than God. God could not be said to love unreservedly a universe that is not allowed to be distinct
from the divine. Since kenotic love requires an ‘other,’ any conceivable creator who refused to risk
allowing the world to be, at least to some degree, independent of God could not truly love it” (Haught,
“Kenosis,” 501).
38

Polkinghorne writes, “Yet, while the responsibility for moral evil seems to lie with human
beings, ultimately the responsibility for natural evil appears to lie at the door of the Creator” (Polkinghorne,
Exploring Reality: The Intertwining of Science and Religion, 138).
39

John F. Haught, "Kenosis," in Encyclopedia of Science and Religion, ed. J. Wentzel van
Huyssteen (London: Thomson Gale, 2003), 501.
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having an inherent openness to novel and unpredictable outcomes as it emerges in patterns of
self-organization.40
The idea of a “universe of becoming” open to its future where divine providence41 is
permitted to operate is Polkinghorne’s response to mitigate theology’s struggles with the

40

“Emergent complexity, chaos, and nature’s generically self-organizing tendencies fit more
comfortably a universe grounded less in coercive power than nurturing love that allows the universe some
degree of self-creativity” (ibid.). Polkinghorne writes, “It can be claimed that a world of that kind of
evolving fruitfulness is a greater good than a ready-made creation would have been” (Polkinghorne, "The
Universe as Creation," 173). Daryl Domning writes, “We are discovering that all sorts of seemingly
complex patterns in the structure and activity of living organisms . . . are generated by surprisingly simple
rules of cell growth and individual behavior. In these sorts of ‘self-organizing’ processes, order in an entire
system emerges spontaneously out of purely local interactions among the system’s subunits, with no central
control or influence from outside, let alone any preconceived blueprint of what patterns will emerge. . . .
The only way to determine how these patterns evolve under the rules is to watch them. . . . Perhaps not even
God can know what will result, in other than the most general terms, except by watching (from a vantage
point outside time and space what comes out of the processes set in motion at the creation” (Daryl P.
Domning and Monika K. Hellwig, Original Selfishness: Original Sin and Evil in the Light of Evolution
(Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006), 111). Scott Camazine, quoted in Domning’s book, illustrates the selforganizing process the following way, “Do ants or, for that matter, termite mounds, flocks of birds, or
schools of fish have leaders that all the members of the group follow? The answer is, clearly, no. Imagine
the kind of oversight that would be needed to build a termite mound. The mound may be thousands or
millions of times larger than an individual termite, and the construction of the edifice may take longer than
dozens of individual lifetimes. It is simply inconceivable that an overseer guides all those processes. The
same holds true for the flock and the school: although their movements are as elegant as the finest
choreography, there is no choreographer to direct each bird or fish. The natural world, it turns out, is replete
with patterns and processes that exhibit organization without an organizer, coordination without a
coordinator” (Scott Camazine, "Patterns in Nature," Natural History 112 (2003): 35). It is along these lines
that Antony Campbell makes a helpful suggestion that a distinction be made between “unguided,”
“guided,” and “risked” evolution. In the first case, God leaves the universe open on its own. The second
alternative explains that God constrains the universe according to his will, and finally, the third option
advocates that “God took the risk of creating an evolutionary universe, is with it in its evolution (with joy
and sorrow, happiness and pain), but without controlling the process itself” (Antony F. Campbell, God
First Loved Us: The Challenge of Accepting Unconditional Love (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 2000), 99).
41

Polkinghorne admits that there is a “interweaving . . . within the cloudiness of intrinsic
unpredictabilities, so that unfolding history cannot be itemized. Such a picture of undisentangleability
corresponds to God’s loving choice to be, in the evolving history of creation, a present cause among
causes” (Polkinghorne, "Kenotic Creation and Divine Action," 105). It is beyond the scope and intention of
this study to thoroughly discuss Polkinghorne’s theology of divine action. Recent works concentrating on
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difficulties and mysteries of theodicy. Kenosis is viewed as a way of balancing divine love42 and
divine power:43 “Love without power would correspond to a God who was a compassionate but
impotent spectator of the history of the world. Power without love would correspond to a God
who was the Cosmic Tyrant, holding the whole of history in an unrelenting grasp.”44

divine action include: George F. R. Ellis, "Ordinary and Extraordinary Divine Action: The Nexus of
Interaction," in Philosophy, Science and Divine Action, ed. F. LeRon Shults, Nancey Murphy, and Robert J.
Russell (Leiden: Brill, 2009); Jürgen Moltmann, "Reflection on Chaos and God's Interaction with the
World from a Trinitarian Perspective," in Chaos and Complexity: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action,
ed. Robert J. Russell, Nancey Murphy, and Arthur R. Peacocke (Berkeley: Vatican Observatory
Publications; The Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences, 1997); Nancey Murphy, "Science, Divine
Action, and the Intelligent Design Movement: A Defense of Theistic Evolution," in Intelligent Design:
William A. Dembski & Michael Ruse in Dialogue, ed. Robert B. Stewart (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress,
2007); Arthur R. Peacocke, "The Sound of Sheer Silence: How Does God Communicate with Humanity?,"
in Philosophy, Science and Divine Action, ed. F. LeRon Shults, Nancey Murphy, and Robert J. Russell
(Leiden: Brill, 2009); Alvin Platinga, "What Is 'Intervention'?," Theology and Science 6 (2008); Robert J.
Russell, "Does the 'God Who Acts' Really Act in Nature?," in Science and Theology: The New
Consonance, ed. Ted Peters (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998); Robert J. Russell, "Special Providence
and Genetic Mutation: A New Defense of Theistic Evolution," in Evolutionary and Molecular Biology:
Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, ed. Robert J. Russell, William R. Stoeger, and Francisco J. Ayala
(Berkeley, CA: Vatican Observatory; The Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences, 1998); Robert J.
Russell, Nancey C. Murphy, and C. J. Isham, Quantum Cosmology and the Laws of Nature: Scientific
Perspectives on Divine Action, 2nd ed. (Berkeley, CA: Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences,
1996); Robert J. Russell, Ted Peters, and Nathan Hallanger, God's Action in Nature's World: Essays in
Honour of Robert John Russell (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2006); F. LeRon Shults, Nancey C. Murphy, and
Robert J. Russell, Philosophy, Science, and Divine Action, vol. 1 (Leiden: Brill, 2009); Wesley J. Wildman,
"Evaluating the Teleological Argument for Divine Action," in Philosophy, Science and Divine Action, ed.
F. LeRon Shults, Nancey Murphy, and Robert J. Russell (Leiden: Brill, 2009).
42
Polkinghorne, "Kenotic Creation and Divine Action," 91-92. “Emphasis on divine love seems to
lie behind Process Theology’s picture of a God who, in A. N. Whitehead’s moving phrase, is a “fellow
sufferer who understands,” and who acts only through the power of persuasion. It is a noble concept, but it
is open to question whether deity has not been so evacuated of power that hope in God as the ground of
ultimate fulfillment has been subverted. . . . The matter can be put in the bluntest terms by asking whether
Whitehead’s God could be the One who raised Jesus from the dead” (ibid., 92).
43

Ibid., 92. “Emphasis on divine power seems to lie behind Classical Theology’s picture of a God
who, through primary causality, is in total control and whose invulnerability is such that there is no
reciprocal effect of creatures upon the divine nature, of the kind that a truly loving relationship would
seemto imply . . . is open to question whether its picture of the divine nature is not so remote and insulated
from creation as to put in question the fundamental Christian conviction that ‘God is love’ (1 John 4:8)”
(ibid.).
44

Ibid., 91.
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But these two attributes are in tension in a theological understanding of the inevitable
shadow side to evolution.45 The evolutionary character46 of the universe has serious implications
for theodicy.47 Unfavorable to any type of romanticism regarding the history of the universe as

45

Polkinghorne, Traffic in Truth: Exchanges between Science and Theology, 18. “Indeed, science’s
gift offers theology modest help with the greatest theological problem of all—the problem of pain and
suffering. There is an unavoidable cost involved in a world allowed to make itself. The very same processes
that allow cells to mutate and produce new forms of life will inevitably allow other cells to mutate and
become malignant. The fact that there is cancer in creation is not due to divine callousness or
incompetence; it is the inescapable dark side of the good of an evolving creation.”
46
This matter will be discussed further in the subsequent chapter but for now it is enough to
mention that Polkinghorne calls on his notion of a two-stage kenotic creation to explain why God works
through evolution. He writes, “Why did God bother with the old creation, this world of transience and
decay? I believe that the answer lies in recognizing that kenotic creation is intrinsically a two-stage act.
First must come a world in which creatures exist at a sufficient distance from the infinite reality of their
Creator so that they are allowed a true freedom to be themselves. If finite creatures are not to be
overwhelmed, the divine presence must initially be veiled. The process of that world will be an
evolutionary process in which creatures are allowed to make themselves, as potentiality is explored and
brought to birth we have seen that mortality is intrinsic to such an evolving world, which has to be poised at
the edge of chaos. The old creation will fulfill some of the divine creative purposes, but not all of them.
God’s final intention is to draw all who will freely come, into closer contact with the divine life, so that
they may live in the light of progressively unveiled divine reality to the utmost extent to which it is possible
for finite beings to share in that infinite reality. True fullness of life will come through this everlasting
encounter, and there will be no need for the evolutionary sequence of finite generations” (Polkinghorne,
Theology in the Context of Science, 158).
47

“Of all the difficulties that hold people back from religious belief, the question of evil and
suffering in the world is surely the greatest. . . . How can such a world be considered to be the creation of a
God who is both all-good and all-powerful? . . . Not only does it give considerable pause to the enquirer
after theism, but it is also one that remains a perpetual challenge and source of perplexity for those of us
who are believers. . . . The attempt to justify the ways of God in the face of the actuality of evil is called
theodicy. It is a task of considerable importance and difficulty for theologians. It is clear that the
perplexities that are raised are not ones that are capable of being dispelled simply by a few paragraphs of
clear-thinking prose. They are as much existential as logical and they lie very deep” (Polkinghorne, The
Polkinghorne Reader: Science, Faith, and the Search for Meaning, 138). After discussing Polkinghorne’s
kenosis model in a recent article, Craig Boyd and Aaron Cobb conclude that evil is the consequence of
kenotic omnipotence. They write, “Individual evil acts are permitted since God chooses not to dominate the
creation with divine power but allows the created beings to act in ways that may or may not be in
accordance with God’s desires. It is therefore possible for creatures to act against God’s wishes, and evil is
therefore a consequence of ‘omnipotent kenosis’ (Craig A. Boyd and Aaron D. Cobb, "The Causality
Distinction, Kenosis, and a Middle Way: Aquinas and Polkinghorne on Divine Action," Theology and
Science 7 (2009): 396). Ward echoes this thought when he writes, “If one asks, ‘Why did God not just
create the good things?’ the answer is that even God could not just create the sort of morally responsible,
creative beings we are in a wholly good universe, without any actual or possible conflict or suffering in it.
In a way not discernible in detail by us, evil arises from the divine nature, though in an unintended way,
and in a way that is always opposed by, and that ultimately can be overcome by, goodness, a goodness that
God intends” (Ward, 160).
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one of exclusive fruitfulness, Polkinghorne accentuates its history as also marred with mass
extinctions in order to arrive at its present form. Thus, Polkinghorne seeks to placate this tension
by conceding that in kenotic creation and its concept of creatio continua, the results of suffering
and death are necessary elements.48 Polkinghorne writes:
Death is the necessary cost of new life; environmental change can lead to extinctions; genetic
mutations sometimes produce new forms of life, oftentimes malignancies. There is an
unavoidable cost attached to a world allowed to make itself. Creatures will behave in
accordance with their natures: lions will kill their prey; earthquakes will happen; volcanoes
will erupt and rivers flood. I have called this insight “the free-process defense” in relation to
physical evil, in analogy with the familiar free-will defense in relation to moral evil. These
defenses do not by any means solve all the problems of theodicy, but they temper them
somewhat by removing a suspicion of divine incompetence or indifference.49
Because Polkinghorne and others50 insist on identifying kenosis with divine selflimitation, the question that naturally arises is why could God not occasionally become unselflimited, that is, forsaking his self-imposed restraints in the name of love and prevent evil
especially committed to innocent victims?

48

Polkinghorne, Exploring Reality: The Intertwining of Science and Religion, 143. “As the
generations succeed each other in the course of evolutionary process, death is seen to be the prerequisite of
the possibility of new life. The history of the shuffling exploration of potentiality will inevitably have its
ragged edges, for there will be developmental blind alleys and extinctions, as well as unfolding fertility. . . .
Things will often just happen, as a matter of fact, rather than for an indivudually identifiable purpose.”
Stoeger writes, “The universe is life-bearing, and even seems to be specially ordered to produce life. And
yet, paradoxically, at the same time death is also a pervasive experience throughout nature. In fact, it is
only through the disappearance, disintegration, and death of structure, systems, and organisms that
emergence and birth of others that are new and more advanced occur” (William R. Stoeger, "Scientific
Accounts of Ultimate Catastrophes in Our Life-Bearing Universe," in The End of the World and the Ends of
God: Science and Theology on Eschatology, ed. John C. Polkinghorne and Michael Welker (Harrisburg,
PA: Trinity, 2000), 20-21).
49

Polkinghorne continues, “From this point of view, the classic confrontation between the claims
of divine love and the claims of divine power is resolved by maintaining God’s total benevolence but
qualifying, in a kenotic way, the operation of God’s power. Of course, this is a self-qualification, exercised
within the divine nature and in accordance with that nature itself” (Polkinghorne, "Kenotic Creation and
Divine Action," 181). “In an evolving world, the death of one generation is the necessary cost of the new
life of the next. We know that biological evolution has been driven by genetic mutation, but if germ cells
are to be able to mutate and produce new forms of life, then somatic cells will also, by the same process, be
able to mutate and sometimes they will then become malignant. . . . The anguishing fact of cancer is not
something gratuitous, as if a Creator who was a bit more competent or a bit less callous could easily have
eliminated it. It is the necessary cost of creation in which creatures are allowed to make themselves”
(Polkinghorne, "The Universe as Creation," 173).
50

Refer to footnote 47.
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Integrating the evolutionary theory of life with a loving God is not a simple task. Though
Polkinghorne offers kenosis as a theological response to theodicy, tempering divine responsibility
“by removing a suspicion of divine incompetence or indifference,”51 it does not provide a
satisfactory answer regarding the question of moral and natural evil and suffering.52 For
Polkinghorne, in the midst of a suffering creation is the suffering Creator, a fellow sufferer
sharing the load while seeking its ultimate redemption.53 After reviewing the manner in which
Polkinghorne’s kenotic model incorporates scientific and theological insights and the difficulty of
theodicy, his belief in theistic evolution can now be described and evaluated, providing a better
understanding as to why he rejects a univocal reading of biblical protology.
Theistic Evolution
The origin of the universe and of life is the classic dissension between science and
theology. Nevertheless one important overlap is the fact that both the science and Scripture claim
the universe had a beginning. Describing that beginning or building a cosmology is the ultimate

51

Polkinghorne, Exploring Reality: The Intertwining of Science and Religion, 144. “We tend to
think that had we been in charge of creation, frankly, we would have done it better. We would have kept all
the nice things . . . and got rid of all the nasty things. . . . However, the more science enables us to
understand the nature of evolving fertility, the more we see that it is necessarily a package deal, an
integrated process in which growth and decay are inextricably interwoven as novelty emerges at the edge of
chaos” (ibid.).
52

The challenge of theodicy is the perennial issue for a belief in theism. Haught comments that
when discussing God in the context of evolution, what is at stake is the reality of a “personal, caring,
compassionate, and providential God that science seems to place in question, and it is on such an
understanding of God that the debate about evolution must remain focused” (Haught, "God and Evolution,"
697). But the question persists. If God is truly caring and compassionate, why does he not minimize moral
evil (the evil committed by humanity) and the suffering, death and extinction of species (natural evil)? This
is the very question expressed eloquently by George Ellis: “Indeed the issue of evil, pain, and suffering as
experienced in the present-day world, of God’s acceptance and allowance of horrors of all kinds, which one
might a priori presume he/she could and would prevent if he/she so desired. If the usual Christian view is
to make sense, there has to be a cast-iron reason why a merciful and loving God does not alleviate a lot
more of the suffering in the world, if he/she has indeed the power to do so” (George Ellis, "Ordinary and
Extraordinary Divine Action: The Nexus of Interaction," in Chaos and Complexity: Scientific Perspectives
on Divine Action, ed. Robert J. Russell, Nancey Murphy, and Arthur R. Peacocke (Berkeley, CA: Vatican
Observatory; The Center for Theology and the Natural Sciences, 1997), 360).
53

Polkinghorne, Exploring Reality: The Intertwining of Science and Religion, 146.
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goal of science,54 and it is here that Polkinghorne links the scientific theory of origins to the
Christian belief of a divine creator by accommodating biblical cosmology to the modern world,
thus making it an intelligble option for belief.55
Two concepts are critical in Polkinghorne’s cosmology. The first concept, kenosis,
viewed in the previous section, is an attempt to accommodate the belief in divine action within
history while allowing creatures to behave in accordance with their natures. The second concept
is theistic evolution.56 Evolutionary theism teaches that evolution is God’s chosen method of
introducing life and creating complexity within life through natural laws. Polkinghorne claims
that the doctrine of creation makes intelligible what from a purely scientific point of view has to
be treated as plain fact or accident. Evolution is an event and an unfolding process whose
devleopments take place over vast tracts of deep time, expressing the purpose of a good and
almighty God.57 Polkinghorne continues to take science seriously “by accepting all that science

54

Fernando Canale, Creation, Evolution, and Theology: The Role of Method in Theological
Accommodation (Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews University LithoTech, 2005), 19.
55

It is precisely with this point that Nigel Brush disagrees. He comments, “Thus, to link the current
scientific thought with Christian belief is to embrace chaos. The Christian who would link religious beliefs
to the latest scientific theory must be willing to constantly readjust his or her faith to fit each new scientific
discovery, theory, or paradigm. Christians who adopt this approach soon find themselves adrift on a sea of
subjectivism with no solid ground on which to stand. . . . To whom can the scientist turn for solid answers
to life’s ultimate questions if Christian beliefs are themselves constantly being adjusted to conform to the
current teachings of science?” (Nigel Brush, The Limitations of Scientific Truth: Why Science Can't Answer
Life's Ultimate Questions (Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel Publications, 2005), 269-270). Lennox is in complete
agreement with Polkinghorne on this point. He writes, “I am not, of course, claiming that the Bible can
inform every branch of science, but I am claiming that there are certain fundamental points of convergence
of such immense significance for our understanding of the universe and ourselves that it is worth pointing
them out. Such convergences between the Bible and contemporary science add to the Bible’s credibility in
a skeptical world—as Scripture itself would warrant us in thinking (Rom. 1:19-20)” (Lennox, Seven Days
that Divide the World, 42).
56

Campbell recognizes three versions of theistic evolution: Risked evolution, a Guided evolution,
and an Unguided evolution. For an overview, see Campbell, God First Loved Us: The Challenge of
Accepting Unconditional Love, 99.
57

Polkinghorne, Science and Creation: The Search for Understanding, 51.
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can tell us about cosmic and terrestrial history”58 while embedding it within a theological context,
without which the universe cannot be understood completely.
It is evident that Polkinghorne’s scientific premises59 influence and impact his theology
and particularly his cosmology, which leads him to reject biblical univocity in regard to the origin
of the cosmos and theistic evolution. According to him, any theological discourse on creation
must yield and comply with the scientific account of cosmology.60 “In considering creation,

58

Polkinghorne, Science and Religion in Quest of Truth, 83. If God has a purpose for the universe
then the universe has a historial character, i.e., a story. Haught identifies the three fundamental constituents
that make up the narrative character and are the main factors of the evolutionary process. They are,
contingency, predictability and deep time. A theolgy of evolution should focus on their religious meaning
and ask “Why the universe would be graced at all with such a potential for drama and adventure” (Haught,
"God and Evolution," 704-706). A few pages later he concludes, “The pattern of evolution seems to fit
quite comfortably into a world-view that features at its centre the idea of a humble God who loves stories,
and who offers an open future in which the story of this universe and perhaps others as well, can continue
to unfold” (709).
59

On the assimilation of scientific premises see Michael Polanyi, Science, Faith and Society
(Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1964). He discusses how the assimilation of scientific
premises shapes the perception of reality. He writes, “The scientific intuition of reality henceforth shapes
his perception. He learns the methods of scientific investigation and accepts the standards of scientific
value. At every stage of his progress towards this end he is urged on by the belief that certain things as yet
beyond his knowledge and even understanding are on the whole true and valuable, so that it is
worthspending his most intensive efforts on mastering them. This represents a recognition of the authority
of that which he is going to learn and of those from whom he is going to learn it. It is the same attitude as
that of the child listening to its mother’s voice and absorbing the meaning of speech. . . . And so similarly
no one can become a scientist unless he presumes that the scientific doctrine and method are fundamentally
sound and that their ultimate premises can be unquestioningly accepted” (44-45). He also writes, “It would
thus appear that when the précises of science are held in common by the scientific community each must
subscribe to them by an act of devotion. These premises form not merely a guide to intuition, but also a
guide to conscience; they are not merely indicative, but also normative. The tradition of science, it would
seem, must be upheld as an unconditional demand if it is to be upheld at all. . . . It is a spiritual reality
which stands over them and compels their allegiance” (54).
60

Polkinghorne writes, “Theology seeks to speak of God, the One who is the source of all created
being. Therefore, to some degree theology must take account of all forms of truth-seeking investigation into
the nature of what is. Among such enquiries, the discoveries of science are of clear significance as they tell
us about the pattern and history of the universe” (Polkinghorne, Science and the Trinity: The Christian
Encounter with Reality, 1). Antony Campbell reiterates Polkinghorne’s conclusion. He writes, “In many
respects, past tradition has seen Genesis One as the definitive biblical account of creation. While evidence
that this is not the case was present in multiple biblical texts, it was ignored. When modern science asserts
the contrary of past tradition, the valid conclusions of science must be accepted. In the case of creation, the
acceptance was often grudging, probably because science was assumed to be inimical to religious faith. In
due course, bilical interpretation itself gave greater emphasis to the Bible’s own contradiction of past
tradition” (Antony F. Campbell, Making Sense of the Bible (New York: Paulist Press, 2010), 17).
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theology has to take account of all that science can tell it about what exists and what the character
of its history has been, for God is as much the Creator today as 13.7 billion years ago.”61
The Authority and Role of Modern Cosmology
in Protology
Polkinghorne asserts that the universe is a divine creation, yet science, not theology,
describes the nature and history of the cosmos. He believes that science, not Scripture, provides
the best explanation for cosmology. Polkinghorne does not treat Scripture as the hermeneutical
lens through which he views all other things. This honor he has granted to science.62 Instead of
replicating the origin of the universe as portrayed by the biblical text, theology has to conform to
a reality that is grounded in a scientific worldview.63 Doing theology in a contemporary scientific
context allows Polkinghorne to use scientific insights to dictate and impose an interpretation on
theology64 because theology should not rival science on its own ground but complement it by
offering a more profound kind of understanding.65 For Polkinghorne, one does not have to choose
between God and modern cosmology because each explains things differently, yet they are
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Polkinghorne, Science and Religion in Quest of Truth, 78.

62
John Lennox thinks along the same lines when he writes that “though our interpretation relies on
scientific knowledge, it does not compromise the authority of Scripture. And this is the important point.
Scripture has the primary authority. Experience and science have helped decide between the possible
interpretations that Scripture allows” (Lennox, Seven Days that Divide the World, 33). As Gilkey wrote,
“Cosmology does make a difference in hermeneutics” (Gilkey, "Cosmology, Ontology, and the Travail of
Biblical Thinking," 204).
63

Polkinghorne, Science and Religion in Quest of Truth, 78. “While the physics of the early
universe is certainly interesting, it holds no unique siginificance for theology.” See also Haught, "God and
Evolution," 709. “Any supposed theological alternative to an evolutionary world peppered with
contingency might be one in which there is no suffering or death. But such a world would also be devoid of
life, human freedom, and the possibility of surprising future outcomes. . . . It seems to me that the scientific
portrait of life emerging from this narrative matrix is completely consistent with a Christian understanding
of God” (ibid.).
64

Polkinghorne, Traffic in Truth: Exchanges between Science and Theology, 11. Polkinghorne
correctly and adamantly affirms that “science will tell theology what the structure and the history of the
physical world are like. Theology will gratefully acknowledge these gifts and seek to set them within the
more profound and comprehensive setting that belief in God affords” (ibid.).
65

Ibid., 30. According to Polkinghorne, science asks the how questions and theology asks the why

questions.
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complementary.66 They should be read on different levels. For example, on one level is God’s
creatorial agency and another level is the mechanism and the regularity of natural laws which
were built by God. Reading the universe in multiple ways can be enriching, but scriptural and
cosmic literalism cripples the attainment of depth in understanding.67
The Problem of a Biblical Protology
The book of Genesis is foundational for the rest of Scripture. The opening chapters lay
down the basis of a biblical worldview claiming that the universe is derivative of God’s word.
These passages claim that God acted and spoke.68 Thus, a univocal understanding of the Genesis
narrative informs the reader How the universe came to exist. Interpretative problems arise for
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Stoeger, "The Big Bang, Quantum Cosmology and Creation Ex Nihilo," 175. “Thus quantum
cosmology and creatio ex nihilo contribute deeply complementary and consonant levels of understanding
of the reality in which we are immersed. Exactly the same point can be applied to divine creation and
biological evolution—they are not exclusive alternatives, but rather complementary accounts, linking the
ultimate ground of being and order with their elaboration in concrete structures, dynamisms, processes and
transitions” (ibid.).
67

Haught comments, “Natural science, for the sake of its own integrity, has to leave out all appeals
to divine explanation. From the point of view of science, a theological reading of nature is always out of
place. The question remains, however, whether the scientific reading takes us deeper than all other
readings. . . . Is it possible that the clarity given by science does not inevitably bring along with it the depth
that the human quest for truth is really after?” (Haught, Deeper Than Darwin: The Prospect for Religion in
the Age of Evolution, 17).
68

Langdon Gilkey recognized this fact when he wrote, “The modern assumption of the world order
has stripped bare our view of the biblical history of all the divine deeds observable on the surface of
history. . . . The biblical and orthodox understanding of theological language was univocal. That is, when
God was said to have ‘acted,’ it was believed that he had performed an observable act in space and time so
that he functioned as does any secondary cause. . . . The words “act” and “speak” were used in the same
sense of God as of men” (Gilkey, "Cosmology, Ontology, and the Travail of Biblical Thinking," 196).
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Polkinghorne if the narrative is interpreted univocally.69 First, according to him, when discussing
primal creation, the language of Gen 1-2 is mythical and is incompatible with each other. Second,
if the narrative is taken univocally, then the interpretative ambition is to explain the same thing
that science does.70 But interpreting the universe against the backdrop of the sacred text is
problematic for Polkinghorne due to his acceptance of the modern cosmological account of
origins. It is essential that a distinction be made between what Scripture actually says and what
we think it means. 71
The central issue then at stake is how should Scripture be interpreted in terms of the How
in cosmology.72 Scripture has an important and specific role, and Polkinghorne seeks to legitimize
its usage while avoiding two fundamentalist approaches: scientific and biblicist fundamentalism.
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Polkinghorne, Encountering Scripture: A Scientist Explores the Bible, 15. Polkinghorne provides
an example. He writes, “In a literal-minded way of reading them, the two accounts are incompatible. For
example, in the first the creation of humans follows the creation of the animals, while in the second the
order is reversed” (ibid.). A few pages later he further comments, “We have already seen that the fact that
these two stories themselves are incompatible with each other should warn us against treating them as if
they were divinely dictated accounts, given to save us the trouble of scientific investigation into terrestrial
and cosmic history” (22). Gordon Clark argues that if religious language is mythological, then apparent
contradictions can only be true if the language is literal. Does Polkinghorne interpret Gen 1 or 2 literally to
make such a claim? Whether he does or not, in the end he believes both chapters are mythological. Clark
concludes that “inconsistencies never will prove that the language is mythological” (Clark, Language and
Theology, 112).
70

Gilkey pointed this out. It is because of modern cosmology that biblical theological categories
have lost their univocal meaning. “What has happened is clear: because of our modern cosmology, we have
stripped what we regard as ‘the biblical point of view’ of all its wonders and voices. This in turn has
emptied the Bible’s theological categories of divine deeds and divine revelations of all their univocal
meaning” (Gilkey, "Cosmology, Ontology, and the Travail of Biblical Thinking," 202).
71

Anthony C. Thiselton, Hermeneutics: An Introduction (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2009), 5.
Thiselton writes, “Hermeneutics seeks to establish bridges between opposing viewpoints” (ibid.).
72

Campbell, Making Sense of the Bible, 18. Campbell suggests that different references to creation
and the absence of any additional sequences of six days in the Old Testament should prevent the reader
from “jumping to rash conclusions.” He explains, “In ancient Israel, with awareness of the breadth of
Israel’s traditions . . . few would have indulged the idea that Genesis One gave a picture of how God had
created the world. Given the “other and different portrayals of creation or references to creation” in the
biblical texts (such as Prov 8, Ps 104, Job 26 or 38, Gen 2, and more), we can conclude that Israel believed
God created the world and Israel’s theologians were aware that they had no idea as to how it might have
been done” (ibid.).
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The essential nature of fundamentalism is proclaiming partial truth as if it were the whole truth,73
which explains why the unity of truth is critical for Polkinghorne. According to him, the problem
of biblical cosmology is one of interpretation and harmonization with modern cosmology,74 and
in order to achieve his goal, Polkinghorne has to interpret the biblical narrative of Gen 1-2
metaphorically, not univocally.75
Scripture was not written in a scientific language,76 but Polkinghorne reads and evaluates
Gen 1-3 in the context of contemporary scientific cosmology.77 Regarding Gen 3 Polkinghorne
explains:
Once again we have to recognize that we are dealing with the genre of myth. I do not believe
that the chapter is the historical account of a single disastrous ancestral act, but it is a story
conveying truth about the relationship between God and humanity. Read in a literal way, the
story would clearly be incompatible with well-established knowledge given us by the sientific
study of the past. Snakes do not speak, thorns and thistles did not arise as a result of an act of
human disobedience and, most important of all, death was present in the world long before it
73

Ellis, "Physics, Complexity, and Religion," 762.
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Polkinghorne, Encountering Scripture: A Scientist Explores the Bible, 21. “Read in a flatfootedly literal way they are obviously incompatible with the well-founded conclusions of modern
cosmology and evolutionary biology” (ibid.).
75

Ibid., 22-23. “In fact, from the earliest Christian centuries it was recognized that Genesis is not
giving a literal account. People noted that light was created on the first day but the sun, moon and stars, the
apparent sources of light, on appeared on the fourth day. . . . In fact, the late creation of the heavenly bodies
in the narrative illustrates the theological character of Genesis 1. In the ancient world, sun, moon and stars
were often worshipped as deities. Genesis is at pains to make it clear that they are merely creatures,
appearing rather late on the scene in order to indicate their properly subordinate status. . . . The much older
story of Genesis 2 is even more obviously mythical in its character, meaning by ‘myth’ not a fairy story but
a truth so deep that only story can convey it. This second chapter of Genesis offers important theological
insights by means of the story that it tells: humanity’s place within nature” (ibid., 23).
76

Lennox, Seven Days that Divide the World, 30. Lennox suggests that Scripture uses
phenomenological language, the language of appearance. He explains that phenomenological language
“describes what anyone can see. It talks about the sun rising just as everyone else does, including scientists,
even though they know that the sun only appears to rise. . . . Saying that the sun ‘rises’ does not commit the
Bible, or a scientist for that matter, to any particular model of the solar system” (ibid.).
77

Campbell, Making Sense of the Bible, 18. Campbell claims that the six days of creation recorded
in Gen 1 “seems tame and desperately out of date when confronted with modern science’s awareness of our
13.7 billion-year-old universe.” Gilkey comments, “Actually we are translating the biblical view into our
own, at least in rejecting its concrete content of wonders and voices and so changing these categories from
univocal concepts to empty analogies. But we have done this translating without being aware of the change
we have made and thus without thinking out the problems in which this shift in cosmology and the resultant
translation of biblical language involve us” (Gilkey, "Cosmology, Ontology, and the Travail of Biblical
Thinking," 204).
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had any hominid inhabitants. . . . Any attempt to struggle with these difficulties in order to try
to find a literal interpretation of the chapter is, in fact, once again to miss the point.78
The immediate and obvious consequences in Polkinghorne’s manner of relating
contemporary cosmology to Scripture involves a revision or reinterpretation of Scripture based on
scientific concepts. For Polkinghorne, theological langauge is non-literal and metaphorical
features are often used, which is why he claims the text is not meant to be read “in a flat-footedly
literal way.”79 If the texts are read in a legalistic80 or literalistic manner,81 then obviously the
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Polkinghorne, Encountering Scripture: A Scientist Explores the Bible, 28. How does
Polkinghorne interpret the Fall? The experience of self-consciousness possessed by human beings brought
the Fall. He writes, “The Fall is indeed a fall ‘upward’, the gaining of knowledge, but it is an error to
suppose that humans can thereby attain equality with their Creator, so that they can live their lives
independently of God. This declaration of complete human autonomy, the assertion that we can simply ‘do
it my way’, is the root meaning of sin. . . . This turning from God did not bring biological death into the
world, for that had been there for many millions of years before there were any hominids. What it did
bring was what we may call ‘mortality’, human sadness and bitterness at the inevitability of death and
decay. Because our ancestors had become self-conscious, they knew long beforehand that they were going
to die” (ibid.). Polkinghorne does recognize that his modern interpretation excludes an aspect that was used
in early Christian centuries. The presence of disease in a good creation (Gen 1.10, 12, 18, 21, 25, 31) was
understood by some of the Church Fathers as being caused by the cursed ground and the entry of death that
marred an original perfect creation. The biblical text which claims these things is ignored by Polkinghorne.
He writes, “This strategy for explaining the apparent imperfection of a world that is the creation of a perfect
Creator is not available to us” (31). Compare Polkinghorne, Reason and Reality: The Relationship between
Science and Theology, 72. “Nowhere is the textbook approach to Scripture more out of place than in
Genesis 1-3. . . . We read them as powerful symbolic stories (myths) conveying the idea of a total
dependence of the creation upon its Creator and (most astonishing of all) the sevenfold reiterated message
that all is ‘good’. Science, in making untenable a literal reading of Genesis 1 and 2 (itself a tendency
originating in late medieval and reformation times), has liberated these chapters to play their proper and
powerful role in Christian thought” (ibid.).
79

Polkinghorne, Theology in the Context of Science, 100. Gilkey writes, “We deny this univocal
understanding of theological words. To us, theological verbs such as ‘to act,’ ‘to work,’ ‘to do,’ ‘to speak,’
‘to reveal,’ etc., have no longer the literal meaning of observable actions in space and time or of voices in
the air. The denial of wonders and voices has thus shifted our theological language from the univocal to the
analogical” (Gilkey, “Cosmology, Ontology, and the Travail of Biblical Thinking,” 196).
80

I am indebted to Martin Hanna for coining the expression legalistic reading.
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Lennox, Seven Days that Divide the World, 23-25. Lennox correctly explains that all language
contains elements of literal and metaphor. He provides a couple of examples. The first is, “The car was
flying down the road,” where the car and road are literal but despite flying being a metaphor, the sentence
does refer to something real. Another example is the statement made by Christ, “I am the door” (John
10.9). Clearly the primary, literal sense of a physical door is not meant but the metaphor does convey real
truth regarding Christ as a real doorway into a literal experience of salvation. He makes a distinction
between a literalistic and a literal meaning. Literalistic refers to the basic, primary meaning of a word and
literal refers to the natural reading intended. Thus, in the sentence “the car was flying down the road,” a
literalistic reading implies that the car was actually flying and reading it literally, in the natural sense,
means the car was going very fast.
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narrative is incompatible with the conclusions drawn from modern cosmology and evolutionary
biology. According to Polkinghorne, modern cosmology provides a detailed account of terrestrial
and cosmic history. Evolutionary theory demonstrates that creation is a process, and Polkinghorne
states that Genesis also portrays creation as a process.82
Another aspect that should be taken into consideration, according to Polkinghorne, is the
genre of the biblical text. He explains that a fundamentalist biblical literalism reading of Gen 1-2
mistakes its genre.83 A theological reading brings into focus the purpose of Gen 1-2.84

A Reinterpretation of Biblical Protology:
Rejection of Biblical Univocity
Interpretation is the key, and reinterpretation is necessary in light of the fact that science
has changed the meaning of theological discourse.85 Polkinghorne is aware of this, and how does
he interpret the opening chapters of Genesis? Polkinghorne reads Scripture in the context of
contemporary scientific cosmology, thus rejecting a univocal reading of the biblical narrative.
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Polkinghorne, Encountering Scripture: A Scientist Explores the Bible, 28.
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Ibid., 21. “In fact, from the earliest Christian centuries it was recognized that Genesis is not
giving a literal account. People noted that light was created on the first day but the sun, moon and stars, the
apparent sources of light, only appeared on the fourth day. . . . The late creation of the heavenly bodies in
the narrative illustrates the theological character of Genesis 1. In the ancient world, sun, moon and stars
were often worshipped as deities. Genesis is at pains to make it clear that they are merely creatures,
appearing rather late on the scene in order to indicate their properly subordinate status” (ibid.). Even though
a theological reading might provide insights, does the genre conclude that Genesis is irrelevant for doing
science?
84

Ibid., 22. “Genesis 1 does not give us a quasi-scientific account of a hectic six days of divine
activity, but is something altogether deeper and more interesting than that. It is a theological text whose
principal purpose is to assert that nothing exists except through the will of God.” Campbell interprets Gen 1
eschatologically as a “grand portrayal of an ordered world. Chaos has been banished; everything is in its
place. All is good. . . . It is not the world we live in and the world we experience that is described this way;
it is the world coming, in the text, from God’s creative hand. Experience can encounter a chaotic and messy
world. Israel’s experience certainly did. . . . They portrayed it with the images of a world coming from the
creative hand of God. Each week, they celebrated it on the seventh day. Christians today can rise to the
imaginative challenge of finding longed-for order and stability in the image of a crucified God” (Campbell,
Making Sense of the Bible, 19).
85

Bronislaw Szerszynski, "Rethinking the Secular: Science, Technology, and Religion Today,"
Zygon 40 (2005): 816.
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The biblical accounts of the creation found in Genesis cannot be accepted as true scientifically
because they do not provide reliable contemporary scientific information. As already mentioned,
Polkinghorne evades “fundamentalist biblical literalism” by claiming that Genesis should be
understood theologically, not historically. He separates theology from history by not reading it as
history but by reading and believing the text conveys timeless truths through figurative,
theological language.86 The message that Genesis conveys is that God continuously sustains the
universe because it constantly depends on his providential care.87
Polkinghorne does not spurn the interpretation of evolutionary science. Rather, he rejects
a univocal reading of the opening chapters of Genesis.88 As a scientist, Polkinghorne continues to
embrace a scientific literalism in regard to the How of the universe in order to bolster theology’s
cognitive status in a scientific culture. He continues to concede that only an evolutionary
interpretation of nature will command respect intellectually. However, he suggests an alternative
way of interpreting evolutionary science. The alternative way places evolutionary science in a
theological framework, and Gen 1-2 is interpreted theologically and metaphorically.
Summary and Conclusions
It is evident that Polkinghorne provides a coherent model in the case of protology in his
interpretation of science and theology. By placing the created universe in a theological
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An excellent discussion of the usage of literal meaning can be found in R. W. L. Moberly, The
Bible, Theology, and Faith: A Study of Abraham and Jesus (Cambridge: Cambirdge University Press,
2000), 225-232. Moberly concludes that an interpreter should take “full seriousness the integrity of the
biblical text on its own terms: that is, to find the ‘spiritual meaning’ precisely in the ‘literal sense’” (232).
87

Polkinghorne, Encountering Scripture: A Scientist Explores the Bible, 22. He writes, “The sad
irony of so-called ‘creationism’, based on a fundamentalist biblical literalism, is that in fact it abuses the
very text that it seeks to respect” because “Genesis 1 does not give us a quasi-scientific account of a hectic
six days of divine activity, but is something altogether deeper and more interesting than that. It is a
theological text whose principal purpose is to assert that nothing exists except through the will of God”
(ibid.). If this is the principal purpose, what might be the other lesser purposes of the text and how does
Polkinghorne know this is the principal purpose of the text?
88

Polkinghorne, "Beyond the Big Bang," 17. “The error is to believe that the doctrine of creation is
concerned with the physical question of temporal origin (‘Who lit the blue torch paper of the Big Bang?’),
whilst in fact its focus is on ontological origin (Leibniz’ question about why anything exists at all)” (ibid.).
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framework, Polkinghorne points to an ultimate meaning in creation that is beyond the competence
and vision of science.
However, by not having a strict theological focus on the biblical doctrine of creation,
Polkinghorne, in the interest of cohesion, has adopted a system in which he reinterprets and
reshapes theological concepts. He presupposes that modern science and theology are compatible
by accomodating Genesis to theistic evolution, and his redefinition of cosmology relies on
scientific knowledge and language. This is based on the presupposition that science determines
the best possible interpretation of protology. His desire to bring the doctrine of creation into
empirical conformity with a particular scientific theory leads Polkinghorne to reject a univocal
reading of Gen 1-3, and he presumes that reinterpreting these texts in light of modern science
does not compromise Scripture’s authority.
The next chapter critically describes Polkinghorne’s Eschatology and his relative
acceptance of scriptural univocity.

80

CHAPTER IV
POLKINGHORNE’S ESCHATOLOGY AND THE RE-INTRODUCTION
OF BIBLICAL UNIVOCITY
Introduction
By situating Polkinghorne’s different scriptural approaches into case studies, one is able
to investigate and discover more clearly the role Scripture plays in his theological method.
Polkinghorne’s manner of using Scripture in protology was presented in chapter 3. The aim of the
present chapter is to delineate Polkinghorne’s eschatology and how his relative acceptance of
biblical univocity has impacted his eschatology.
Eschatology
Eschatology is the study of the final end of all things and the ultimate destiny for
individuals and creation. Two key elements are identified in Polkinghorne’s eschatology. First, he
is concerned with history as it moves toward its fulfillment and, second, he is equally concerned
with the fulfillment of history and its perpetuity. Polkinghorne argues that a hopeful eschatology
must include both concerns.1 Grounded on a theistic view of reality, he claims that there is
legitimacy of a future hope for a universal resurrection and transformation. Yet, these claims rest

1

Polkinghorne, The God of Hope and the End of the World, 81. “Others again, including the
present writer, adopt the familiar eschatological stance of already/not yet, believing that it is necessary to
combine elements of both realized and futurist eschatology, in what one may call an inaugurated, but not
completed, eschatology.” Regarding realized eschatology, he adds, “Realised eschatology finds its enabling
in the hope sustained by a realistic futurist eschatology” (ibid., 49).
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on revelation mediated in Scripture and tradition2 through the use of eschatological language,
which Polkinghorne labels “mythic language.”3 Understanding eschatological claims of a hopeful
future are formulated through symbolic language, assigning deep and complete relevancy to the
universe and its history.4 Polkinghorne presents a future irradiated with hope of transformation
for the universe despite the pessimistic forecast of scientific cosmology.5 As a scientist,
Polkinghorne is cognizant of the challenges scientific cosmology presents in terms of
eschatology.
Scientific cosmology is not capable of offering any type of hope and, as Polkinghorne
describes, “the bleak prognosis for the universe puts in question any notion of evolutionary
optimism, of a satisfactory fulfilment solely within the confines of the unfolding of present
physical process.”6 Then, how does Polkinghorne understand Christian eschatological claims in

2

Polkinghorne writes, “If, as I believe, any hope of a destiny beyond death can ultimately rest only
on the faithfulness of God the Creator, then appeal to the revelatory insights . . . is absolutely fundamental
to the discussion” (ibid., xvii).
3

Polkinghorne, The Faith of a Physicist: Reflections of a Bottom-up Thinker: The Gifford Lectures
for 1993-4, 164. “Needless to say, our recourse to mythic language is in order to speak of that which is not
yet experienced, and not in the form of the illusory comfort of a fable.”
4

According to Richard Bauckham, eschatological language is symbolic and imaginative because
eschatology transcends all known concepts. Yet, the symbols direct imaginative thought so “the
imaginative is not necessarily the imaginary” and “hopeful imagining is protected from mere speculation in
that it is grounded in the promises of God and resourced by the images of Scripture” (Richard Bauckham,
"Eschatology," in The Oxford Handbook of Systematic Theology, ed. John Webster, Kathryn Tanner, and
Iain Torrance (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 316-317).
5

For example, Robert Russell writes that “John Polkinghorne offers the most promising insights
for responding to the challenge of cosmology” (Robert J. Russell, "Cosmology and Eschatology," in The
Oxford Handbook of Eschatology, ed. Jerry L. Walls (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 572).
6

Polkinghorne, The Faith of a Physicist: Reflections of a Bottom-up Thinker: The Gifford Lectures
for 1993-4, 162.
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light of the pessimistic prognosis of scientific cosmology?7 As a scientist and theologian,
Polkinghorne concedes that nothing can be proven about what takes place after death, but he
believes there are reasonable motivations for hope in a life to come or in a continued life. But, if
proof cannot be offered, then how credible can any eschatological assertion be? Polkinghorne
replys that “a credible eschatology is seeking to establish that the divine creation is truly and
everlastingly a cosmos and not . . . a chaos whose final end must lie in futility. The message of
eschatological hope is that the world makes sense, now and always.”8
The ultimate hope of eschatology “will have to rest in an ultimate reality, that is to say, in
the eternal God himself, and not in his creation.”9 Polkinghorne holds that Christian belief
“provides the essential resource for answering this fundamental question.”10

7

Discussions in scholarly works that treat specifically the relation between eschatology and
scientific cosmology and its implications include: Richard Bauckham and Trevor Hart, Hope against Hope:
Christian Eschatology at the Turn of the Millenium (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1999); Neil Gillman,
"How Will It All End? Eschatology and Science in Religion," Cross Currents 57 (2007); Norman R.
Gulley, "The Impact of Eschatology on Protology," Journal of the Adventist Theological Society 11 (2000);
Michael G. Hasel, ""In the Beginning . . . " The Relationship between Protology and Eschatology," in The
Cosmic Battle for Planet Earth: Essays in Honor of Norman R. Gulley, ed. Ron Du Preez and Jirí Moskala
(Berrien Springs, MI: Old Testament Department, Seventh-day Adventist Theological Seminary, Andrews
University, 2003); Ulrich H. J. Körtner, The End of the World: A Theological Interpretation (Louisville,
KY: Westminster John Knox, 1995); Ted Peters, "Where Are We Going? Eschatology," in Essentials of
Christian Theology, ed. William C. Placher (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2003); Robert J.
Russell, "Bodily Resurrection, Eschatology, and Scientific Cosmology: The Mutual Interaction of Christian
Theology and Science," in Resurrection, ed. Ted Peters, Michael Welker, and Robert J. Russell (Grand
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2002); Robert J. Russell, "Sin, Salvation, and Scientific Cosmology: Is Christian
Eschatology Credible Today?," in Sin and Salvation, ed. Duncan Reid and Mark William Worthing
(Hindmarsh, Australia: Australian Theological Forum, 2003); Robert J. Russell, "Five Key Topics on the
Frontier of Theology and Science Today," Dialog 46 (2007); Russell, "Cosmology and Eschatology," 563580; Robert John Russell, "Eschatology and Scientific Cosmology: From Conflict to Interaction," in What
God Knows: Time, Eternity, and Divine Knowledge, ed. Harry Lee Poe and J. Stanley Mattson (Waco, TX:
Baylor University Press, 2006); Hans Schwarz, Eschatology (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2000); John
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Polkinghorne, The Faith of a Physicist: Reflections of a Bottom-up Thinker: The Gifford Lectures
for 1993-4, 163.
10
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Polkinghorne’s hopeful eschatology revolves around four propositions.11 First, if the
universe is a created entity, then it must make sense, that is, it has a purpose. Second, if God is a
loving Creator, then there must be an ultimate destiny for the universe and its creatures. Third,
any eschatological expectation must have elements of continuity and discontinuity, and finally,
this hope is grounded on the steadfast love and faithfulness of God and the resurrection of Christ.
The hope of the transformation of the universe into the new creation is based on an
analogy with the bodily resurrection of Christ. Polkinghorne introduces the expression ex vetere12
in order to distinguish between the initial and present creation with the future transformed
creation. He writes: “What is brought about is the divine redemptive transformation of the old
creation. The new is not a second creation ex nihilo, but it is a resurrected world created ex vetere.
Involved in its coming to be must be both continuity and discontinuity, just as the Lord’s risen
body bears the scars of the passion but is also transmuted and glorified.”13
If the eschatological cosmic transformation is a radically new act of God, how can
science be relevant? Polkinghorne emphasizes that eschatological fulfillment will have elements
of continuity and discontinuity with the creation presently experienced in many ways. This is so
because theologically there must be a continuity between present reality and the final
transformation at the eschaton. To a certain degree, it will be the same creation with the same
individual identities who belong to it. For Polkinghorne, it is the point of continuity that allows
the natural sciences to be relevant and make a contribution, whereas the discontinuities are the
property of theology.14
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Polkinghorne, The God of Hope and the End of the World, 148-149.
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The definition of the term ex vetere is “from/out of the old.”
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John C. Polkinghorne, "Eschatology: Some Questions and Some Insights from Science," in The
End of the World and the Ends of God: Science and Theology on Eschatology, ed. John C. Polkinghorne
and Michael Welker (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity, 2000), 30. See also Polkinghorne, Reason and Reality: The
Relationship between Science and Theology, 102-103.
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Scientific Cosmology and the Problem of a Scientific Eschatology
Contemporary natural science presents descriptions of partial, global, and cosmic
catastrophic events capable of obliterating life on this planet and the entire cosmic development.15
Since there is no scientific supportable foundation for the belief in a transformed new heavens
and new earth, scientific cosmology poses a serious challenge to any credible Christian
eschatology based on the resurrection of Christ and the transformation of the universe into the
new creation. If the manner in which the emergence of the universe came to be is taken as factual,
then its demise should be thoughtfully considered. Regardless of the fact that the end of the
cosmic time scale lies billions of years into the future, the prognosis that scientific cosmology
presents, through the extrapolation of its present history, is a hopeless and futile end to all forms
of life in the universe. Certain death is the ultimate destiny for the present and all future
generations, as it was for all of the preceding forms of life during the evolution of the universe.16
The universe is controlled by the competing effects of expansion and gravity, and
scientific cosmology asserts that the observable universe will eventually evanesce by one of two
certain catastrophes: freeze or fry. The first scenario explains that the universe is infinite in size,
and as a consequence of the big bang it is destined to expand unceasingly. If expansion prevails,
then the temperature will exponentially drop to absolute zero. This scientific description of
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Examples of partial and global catastrophes include geological and climatic changes, collision
with a comet or meteor. Examples of cosmic catastrophes include the cyclical theory of the oscillating
universe and the thesis of heat death based on the Second Law of Thermodynamics.
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Kathryn Tanner, "Eschatology without a Future?," in The End of the World and the Ends of God:
Science and Theology on Eschatology, ed. John C. Polkinghorne and Michael Welker (Harrisburg, PA:
Trinity, 2000), 222. She writes, “The best scientific description of the day leaves little doubt that death is
the end toward which our solar system and the universe as a whole are moving. Our sun will one day
exhaust its fuel, annihilating life on planet Earth” (ibid.).
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universal death is termed freeze.17 In the second model, the universe is finite in size and if gravity
predominates, the universe’s present expansion will eventually stop. The universe will then
reverse and recollapse, ending with an implosion where the temperature will rise infinitely. This
scientific description of universal death is termed fry.18
Both of these scenarios can either conflict with a future-oriented Christian eschatology or
these dire perspectives can be consistent with God’s modus operandi, thus defusing the challenge
to a future-oriented Christian eschatology altogether.19 What response can Polkinghorne’s
interpretation of Christian eschatology give to the challenge presented by scientific cosmology?
Biblical Eschatology: Relative Introduction of Biblical Univocity
An implication of a theistic perspective of reality is its assigning of relevancy and
meaningfulness to the universe and its history.20 Polkinghorne introduces eschatology as the
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Polkinghorne, The God of Hope and the End of the World, 8-9. Polkinghorne explains that if
expansion continues, “the galaxies now receding from each other will continue to do so for ever. Within
each galaxy, gravity will bring about condensation into enourmous black holes, which will eventually
decay into low-grade radiation through a variety of possible physical processess” (Polkinghorne, The Faith
of a Physicist: Reflections of a Bottom-up Thinker: The Gifford Lectures for 1993-4, 162).
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(Polkinghorne, The Faith of a Physicist: Reflections of a Bottom-up Thinker: The Gifford Lectures for
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response to the impending fact of cosmic annihilation. He asserts that any adequate theological
response to science must rest on two foundational assumptions: the first is the everlasting
faithfulness of God and the second is the idea that creation is important to God.21 A hopeful
eschatology is not based on evolutionary optimism but rather it is predicated on the enduring
faithfulness of God.22 Polkinghorne affirms that eschatology is indispensable to Christian
theology23 because it provides the answer by affirming that the universe makes complete sense.
He infers that a unified theory of everything can be found in a theological understanding of
reality. This view leads him to believe that “if the universe is to make complete sense, it will be
through something like the continuity/discontinuity of the Christian resurrection hope. The
theological motivation for entertaining that hope lies in the resurrection of Jesus and the
faithfulness of (chesed) of God.”24
In Polkinghorne’s eschatological discourse, science is dependent on theology. In terms of
eschatology, the principal role of science is to raise questions while looking at theology to
provide the answers for a hopeful end.25 But the exploration of a credible hope will not only make
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John C. Polkinghorne, "Eschatological Credibility: Emergent and Teleological Processes," in
Resurrection (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2002), 48.
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Polkinghorne writes, “The insight of God’s steadfast faithfulness is its foundation for
eschatological hope, the basis for theology’s affirmation that the universe is not a chaos but a cosmos, not
simply a world making sense now but always” (Polkinghorne, Science and Religion in Quest of Truth,
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full use of the resources for understanding offered by science but will also be grounded on
scriptural evidence and theological tradition.
Polkinghorne’s conviction is framed in a resurrection concept of continuity and
discontinuity, and it is here that we begin to gain insight into his contrastive reading of Scripture.
How will the universe come to an end? Polkinghorne’s claims of an optimistic and hopeful end,
that is, the concept of discontinuity, are based on a univocal reading of theological phenomena
that science cannot verify in order to deny or confirm its reality.26 It becomes noticable that
Polkinghorne is not following science blindly. His method of interpretation deviates because, in
his cosmology, he yields to a scientific account of How the universe originated. But, in terms of
eschatology, Polkinghorne chooses not to yield to the scientific account of How the universe will
end but rather is open to and accepts a scriptural reading of eschatology. Through the concepts of
discontinuity, Polkinghorne allows theology to continue not only answering the Why questions
but even sanctions it to answer the How questions. He also assumes that through the linkage of
the present creation to the future new creation, that is, the concept of continuity, is what will
make Christian eschatology coherent with science. Polkinghorne clarifies this point:
Science . . . could not usurp theology’s role in speaking of what God might do by way of a
new creation. However, if that new creation is to be related to the present creation in a way
that involves both continuity and discontinuity (as the Christian resurrection hope suggests),
then science may have something to say about the conditions of consonance and credibility
that the continuity aspect of the relationship might be expected to fulfill.27
As already noted, this linkage requires Polkinghorne to interpret the discontinuity
element of Scripture univocally. As a theist, Polkinghorne needs Scripture and biblical
eschatology. But why? Polkinghorne needs biblical eschatology because “an unaided scientific
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Polkinghorne, Science and Religion in Quest of Truth, 103. “Science, which can only tell the
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story of divine faithfulness” (ibid.).
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account of the world does not suceed in making complete sense of cosmic history.”28 Whereas in
science, Polkinghorne yields to the scientific account of the cosmic past, in eschatology, he does
not allow science to dictate exhaustively his belief and explanation of the cosmic future due to the
inherent limitations of science. Eschatology is a matter of faith in God and Christ.
How should the language of these claims be understood in light of scientific cosmology
and Christian theology? Polkinghorne takes eschatological language seriously and literally.
The God of Hope and the Resurrection of Christ
Polkinghorne contends that in order for eschatology to be persuasive, it has to adequately
articulate God’s overall purpose for all creation.29 His hopeful and credible eschatology rests on
two essentials as its foundation: God’s enduring faithfulness and the resurrection of Christ:
What could then be the ground of a true hope beyond history? There is only one possible
source: the eternal faithfulness of the God who is the Creator and Redeemer of history. . . .
Christian trust in divine faithfulness is reinforced by the knowledge that God is the One who
raised Jesus from the dead. Only such a God could be the ground for that hope against hope
that transcends the limits of any natural expectation.30
Because of God’s eternal faithfulness, Polkinghorne then believes that God has an
ultimate purpose for creation and that his faithfulness will endure. But, what evidence does he
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Polkinghorne, The God of Hope and the End of the World, 94. “If eschatology is to make sense,
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Christ, rather than in general considerations about the nature of the world” (ibid.).

89

offer that this is factual? What evidence does he present for the veracity of the the story of the
resurrection of Christ? Both are derived from a univocal reading of Scripture. First, Polkinghorne
affirms “a credible eschatology must find its basis in a ‘thick’ and developed theology.” What
type of robust theology does he have in mind? He answers:
A kind of minimalist account of deity, which sees God as not much more than the Mind
behind cosmic order, will not be adequate. Nor will a kind of minimalist Christology, which
sees Jesus as no more than an inspired teacher, pointing humanity to new possibilities for
self-realisation. . . . These concepts are too weak to bear so great a weight of expectation. To
sustain true hope it must be possible to speak of a God who is powerful and active, not simply
holding creation in being but also interacting with its history, the one who “gives life to the
dead and calls into existence the things that do not exist” (Romans 4:17).31
In other words, his eschatological hope and his belief in the meaningfulness of human life
contain rationalistic faith in biblical theology.32 Second, eschatology is based on the resurrection
of Christ. In Christ, there is a destiny for humanity and physical creation. It was the purpose of
God that Christ should be the “first born from the dead” (Col 1.18). Polkinghorne believes that
God’s final aim is cosmic in scope. The resurrection of Christ demonstrated that death is not the
end because a resurrection and transformation awaits those who trust in him. There is a single
destiny for the universe and humanity. According to Polkinghorne, in order for theology to
coherently argue for a destiny beyond death, it is essential to wrestle with the elements of
continuity and discontinuity in terms of the New Creation and humanity.
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Polkinghorne, The God of Hope and the End of the World, 95. We see the tension in
Polkinghorne’s interpretation. First, he believes in the literal resurrection of Christ and the power of God’s
words to “call into existence” things that do not exist, yet Polkinghorne appears not to be open in
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of biblical protology, where God spoke creation and life into existence. This he plainly rejects as myth.
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Polkinghorne, "Beyond the Big Bang," 24. “It is my religious faith that enables me to take the
more hopeful view. I believe that the really Grand Unified Theory, the true Theory of Everything, is not
some set of beautiful equations which we might hope one day to write on our T-shirts, but theology itself,
with its account of the God who is the Sustainer of the physical world and the Ground of creation’s
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Big Bang, fifteen billion years ago” (ibid.).
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The New Creation: Ex Vetere in Contrast to Ex Nihilo
Polkinghorne’s notion of God as Creator and sustainer of all creation implies that an
exclusive anthropocentric approach to eschatology should be resisted in favor of a future cosmic
destiny beyond death.33 Because eschatological hope is cosmic in scope, Polkinghorne accepts
univocally the universal hope presented in Rom 8.19-23 by proposing that the ultimate fulfillment
for the whole universe is a New Creation inaugurated by the resurrection of Christ.34
Just as we see Jesus’ resurrection as the origin and guarantee of human hope, so we can also
see it as the origin and guarantee of a universal hope. The significance of the empty tomb is
that the Lord’s risen and glorified body is the transmuted form of his dead body. Thus matter
itself participates in the resurrection transformation, enjoying thereby the foretaste of its own
redemption from decay. The resurrection of Jesus is the seminal event from which the whole
of God’s new creation has already begun to grow.35
Theologically, Polkinghorne argues that the natural laws and physical properties of the
present universe will be transformed.36 His understanding of the process and character of a
creatio continua through evolutionary development influences his eschatology37 even though it
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Polkinghorne notes “that the empty tomb asserts that Christ’s risen and glorified body is the
transformation of his dead body, thereby implying a destiny in Christ for matter as well as for humanity”
(Polkinghorne, Science and Theology: An Introduction, 117). Gabriel Daly writes, “Something cosmic has
to happen if there is to be redemption in any real sense. A Christ who arises only in the human heart cannot
meet the demands of a universe in travail” (Gabriel Daly, Creation and Redemption (Wilmington, DE:
Michael Glazier, 1989), 100).
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37

Polkinghorne, The Faith of a Physicist: Reflections of a Bottom-up Thinker: The Gifford
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presence. Its process can be free from suffering, for it is conceivable that the divinely ordained laws of
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leads him to make a distinction between protology and eschatology in his attempt to find a
resolution between the concept of process and the concept of hope.38
This resolution is found in his understanding of creation as a two-stage process.39 First,
the old creation exists at a distance from the veiled presence of God. This distance is necessary in
order for creation to truly be free while being allowed to develop and make itself. The second step
is the new creation made up of new matter and brought into closer intimacy with its Creator who
is no longer veiled. His interpretation of the new creation is framed in terms of an eschatological
transformation, not an eschatological replacement, satisfying the necessary continuity between
the old and new creations.40 It is important to note that by the adjective new, Polkinghorne does
not imply the abolition of the present creation. Rather, the first creation will be a redeemed and
transformed ex vetere creation and not a second, totally new creation ex nihilo. He argues that the
new creation is not a second attempt by God at what he had first tried to do in the old
creation. It is a different kind of divine action altogether, and the difference may be
summarized by saying that the first creation was ex nihilo while the new creation will be ex
vetere. In other words, the old creation is God’s bringing into being a universe which is free
to exist ‘on its own’, in the ontological space made available to it by the divine kenotic act of
allowing the existence of something wholly other; the new creation is the divine redemption
of the old.41
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Ibid., 169. “The concept of a new creation ex vetere is the attempt to do justice both to the God
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Polkinghorne, Theology in the Context of Science, 158.

40

Polkinghorne, The God of Hope and the End of the World, 116. He also adds, “This
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Polkinghorne speculates that the character of the new creation will be different from the
current one.42 It will not evolve from existing resources but will be infused with new laws
conducive to the permanency of life along with the final eradication of suffering and death.43
If natural laws can be rewritten in a manner that suffering and death are excluded, then,
why were these laws not the basis for the present creation? Polkinghorne explains that
kenotic creation is intrinsically a two-stage act. First must come a world in which creatures
exist at a sufficient distance from the infinite reality of their Creator so that they are allowed a
true freedom to be themselves. If finite creatures are not to be overwhelmed, the divine
presence must initially be veiled. The process of that world will be an evolutionary process in
which creatures are allowed to make themselves, as potentiality is explored and brought to
birth. We have seen that mortality is intrinsic to such an evolving world, which has to be
poised at the edge of chaos. The old creation will fulfil some of the divine creative purposes,
but not all of them. God’s final intention is to draw all who will freely come, into closer
contact with the divine life. . . . True fullness of life will come through this everlasting
encounter, and there will be no need for the evolutionary sequence of finite generations.
Theologically we may say that the world of the new creation will be the realm where final
eschatological fulfilment will be attained through a panentheistic participation in divine
reality (1 Corinthians 15:28).44
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It has already been noted that the new creation is a transformation of the present creation.
Still, by what means is this transformation brought about and how long will it take? Creation will
be reclaimed by God through Christ. Based on a univocal reading of Scripture (Col 1.15-20),
Polkinghorne infers that this transformation is generated as a result of a universal reconciliation to
God because it will be “integrated into the divine life (‘theosis’).”45 In other words, Polkinghorne
believes that the eschatological cosmic destiny will be panentheistic in character.46 The “new
creation,” writes Polkinghorne, “will be wholly sacramental, suffused with the presence of the life
of God.”47 The new creation enters into a new state of intimacy with God, possible only through a
“relinquishment of that gift of independence and a return”48 by the old creation, but he does not
go into detail concerning the transformational time lapse between the old and new creation. He
discards the idea of the millennium serving as a bridge between the old and new creation,
claiming he is “unconvinced of the need for such a transitional episode.”49 However long it takes,
Polkinghorne speculates that the nature of temporality in the new creation will bear some
similarity with the time of the present creation. He explains:
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that the empty tomb asserts that Christ’s risen and glorified body is the transformation of his dead body,
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47

Ibid.

48

Polkinghorne, Reason and Reality: The Relationship between Science and Theology, 103.
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What does seem clear is that if it is intrinsic to humanity to be embodied, then it must be
intrinsic to humanity to be temporal. The life of the world to come will doubtless be
everlasting, but it will not be eternal in that special and mysterious timeless sense in which
the word is applied to God himself. The patient process of this world will find its reflection in
the redemptive process of the world to come. Our notion of heaven is delivered from any
static, and potentially boring, conception. The life of heaven will involve the endless,
dynamic exploration of the inexhaustible riches of the divine nature.50
The Psychosomatic Nature of Humanity and the Resurrection
If the universe has a purpose and ultimately makes sense, then the reality of death
certainly brings into question God’s intention for his creation. Does God simply abandon his
creation, especially in terms of humanity, after serving its purpose, and if that is the case, how
credible is a Christian eschatological hope? Polkinghorne argues that God has an eternal destiny
for humanity: “It seems a coherent belief that God will remember and reconstitute the pattern that
is a human being, in an act of resurrection taking place beyond present history. Thus the Christian
hope centres on a real death followed by a real resurrection, brought about through the power and
merciful faithfulness of God.”51
Polkinghorne clarifies that even though death is a reality, it is not the ultimate end. He
clearly accepts and maintains that the resurrection is a direct eschatological act of God.
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Polkinghorne, The Faith of a Physicist: Reflections of a Bottom-up Thinker: The Gifford
Lectures for 1993-4, 170. Elsewhere he writes, “The new creation will not be a timeless world of ‘eternity’,
but a temporal world whose character is everlasting. . . . Just as it is intrinsic to humanity that we should be
embodied, so it is intrinsic to humanity that we are temporal beings. One must recognize, however, that this
conclusion runs counter to a good deal of eschatological thinking” (Polkinghorne, The God of Hope and the
End of the World, 117).
51

Polkinghorne, Science and Theology: An Introduction, 115. See also Polkinghorne, The Faith of
a Physicist: Reflections of a Bottom-up Thinker: The Gifford Lectures for 1993-4, 163. “The Christian hope
is, therefore, for me not the hope of survival of death, the persistence post mortem of a spiritual component
which possesses, or has been granted, an intrinsic immortality. Rather, the Christian hope is of death and
resurrection” (ibid.).
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Polkinghorne veers from the classic theological definition of an inherent immortal soul.52 He
prefers a psychosomatic view of human nature as “animated bodies” to classical dualism
“incarnated souls,” 53 thus accepting Scripture’s primary definition of the soul as a unit.54
Polkinghorne stresses the completeness of death due to its naturalness.55 Yet, death is not the
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Polkinghorne, The Faith of a Physicist: Reflections of a Bottom-up Thinker: The Gifford
Lectures for 1993-4, 163-164. “That will be his eschatological act of resurrection. Thus, death is a real end
but not the final end, for only God himself is ultimate. Although there have, of course, been strands of the
Christian tradition which have used the language of the survival of an immortal soul, I believe that the
tradition which is truer, both to New Testament insight and to modern understanding, is that which relies on
the hope of a resurrection beyond death. If this psychosomatic understanding is correct, then it is intrinsic
to true humanity that we should be embodied. We are not apprentice angels, awaiting to be disencumbered
of our fleshly habitation. Our hope is of the resurrection of the body” (ibid.). For a brief essay on a
scriptural monistic rendering of human nature, see Joel B. Green, ""Bodies--That Is, Human Lives": A ReExamination of Human Nature in the Bible," in Whatever Happened to the Soul? Scientific and Theological
Portraits of Human Nature, ed. Warren S. Brown, Nancey Murphy, and H. Newton Malony (Minneapolis,
MI: Fortress Press, 1998), 149-173.
53

John C. Polkinghorne, "The Person, the Soul, and Genetic Engineering," Journal of Medical
Ethics 30 (2004): 595. Polkinghorne is fond of this classic sentence of H. Wheeler Robinson, “The Hebrew
idea of personality is an animated body, and not an incarnated soul” (H. Wheeler Robinson, "Hebrew
Psychology," in The People and the Book, ed. Arthur S. Peake (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925), 362.
54

Polkinghorne writes, “I believe that we human beings are psychosomatic unities, a package deal
with mind and matter in inseparably complementary relationship to each other. It is a conclusion that would
not have surprised the writers of the Bible. It has often been acknowledged that they thought of human
beings as ‘animated bodies’, rather than ‘incarnated souls’. We are risen beasts and not fallen angels
trapped in the flesh. If Christianity has often seemed to have bought into a dualist account of human nature,
that has been because of platonic influence on its development, rather than being drawn from its scriptural
roots” (Polkinghorne, "The Person, the Soul, and Genetic Engineering," 595). He also comments that
“despite both Hebrew thought and much of the thinking of the New Testament being in accord with this
unitary view of human nature, a difficulty might be feared to ensue for the coherence of eschatological
hope” (Polkinghorne, The God of Hope and the End of the World, 105). Elsewhere he remarks that the
“pysochosomatic account of human nature is the dominant, but not exclusive, way of thinking to be found
in the Bible” (Polkinghorne, Science and Theology: An Introduction, 63).
55

Death is natural because it is part of the physical fabric of the present creation. As documented in
the previous chapter, death is not an intruder that entered God’s creation. Instead, death is necessary
because it is the cost of new life. Polkinghorne reads some Pauline passages univocally (e.g., Rom 8.19-23;
2 Cor 5.17; Col 1.15-20), but he rejects a univocal reading of certain biblical passages where death is
presented as a consequence of human sin. Two examples are provided. First, Polkinghorne’s understanding
of Rom 5.12, “Therefore, as through one man sin entered into the world, and death through sin; and so
death passed unto all men, for that all sinned” (ASV). Polkinghorne writes regarding this passage, “With
our evolutionary understanding of the history of terrestrial life and of hominid origins, we can no longer
hold this view literally in relation to the fact of physical death” (Polkinghorne, The God of Hope and the
End of the World, 126). A second example of his rejecting death as a natural consequence to the entrance of
sin is his interpretation of the Fall found in Gen 3 and how he relates it to Rom 5. He comments and
concludes, “The episode that theologians call the Fall can then be understood as a turning away from God
into the human self, by which our ancestors became curved in upon themselves and alienated from the
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ultimate end because Polkinghorne is convinced of the truthfulness of a future supernatural
human resurrection.56 He explains:
There is indeed the Christian hope of a destiny beyond death, but it resides not in the
presumed immortality of a spiritual soul, but in the divinely guaranteed eschatological
sequence of death and resurrection. Only a hope conceived of in this way can do full justice
to human psychosomatic unity, and hence to the indispensability of some form of reembodiment for a truly human future existence.57
What is this soul, what is it made of, and does it persist? Polkinghorne defines and
describes the soul as a complex “information-bearing pattern” as a way to identify what is unique
in each person.58 This pattern slowly changes with time, representing the core reality of a person
persisting from the beginning to the end of one’s life. Each unique pattern contains all the

divine reality. This was not the cause of physical death but it gave to that experience the spiritual dimension
of mortality. Self-concious beings could anticipate their future death, but at the same time they had become
divorced from the God who is the only ground for hope of a destiny beyond that death. Thus humanity
became prey to that sadness and frustration at the thought of human transience. . . . In that sense ‘death’—
the bitterness of mortality—had truly come into the world and passed to all. I think this interpretation does
the theological work that Paul wants it to do in Romans 5” (ibid.).
56

“There is no natural hope of a destiny beyond death, a story that science could tell us in terms of
its ‘horizontal’ account of what happens now. But that is not the only story to be told. Religion can tell the
‘vertical’ story of God’s faithfulness, and that story undergirds the hope, already manifested by Jesus’
resurrection, that the last word does not lie with death but with God” (John C. Polkinghorne and Nicholas
Beale, Questions of Truth: Fifty-One Responses to Questions About God, Science, and Belief (Louisville,
KY: Westminster John Knox, 2009), 22).
57

Polkinghorne, The God of Hope and the End of the World, 108. Polkinghorne’s reasons for
rejecting dualism can be found in Polkinghorne, Science and Theology: An Introduction, 54. Elsewhere he
indicates that “Christianity is not concerned with a claim that there is human survival because there is an
intrinsically immortal, purely spiritual, part in our being. The ground of hope for a destiny beyond death
does not lie in human nature at all, but in divine, steadfast love” (ibid., 115).
58

Polkinghorne, The God of Hope and the End of the World, 105-106. “Whatever the human soul
may be, it is surely what expresses and carries the continuity of living personhood. . . . The soul must be the
‘real me’ that links the boy of childhood to the ageing academic of later life. If that carrier of continuity is
not a separate spiritual component, what else could it be? It is certainly not merely material. . . . What does
appear to be the carrier of continuity is the immensely complex ‘information-bearing pattern’ in which that
matter is organised. This pattern is not static; it is modified as we acquire new experiences, insights and
memories, in accordance with the dynamic of our living history. It is this information-bearing pattern that is
the soul.” Elsewhere he writes along the same lines, “Whatever it may actually be, the soul is presumably
what one might call ‘the real me’, the essence of my particular personhood. . . . It certainly is not just a
crude material continuity, for that does not really exist. The atoms in our bodies are changing all the time.
. . . Atoms are not the carriers of human continuity, but the real me is surely constituted by the almost
infinitely complex information-bearning pattern in which these atoms are organised. . . . My soul is the
pattern that is me” (Polkinghorne, Science and the Trinity: The Christian Encounter with Reality, 161).
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experiences, memories, and knowledge of each individual. It is the form of the body, and when
the body dissipates at death, the soul is also dissolved.59 Even though the soul is not inherently
immortal, it does perdure post-mortem, linking the past life to the future life, thus preserving its
unique identity.60 Where, then, does the soul proceed following death? Polkinghorne explains that
the soul continues to exist because it is held only in the divine memory, not outside of it.61 But,
the fact that the soul is preserved in the divine memory, does not constitute living beyond death
because it is intrinsic for psychsomatic unities to be embodied.
If embodiment is essential for true humanhood, then each soul should be re-embodied at
the resurrection. The possibility of a resurrection will require a direct act of God in order for these
souls to be revitalized, not through resuscitated bodies, but as new creations with new material
bodies, translated from the conditions characterized by entropy, to serve as the carrier of
continuity.62 He explicates:
Thus the Christian hope centres on a real death followed by a real resurrection, brought about
through the power and merciful faithfulness of God. . . . If human beings are psychosomatic
unities, then the persons reconstituted in the divine act of resurrection must have new bodies
to act as the carriers of the soul. It is not necessary, however, that the ‘matter’ of these bodies
should be the same matter as makes up the flesh of this present world. In fact, it is essential
that it should not be. That is because the material bodies of this world are intrinsically subject
to mortality and decay. If the resurrected life is to be a true fulfilment, and not just a repeat of
an ultimately futile history, the bodies of that world-to-come must be different, for they will
be everlastingly redeemed from mortality. Science knows only the matter of this world but it
59

Polkinghorne, Science and Theology: An Introduction, 115.
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Polkinghorne, The God of Hope and the End of the World, 107. “There is, therefore, no intrinsic
immortality associated with the soul in this way of understanding it. Death is a real end. However, it need
not be an ultimate end, for in Christian understanding only God is ultimate. It is a perfectly coherent hope
that the pattern that is a human being could be held in the divine memory after that person’s death” (ibid.).
Polkinghorne grounds his belief in Mark 12.18-27, which closes with the text that God “is not the God of
the dead, but of the living.”
61

Ibid.
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Ibid., 113.
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cannot forbid theology to believe that God is capable of bringing about something totally
new.63
The Four Last Things

The Four Last Things, death, judgment, heaven, and hell, have been the center of
traditional Christian eschatology. Polkinghorne argues in favor of a universal
eschatology, but these four are also pertinent to an individual eschatology. This
penultimate section examines Polkinghorne’s view on their nature.
Death
In addition to physical death, Scripture does mention spiritual death (Eph 2.1-2) and
eternal death (e.g., Rev 21.8). Of these three types of death, Polkinghorne prefers to concentrate
on the origin of physical death.64 As previously mentioned,65 physical death, according to
Polkinghorne, cannot be understood as the consequence of sin:
There has been a strong Christian tradition . . . that sees human death as the consequence of
human sin. Paul expressed the idea when he wrote to the Romans concerning Adam that ‘just
as sin came into the world through one man and death came through sin, so death spread to
all because all have sinned’ (Romans 5:12). With our evolutionary understanding of the
63

Polkinghorne, Science and Theology: An Introduction, 115-116. Daly argues that the “faith of
the Church has been from the start that what was raised from the dead was a body and not simply a soul, a
spirit, a memory, or an inspiration. The trouble is that we have no language to describe a ‘body’ which is no
longer in our time and space. . . . Christians have no business taking refuge in gnostic dualism as a
stratagem for dealing with problems of creation ex nihilo and bodily resurrection from the dead. We may
not know how to describe a risen body, but that does not license us to disregard its existence. . . .
Revelation tells us nothing about the physical properties of risen bodies. . . . To profess faith in the
resurrection of the body. . . does not entail the ability to describe the characteristics of a risen body.
Equally, to express ignorance about the characteristics of a risen body does not prohibit one from
professing faith in bodily resurrection” (Daly, Creation and Redemption, 101).
64

Perhaps he has spiritual death in mind when he writes, “Those who knowingly turn from God in
his world will find it correspondingly more painful and more difficult to make that turn of repentance if it is
delayed to the life to come” (Polkinghorne, The God of Hope and the End of the World, 128). Eternal death
for Polkinghorne seems to be irrelevant on account of his universalist approach to soteriology. See the
subsequent sections on judgment, heaven, and hell.
65

Refer to pages 74-75.
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history of terrestrial life and of hominid origins, we can no longer hold this view literally in
relation to the fact of physical death.66
However, Polkinghorne does believe that the biblical text, in “mythic mode,” must have
been analogous to the history of past descendants. He speculates that at some point in the distant
past, these ancestors turned away and estranged themselves from God. This estrangement was
“not the cause of physical death,” and as humanity gradually developed into self-conscious
beings, they could now anticipate their death. Polkinghorne concludes it is in “that sense that
‘death’—the bitterness of mortality—had truly come into the world and passed to all.”67
Judgment
Polkinghorne defines judgment as “the acknowledgement of moral seriousness.”68 He
speculates that a salvific process will include purgation and judgment as cleansing elements of
each individual. He labels this judgment “purgatorial judgment,” believing that the judgment is a
process of human self-exposure, not a verdict.69 He writes:
Take that haunting parable of judgement, the sheep and the goats (Matthew 25:31-46). To the
sheep the Lord says . . . To the goats, the Lord says the opposite. . . . These words present us
with a formidable challenge, but if we take them seriously, do we find ourselves
unambiguously in one company or the other? . . . We are neither wholly sheep nor wholly
goat. Perhaps then, judgement is not simply a retrospective assessment of what we have been
but it includes the prospective offer of what we might become. . . . Perhaps judgement builds
up the sheep and diminishes the goat in each one of us.70
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Polkinghorne, The God of Hope and the End of the World, 125-126.
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Ibid., 126. See also Polkinghorne, Science and Theology: An Introduction, 63-65. Could not this
alienation from God, this loss of sensitivity or spiritual deadness be what Scripture describes as spiritual
death (Eph 2.1-2)?
68

Polkinghorne, The God of Hope and the End of the World, 129. “God is a holy God whose
kingdom is the realm of moral purity. . . . The cross of Christ is the measure of the costliness of divine
forgiveness. Sin is no trivial matter, but it is in fact a deadly matter (Romans 6:23), a spiritual gangrene that
must be dealt with by excision. Judgment is the acknowledgment of moral seriousness” (ibid.). How should
Polkinghorne’s usage of Rom 6.23 be read and interpreted? In this last passage, he seems to use it
univocally, but he affirms that death is the result of a continuous creation, not as a result of the Fall. See
sections in chapter 3.
69

Ibid., 130.
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Ibid., 129-130.
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For Polkinghorne, viewing judgment as an encounter with self is a hopeful image. It will
one day come to an end, followed by the gradual unveiling of the divine nature.
Heaven
Even though Polkinghorne does not thoroughly examine the concept of heaven,
he does provides a brief sketch of his understanding of a heavenly life. First, there is an unsolved
tension in Polkinghorne’s soteriology. He appears to be partial to a universalist understanding of
soteriology,71 yet, he does not believe that God’s offer of mercy is irresistable.72 Second,
Polkinghorne does not equate heaven with the perfect life on earth, but he does view it as a place
of unlimited progress because humanity will participate in an endless process of divine selfrevelation. “The life of heaven will be lived in the presence of the divine reality, but the
exploration by finite creatures of the infinite riches of that reality will be unending. We shall enter
further and further into that panentheistic experience.”73
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Polkinghorne, The Faith of a Physicist: Reflections of a Bottom-up Thinker: The Gifford
Lectures for 1993-4, 171. The following quotes seem to suggest that the love of God is bound to eventually
save all. He writes, “If what I have said is true, it follows that there cannot be a kind of curtain which
comes down at death, dividing humanity irreversibly into the companies of the saved and of the damned.
God’s loving offer of mercy cannot be for the term of our earthly life alone, so that it is withdrawn after
three score years and ten” (ibid.). Elsewhere he adds, “I do not think that it will only be those who have
made a definite commitment to God in this life who will participate in salvation. The decisions and actions
we take in this life are certainly very important and it is spiritually damaging wilfully to turn from God, but
the divine love and mercy are not on limited offer for this life only. There will surely be further
opportunities to turn to God in the clearer light of the world to come” (Polkinghorne, Science and Religion
in Quest of Truth, 108-109).
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Polkinghorne, The Faith of a Physicist: Reflections of a Bottom-up Thinker: The Gifford
Lectures for 1993-4, 171. Polkinghorne sees this unresolved tension in Scripture. He writes, “But will there
be those who will refuse the divine pardon and purgation for ever, or in the end will all be saved (even
Hitler and Stalin)? It is well known that the New Testament seems sometimes to speak in universalist terms
(e.g., Rom. 11.32; 1 Cor. 15.22) and sometimes in terms of some who will be lost (e.g., Matt. 25.46; Rom.
2.6-11). I cannot believe that God will ever foreclose on his loving offer of mercy, but equally I do not
believe he will override the human freedom to refuse” (ibid.).
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Polkinghorne, The God of Hope and the End of the World, 132-133. “What awaits us is the
unending exploration of the inexhaustible riches of God, a pilgrim journey into deepest reality that will
always be thrilling and life-enhancing. ‘What no eye has seen, nor ear heard, nor human heart conceived,
what God has prepared for those who love him’ (I Corinthians 2:9; derived from Isaiah 64:4)” (ibid., 135).
See also Polkinghorne, Science and Religion in Quest of Truth, 108.
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Third, heaven, according to Polkinghorne, will be impervious to a second Fall. What
assures the eternal security of heaven? Polkinghorne says it is the “openness of the new creation
to its Creator, divine persuasion will indeed be that which brings about the divine will, without
violence to the freedom of the creature.”
The sinful distortions of this life often make people misapprehend in grievously hurtful ways
where the good actually lies. In the clear light of the divine presence, shining in the new
creation, such disastrous errors will no longer be possible. We shall see the good, and freely
and totally consent to it. Our wills and our desires will be turned by love. That will be the free
source of celestial stability.74
Hell
The reality of hell is suspect in Polkinghorne’s eschatology. By subscribing to
universalism, the purpose and relevancy of a hell diminishes because “God’s offer of mercy and
forgiveness,” according to Polkinghorne, “is not withdrawn at death but, rather, divine love is
everlasting.”75 Polkinghorne rejects the classic notion of hell, a place of endless torture where a
vindictive God casts people who did not make a commitment to him during their earthly years.
This view of hell is rejected on account of its incompatibility with a loving God and the
purposelessness of being created.76
If hell does exist, who would occupy it and what would it be like? Polkinghorne
speculates that if hell is populated, it is because they deliberately chose to be there, not because
they were cast there by God. Hell is a place where people remain in alienation from God,
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Polkinghorne, The God of Hope and the End of the World, 134.
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Ibid., 136.
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Ibid., 138. Polkinghorne believes that thinking about hell as a place of eternal torment has been
largely abandoned. “This has come about, not through surrender to a secular sentimentality, but through the
realization of its incompatibility with the mercy of a loving God, who cannot be conceived to exact infinite
punishment for finite wrong. Theology has proven itself to be open to correction” (Polkinghorne, The Faith
of a Physicist: Reflections of a Bottom-up Thinker: The Gifford Lectures for 1993-4, 172).
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believing they can live without his grace.77 He also describes it as a place of “unending boredom,
painted grey, because the divine life that is life indeed has been excluded from it by its
inhabitants.”78
Summary and Conclusions
Scientific cosmology presents a futile and hopeless future for creation. This
meaninglessness is met by biblical eschatology which provides meaning and relevancy to the
universe and its history. Polkinghorne interprets creation as being a two-stage process, and he
believes that because of the eternal faithfulness and purposes of God, God will directly intervene
in the bringing forth of a new creation following the eradication of death. This new creation is the
center of eschatology.
His reading of biblical eschatology and its new creation is based on a relatively univocal
reading of Scripture. However, an element of inconsistency arises in Polkinghorne’s
understanding of biblical univocity in connection with his theological interpretation between
protology and eschatology. On the one hand, Polkinghorne rejects the scriptural descriptions of
the origins of the original creation already in tune with its Creator as narrated in Gen 1-2 and the
fall of humanity. On the other hand, he agrees largely with the scriptural descriptions of the new
creation and their deeper existential encounter through direct divine intervention.
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John C. Polkinghorne, Living with Hope: A Scientist Looks at Advent, Christmas, and Epiphany
(London: SPCK, 2003), 58-59. “When we thought about the Fall, we saw that its real meaning lay in
human alienation from God and the mistaken belief that we can go it alone without need for the help of
divine grace. Hell is the place where that mistake continues to be made for ever. It is the setting of an
unremitting refusal to allow ourselves ever to attain to the fulfilment of the true humanity that God intends
for us. We can only hope and pray that in the end no one will persist everlastingly in that defiance of God’s
mercy. If that is the case, then hell will be empty, and we may be sure that this would be in accord with
God’s good will for human destiny” (ibid.).
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Polkinghorne, Science and Religion in Quest of Truth, 109. “If hell is the place where the divine
life has been deliberately excluded, then some have thought that its inhabitants will eventually fade away
into nothingness, because the divine Spirit has habitually been denied its sustaining work in their lives”
(Polkinghorne, The God of Hope and the End of the World, 137).
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This inconsistency in the interpretation of biblical language leads to the following
question: If words that describe earthly things cannot be taken univocally, for example,
Polkinghorne’s protology, then similar words should not be applied to heavenly things in a
relatively univocal way.
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CHAPTER V
CRITICAL DISCUSSION AND EVALUATION: SUMMARY
AND CONCLUSION
Summary
The first chapter of this thesis introduced the problem of the appearance of internal
methodological and theological incoherence of the contrastive roles of Scripture in John
Polkinghorne’s writings. Chapter 2 surveyed Polkinghorne’s methodology in science and
theology. Chapters 3 and 4 compared and contrasted Polkinghorne’s protology and eschatology in
the context of science and theology. This study demonstrated that elements of consistency and
elements of incoherence seem to exist in his interpretation.
The present chapter is a critical discussion and evaluation of Polkinghorne’s protology
and eschatology. This chapter will provide a succint overview of what seem to be internal
consistencies and inconsistencies within his hermeneutic for the construction of his protology and
eschatology. This study then finishes with a conclusion and recommendations for further
research.
A Critique of Polkinghorne’s Protology and Eschatology
Polkinghorne should be commended for advocating dialoague between science and
theology while attempting to make the latter relevant in a skeptical world. He is also to be
commended for proposing that science is not the only discipline able to discover and search for
truth. Yet, there are elements of hermeneutical inconsistency. To illustrate, an inconsistency
arises in connection with Polkinghorne’s theological interpretation of protology and eschatology.
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In terms of protology, Polkinghorne believes that science has authority to impose itself on
theology based on epistemelogical reasoning. He rejects the scriptural descriptions of the original
creation with no direct divine intervention and the fall of humanity as a univocal reading of
Genesis indicates. Polkinghorne accepts cosmic and biological evolutionary history stretching
over billions of years and revises and reinterprets the creation narratives of Scripture in light of
scientific knowledge.
With regard to protology, Polkinghorne has conceded much to science, giving its
interpretation of nature full credibility. Because of his overreliance on science, Polkinghorne
accepts a full evolutionary view of protology, which leads him to reject a univocal reading of Gen
1-2, and to reinterpret it in accordance to secular science.
In addition to the reinterpretation of Gen 1-2, Polkinghorne, through the theological
concepts of ex nihilo and creatio continua, adapts a rational strategy to support what he considers
well-motivated belief and his bottom-up reflection on theology, including his critical realism and
revised natural theology. The anthropic fine-tuning of natural laws leads him to believe that these
laws constitute signs of a cosmic Mind and Purpose. He then assumes that God is a rational
being, and that rational creatures can get a glimpse of the deep intelligibility of the physical
universe.
However, in regard to eschatology, Polkinghorne holds a high view of Scripture. He
postulates that God will miraculously usher in the new creation, agreeing largely with the
scriptural descriptions of a new creation with direct divine intervention following the eradication
of death. Polkinghorne acknowledges that there is a definite contradiction between the futuristic
predictions of scientific cosmology and biblical eschatology. He accepts biblical eschatology in
spite of scientific cosmology’s negative prediction that all life in the universe will perish.
Polkinghorne’s hope is based on the eternal faithfulness of God and the resurrection of Jesus, and
his reading of biblical eschatology and its new creation is based on an apparent and relative
univocal reading of Scripture.
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Concerning Scripture, Polkinghorne claims there is an evolution from the primitive to the
more developed; still, he engages with Scripture seriously, acknowledging that it does contain
some propositional truth. Polkinghorne subordinates parts of Scripture to science and other parts
to theology. To illustrate this point, Polkinghorne sandwiches eschatology in the middle of two
biblical doctrines: Creation and Christology. In regard to Christology, the Incarnation and bodily
resurrection of Christ, and his full divinity are non-negotiables for Polkinghorne. He also holds
that eschatology is a non-negotioable. These doctrines belong to theology and he interprets their
language in an apparent and relative univocal manner.
Yet, this apparent manner of univocal interpretation is dissimilar in regard to the doctrine
of Creation. The current state of science dictates that the evolutionary process of creation is a
non-negotiable, whereas the biblical doctrine of Creation is negotiable. This point of sciencetheology convergence is acceptable for Polkinghorne because he holds that Scripture can be
updated as science advances in knowledge because the theological language of Creation is
symbolic. For Polkinghorne, the doctrine of creation is the property of science. This becomes
more evident because Polkinghorne views death not as a consequence of sin but as a necessary
element for a universe that has been endowed with properties to create itself. Polkinghorne’s
kenotic theology allows him to align an almost autonomous creation with secular science because
God voluntarily limits himself to make room for creation to be truly free.
The question rises, what criteria does Polkinghorne present to distinguish between
univocal and non-univocal literature in Scripture? Is it reason, faith, or both? Does authority
reside in Scripture or in a theological interpretation of Scripture? Polkinghorne does not clearly
state his criteria for maintaining this distinction. He does not blindly follow science, rather he
limits science to protology only, so there is a critical principle involved, but it is not clearly
stated. Could this imply that science could be limited even more? In addition, Polkinghorne does
not explain his criteria for identifying which doctrines should be revised; he simply assumes it.
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Further, according to Polkinghorne, theological language is the language of symbol, even
though symbolic stories still communicate theological and non-theological propositions.
Polkinghorne holds the belief that some traditional biblical doctrines need to be revised and
reformulated where there is dissonance or overlapping with science. He runs the danger of
oversimpifying because scriptural assertions address the questions of science to some extent.
For internal consistency, if theological language in protology is to be symbolic, then
eschatological language should be symbolic as well. If eschatological language is interpreted and
understood in an apparent and relative univocal manner, then theological language in protology
should also be be interpreted and understood in an apparent and relative univocal manner.
Conclusions
Polkinghorne is clear that both science and theology are seeking for real truth about the
universe. He opts for consonance between the two disciplines because both science and theology
have their own domain. He strongly resists the notion that theology should be absorbed by
science.1 For Polkinghorne, theology provides coherent and intellecutaly satisfying answers to
questions that go beyond the realm of science. Even though theology has its own conceptual
autonomy, through revisions, theology must be consistent with the cosmological claims of
modern science regarding origins where science-theology overlapping is present.2
The challenge is to maintain in balance preservation and innovation in theology, and

1

Polkinghorne, Science and Theology: An Introduction, 117-118. “Theology has a due autonomy
that science must respect, in just the same way that science’s deliberations are not open to theological
control and interference. Yet knowledge is one and created reality is one (insights theologically
underwritten by the unity of God) and so there must be some interrelationship between the insights and
discourse of theology and the insights and discourse of science. . . . There remains the question of where,
within the spectrum of relationships bounded by absorption at one end and total independence at the other,
a balanced account of the interaction between science and theology is to be located” (ibid.).
2

Ibid., 118. Polkinghorne writes, “Theology must respect what science has to say about the
evolving processes of the universe.” But he also states that “science is in no position to place constraints on
how theology finds that it must understand this unique phenomenon, using terms that are adequate to the
motivating evidence” (ibid.).
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Polkinghorne attains this by employing a dual hermeneutic for interpreting Scripture. This dual
hermeneutic is evident in Polkinghorne’s symbolic interpretation of biblical protology and his
apparent and relative univocal interpretation of biblical eschatology.
In sum, it is evident that this tension suggests a problem in his hermeneutics that affects
his theological understanding of protology and eschatology. If scientific cosmology is not to be
believed regarding biblical eschatology, then why should it be believed regarding biblical
protology?
Further Research Needed
This study documented that there is a contrast in Polkinghorne’s usage of Scripture
between his protology and his eschatology. Further research should be pursued in at least two
areas in Polkinghorne’s hermeneutics. First, further work remains to be done as to why
Polkinghorne interprets eschatology in an apparent and relative univocal fashion. Polkinghorne is
consonant with modern cosmology, and it is clear why he rejects a univocal reading of biblical
protology. However, the same cannot be said of his apparent and relative univocal reading of
eschatology.
Second, with regard to critical realism, how does this epistemological position relate, if at
all, to Polkinghorne’s eschatology? This question deserves to be explored because critical realism
has been the subject of criticism in its interpretation of natural phenomena. Since this is the case,
can there even be a relation between critical realism and eschatology? Future research may prove
useful in answering these questions.
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